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It is our humble pleasure to present this special issue of 
the APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy. This issue 
brings together a variety of diverse voices to refect on the 
experiences, challenges, barriers, and joys of pursuing 
philosophy from the position of a frst-generation student 
and/or person from a low socioeconomic background. 
This issue grew out of a number of conversations we, 
Arianna Falbo and Heather Stewart, have had about 
diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives in the discipline 
of philosophy. Over the course of these conversations, we 
observed that despite the increased attention to matters 
of diversity in the profession (and eforts to “diversify” 
the profession), meaningful conversations about frst-
generation status, socioeconomic class, poverty, and the 
signifcance of these experiences in the lives of those 
who do (or do not) choose to pursue philosophy were 
generally lacking. This is a problem, we believe, because 
class-related concerns oftentimes pose signifcant barriers 
to entering into, and successfully remaining within, the 
feld. Thus, it’s imperative that more careful attention be 
given to these topics and that more serious conversations 
about issues of class status in the profession are had, 
especially among those with the power to increase support 
for members (or would-be members) of our discipline from 
these backgrounds. 
In an efort to spark such conversations, we organized 
a session at the 2020 Eastern Division meeting of the 
American Philosophical Association, held in Philadelphia, 
PA. The session (which shared its name with this issue) 
brought together four panelists to share and refect on their 
experiences as frst-generation students and/or students 
from working-class backgrounds or conditions of poverty. 
We are delighted that two of the panelists, Ashley Lamarre 
and Zinhle ka’Nobuhlaluse, have developed and expanded 
upon their presentation from the session in a contribution 
for this issue. (For an overview of the highlights from 
this session, you can fnd it on the Blog of the APA.) The 
panel was very well received, and many attendees of the 
session and other colleagues encouraged us to keep this 
conversation going. This issue is an efort to do so. 
Before discussing the contents of the issue itself, it is worth 
situating ourselves in relation to its content. We come to 
this topic as a matter of having deep personal connections 
to it. That is, we both personally share in some of the 
experiences refected by the issue’s authors, and have come 
to philosophy from positions typically underrepresented in 
the feld. 
Arianna is a frst-generation college student. Neither of her 
parents attended college, and her father, an immigrant 
who moved to Canada from Italy, left high school in the 
tenth grade to take a job working in a steel fabrication 
factory in order to support his family. Arianna is among 
the frst in her immediate and extended family to receive 
any graduate or professional schooling. Her parents have 
instilled in her the importance of ambition and a strong 
work ethic, and she holds tightly onto these values as she 
progresses through graduate school. Refecting upon the 
hard work of her parents, as well as her grandparents and 
generations before them, she feels incredibly fortunate 
to have had the opportunity to go to university and to be 
currently pursuing a doctoral degree. This is an opportunity 
that simply wasn’t in the cards for her parents, and she 
recognizes that her schooling is the direct result of their 
sacrifce and determination to provide opportunities to 
their children which they never had. For Arianna, college 
was an awkward and uncomfortable time of intellectual 
and personal growth. Everyone else in her classes seemed 
to know what they were doing and how everything worked; 
they were confdent and in control. But she always felt out 
of place, anxious, and confused. Growing up, she had few 
examples of what post-secondary education was like, and 
it took a long time for her to gain the confdence needed 
to feel at ease in philosophy classes. Arianna is indebted 
to a handful of inspiring mentors, who she looks up to and 
respects, not only as brilliant and careful philosophers, 
but also as supportive, genuinely good, and down-to-
earth people, who have helped her to fnd her voice in 
the philosophy classroom, and to fnd her place in the 
profession more broadly. She owes much of her intellectual 
growth and success in the feld to their continued support; 
she wouldn’t be doing philosophy today had she not had 
their guidance. 
Heather is also the frst in her family to attend college or 
university, and comes from a working-poor background. 




After her father, a factory worker, passed away suddenly 
when Heather and her brother, Sean, were young children, 
Heather’s stay-at-home mother, Alice, became a single, 
stay-at-home mother. Their family of three managed to get 
by, thanks to a vast array of social safety-net programs, 
until Heather’s mom remarried when Heather was in high 
school. Heather’s step-father, Barry, is also a blue-collar 
factory worker. Growing up, Heather’s parents always 
supported her and her brother’s many interests, and 
particularly, Heather’s boundless curiosity and love of 
reading, writing, and thinking. Heather and her Ma made 
frequent visits to the local library to check out massive 
stacks of books, which Heather would inevitably devour 
far too quickly. Heather’s mother always prioritized using 
the small bits of disposable cash she had on materials to 
fuel the intellectual fre sparking in Heather: subscriptions 
to National Geographic and Scholastic Kids magazines, 
and even encyclopedias the family would receive by mail. 
Though she never received a post-secondary education of 
her own, Heather’s mom made every efort to foster a love 
of learning in Heather; even when fnances were tight, she 
found creative ways to keep Heather engaged. Heather 
bounced through a number of public schools before 
graduating with a keen desire to go to university. With a 
combination of scholarships, grants, and a hefty amount 
of student loans, she was able to do so, becoming the frst 
in her family to pursue and receive a university education. 
Heather’s brother, Sean, has worked a series of jobs after 
high school, and is currently pursuing his own passion— 
professional wrestling. Where Heather grew up, furthering 
one’s education is a luxury, not a given. And Heather feels 
unimaginably fortunate every single day for the invaluable 
mentorship she has had to help her along her educational 
journey, from a terrifed undergraduate working multiple 
part-time jobs and agonizing over accruing student loans 
to her current self, months away from completing her PhD 
(and still having no idea how exactly that happened). 
It is from these personal experiences that we conceived of 
this project, and from these perspectives that we present 
this issue to you. Before doing so, we ofer an overview of 
the issue’s contents, themes, and goals. 
To begin, let us explain our reasons for our choice of title, 
“Outsiders Within: Refections on Being a First-Generation 
and/or Low-Income Philosopher.” In using the terminology 
of “outsiders within,” we are indebted to Black feminist 
scholar Patricia Hill Collins.1 In coining the term, Collins 
highlights the unique experiences of Black women 
entering the academy. The concept of the “outsider within” 
is used by Collins to underscore how one’s belonging 
to a social group, and that group’s situatedness within a 
particular historical context—pertaining to race, gender, 
and socioeconomic disparities and inequalities—has the 
potential to contribute to and enrich their perspective on 
the social world. As it relates to this issue, we draw upon 
Collins’s concept of the “outsider within” as a powerful 
hermeneutic tool. In later work, Collins says: 
I now use the term outsider-within to describe social 
locations or border spaces occupied by groups 
of unequal power. Individuals claim identities 
as outsiders within; by their placement in these 
social locations. Thus, outsider-within identities 
are situational identities that are attached to 
specifc histories of social injustice—they are not a 
decontextualized identity category divorced from 
historical social inequalities that can be assumed 
by anyone at will. What I aim to do with this shift 
is refocus attention back on the unequal power 
relations of race, class, and gender that produce 
social locations characterized by injustice.2 
The status of the outsider within is apt in the case of 
philosophers who come from poor or working-class 
backgrounds and/or who are frst-generation (especially 
when compiled with additional intersectional experiences 
of oppression and/or disadvantage) because such 
philosophers often fnd themselves straddling two 
disparate social worlds with stark diferences in power, 
norms, values, and social status. This perspective and 
experience of being an outsider within the academy is 
prevalent in the narratives and shared experiences in this 
volume. This concept helps to home in upon the unique 
perspectives of philosophers in the academy who are 
frst-generation and/or who come from disadvantaged 
socioeconomic backgrounds, as well as the important 
intersectional diferences between them, and the critical 
insights they bring to discussions of diversity and inclusion 
in the profession. 
There are a number of themes which have emerged across 
the pieces included in this issue that are important to 
note. The frst is the theme of double alienation: of feeling 
alienated or, as though one is an outsider, upon entering 
into academic philosophy as someone from a working-class 
and/or frst generation-background, while at the same time 
feeling alienated and less able to relate to one’s family and 
home communities as a result of one’s academic lifestyle. 
Fitting into an academic environment oftentimes requires 
that one navigate a social space structured by prestige and 
social hierarchy. One is forced to submerge themselves in a 
world of new culture, norms, and expectations. Oftentimes, 
trying to ft in with the norms and lifestyle of the academy 
results in a weakening of the connections to one’s previous 
home life: missing important milestones (e.g., weddings, 
births, funerals); being unable to help and support loved 
ones at home because of one’s academic obligations and 
geographical seclusion (often resulting in failures to “carry 
the mental weight” of their hardships, resulting in what 
Lucia Munguia’s contribution categorizes as a potential 
instance of “epistemic shame”); feeling unable to fully 
communicate and share your academic life with family and 
friends back home, many of whom might not understand 
the value or point of pursuing a life as a philosopher. All 
the while, many philosophers from socioeconomically 
disadvantaged and frst-generation backgrounds feel 
importantly diferent from their more privileged peers in 
the academy, and often fnd it difcult to relate to their 
colleagues, or to fnd sources of community and support 
within academic spaces. Several contributions to this 
volume bring to the fore how frst-generation and/or 
socioeconomically disadvantaged philosophers often fnd 
themselves doubly alienated—feeling as though they are an 
outsider in academic settings, and in the process of trying 
to ft in and to cultivate a sense of belonging in academic 
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spaces, they fnd themselves becoming increasingly more 
distant from their previous home life or communities. In 
efect, such philosophers are often in the position of being 
outsiders within the academy and, in a sense, outsiders
outside of the academy as well—traveling between two 
worlds, neither of which feels wholly comfortable. 
Related to the idea of double alienation is the feeling of 
imposter syndrome. Imposter syndrome refers to the 
experience that underrepresented people have of feeling 
as if their “external markers of success are unwarranted,” 
and subsequently “fear being revealed as a fraud.”3 
When those around you—your classmates, peers, and 
professors—all seem to represent a fairly homogenous 
group, it can be difcult for outsiders to see themselves as 
really belonging in those spaces, or to feel as if they have 
something meaningful to contribute. Many of the pieces 
in this issue ofer frst-person accounts of experiencing 
oneself as an “imposter,” and, importantly, at diferent 
stages throughout one’s philosophical journey (e.g., Kayla 
Aceves describes experiencing imposter syndrome as 
an undergraduate student, while Bailie Peterson makes 
clear that imposter syndrome often persists, even as one 
completes a PhD and lands an academic job). While our 
focus in this issue is on matters of socioeconomic and frst-
generation status (and thus, the imposter syndrome that 
results from feeling like an outsider among one’s peers 
and professors on those grounds), it is worth noting that 
for those who are members of other social groups that are 
underrepresented in the profession (e.g., women, BIPOC, 
LGBTQ+ individuals, folks with disabilities, and as Brady 
Heiner (this issue) adds, formerly incarcerated folks), the 
sense of imposter syndrome can be multiplied. When 
members of our profession who experience this sort of 
imposter syndrome are not well supported, it can cause 
real damage: anxiety, self-doubt, and withdrawal. 
Widespread experiences of alienation and imposter 
syndrome bring to light the importance of mentorship and 
community with others who share one’s experiences. This, 
too, is a theme that runs through many pieces in this issue. 
Many of the contributors, in describing their experiences in 
the profession, cite the exceptional value they have found 
in sharing their experiences with other philosophers who 
share similar life histories and backgrounds. In refecting 
upon the obscure and unwieldy journey that one takes 
in pursuing a career in academic philosophy, Jennifer 
Morton’s piece highlights the importance of fnding 
community, and fnding others who can “laugh along 
with you at the absurdity.” Similarly, in her piece, Aceves, 
who has recently fnished an undergraduate degree in 
philosophy at University of California, San Diego, discusses 
the value in fnding community with other philosophy 
majors (most of whom were transfer students) who shared 
similar experiences of feeling lost and as though they didn’t 
belong in the philosophy classroom. Aceves says: “We 
could share and bond over the experiences of feeling like 
the odd-one-out in a classroom.” This need for community 
is also expressed in the piece from Ashley Lamarre and 
Zinhle ka’Nobuhlaluse, who describe the importance of 
sisterhood and solidarity that they found in each other as 
Black women from working-class backgrounds collaborating 
and building networks of mutual support in competitive 
academic spaces. John Proios’s contribution emphasizes 
the importance for underprivileged philosophers (with a 
focus on graduate students) to cultivate an “oppositional 
consciousness,” understood as a critical standpoint which 
helps to preserve one’s sense of self and further facilitates 
bonds of community and solidarity among students who 
come to academic philosophy from low-income and/or 
frst-generation backgrounds. Other contributions also 
emphasized the key role of faculty mentorship and support 
for frst-generation students and students who come from 
poverty. The pieces from Elvira Basevich and Bailie Peterson 
(among others) highlight concrete recommendations 
for how faculty and administrators in positions of power 
can help to make academic philosophy more accessible 
to students from low-income and frst-generation 
backgrounds. 
Finally, we would be remiss not to mention the many 
practical challenges and fnancial barriers frst-generation 
and/or students from low-income backgrounds face 
when deciding to pursue philosophy. While many frst-
generation and socioeconomically disadvantaged people 
face barriers to obtaining a higher education at all (and 
often incur substantial debt to do so), there is often added 
pressure to pursue a lucrative degree or career—one that 
can potentially lift oneself and their family out of poverty 
or otherwise provide an opportunity for upward mobility. 
For such students, the decision to pursue philosophy (with 
its perpetually grim job prospects) can be particularly 
weighty (even when, as Elvira Basevich describes, they 
have fallen in love with it). For all students, regardless of 
class standing, the decision to study philosophy can refect 
a signifcant fnancial risk, especially when one acquires 
debt in the process. However, this risk is heightened for 
people without familial wealth or fnancial safety nets to fall 
back on should they not fnd a stable job post graduation. 
When students from socioeconomically disadvantaged 
backgrounds fnd themselves in graduate programs, 
they often experience fnancial hardship throughout— 
experiences many of their peers can alleviate by drawing 
on family support. Graduate stipends tend to be marginal, 
often barely covering living costs for a single person (let 
alone one’s dependents, should they have them, or should 
they need to send money to family or loved ones back 
home). Many graduate students fnd themselves taking 
on additional work (e.g., adjunct-teaching, or outside part-
time jobs) to make ends meet. This can, of course, slow 
or hinder progression towards their degree, and place 
them at a disadvantage relative to peers who might be 
positioned to devote most of their time to their graduate 
work (this experience isn’t by any means unique to graduate 
students, and is also felt at the undergraduate level, as the 
piece from Kayla Aceves makes clear). Furthermore, for 
socioeconomically disadvantaged graduate students or 
precariously employed junior scholars, many dimensions of 
professional life and activity might be of limits entirely (e.g., 
they might not be able to pay out of pocket for conference 
costs while awaiting reimbursement; or, they might not 
have credit cards or sufcient credit to book hotel rooms or 
fights). This, in turn, can exclude such philosophers from 
critical professionalization and networking opportunities, 
often at points in their career trajectory when they are most 
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important. Finally, when socioeconomically disadvantaged 
people do successfully complete graduate degrees in 
philosophy, they might end up pushed out of the feld as a 
result of job insecurity, compounded by a lack of fnancial 
fallbacks. People without fnancial support or stability 
cannot, for example, go on the job market year after year 
hoping to secure a permanent job. As such, some of 
the voices that the discipline needs the most might fnd 
themselves leaving it out of fnancial necessity. 
We raise these concerns because, though they pose 
serious, tangible barriers to members of our profession 
who come from underprivileged-class backgrounds, they 
might go unnoticed by those with the power to enact 
more support for frst-generation and socioeconomically 
disadvantaged students. Often, such fnancial concerns 
are fairly far removed from more senior people in the feld, 
or those in administrative positions. We hope to place 
these issues on the radar of those with professional and 
institutional power, who we hope will come to see them as 
critical dimensions of equity, inclusion, and justice in our 
profession moving forward. 
With these themes and concerns in mind, we now ofer a 
taste of what is to come in this issue. 
First, Jennifer Morton’s piece, “Flourishing in the Academy: 
Complicity and Compromise,” brings together a wealth of 
insights on a range of topics facing frst-generation and 
socioeconomically disadvantaged students, especially in 
the context of elite institutions of higher education. Morton 
discusses the cultural mismatch that such students confront 
upon entering college, trying to reconcile their previous life 
experience with their newfound experiences as a college 
student. In the context of academic philosophy, Morton 
describes how a range of social and cultural forces limit and 
constrain not only who enters into graduate programs and 
who ends up becoming faculty in the profession, but also 
which sorts of research agendas and topics are regarded 
as rigorous or worthy of serious engagement, and, more 
generally, what counts as genuine philosophy. Additionally, 
Morton’s contribution chronicles her experiences teaching 
philosophy across diferent institutions, including her 
experience teaching at City College of New York, which she 
describes as “full of ambitious working-class kids striving 
to realize the promise of higher education.” A key insight 
that Morton develops in her article concerns the difcult 
ethical compromises that many frst-generation and 
working-class students face as they ascend the ranks of 
higher education (e.g., choosing between helping a sick 
loved one, studying for an exam, going to class, or going to 
work to pay rent). In refecting upon her own experiences 
and life choices, Morton appeals to the notion of a double 
bind to ofer a window into the ethical compromises she 
has confronted throughout her career. She considers how 
her educational background at elite institutions reinforces 
and contributes to hierarchies of prestige in the profession, 
as well as her choice to advance her career by taking a job 
at a more prestigious university. Moreover, she discusses 
the strain that her career ambitions have placed upon her 
family relationships, what she describes as one of the 
most painful ethical compromises she has had to confront. 
She says of her family that “We love each other, but I am 
now part of a world whose logic is mysterious to them.” 
This compromise, namely, how academic ambitions can 
make one feel like an outsider in the spaces where one 
previously felt most familiar and at home, seems to be a 
shared feeling among philosophers from frst-generation 
and working-class backgrounds, and is a topic that is 
discussed across many of the pieces in this newsletter. 
Morton ends her contribution by emphasizing the value of 
friendship, community, and fnding networks of support 
when traversing the challenges that a career in academic 
philosophy presents. 
In his contribution, “Ethical Narratives and Oppositional 
Consciousness,” John Proios engages with and builds 
upon arguments in Jennifer Morton’s recent book, Moving 
Up Without Losing Your Way (2019), specifcally through 
the lens of a graduate student from a working-class 
background guiding their way through the complexities 
of elite institutions. Proios persuasively argues for the 
importance of oppositional consciousness: “an adversarial 
self-conception in which one sees oneself as a member of 
a subordinated group in an unjust hierarchy that calls for 
resistance and displacement with new, non-hierarchical 
relations.” Oppositional consciousness, Proios argues, 
is an essential ingredient in allowing students from non-
privileged backgrounds to fnd their voice in academia, 
while at the same time enabling them to acknowledge 
important structural forms of exclusion and elitism that 
permeate academic spaces. Oppositional consciousness, 
he argues, allows one, in a sense, to stay true to their roots, 
core identity, and upbringing, while ascending the ranks of 
academic philosophy—a balancing act that is fraught with 
moral risks, alienation, and imposter syndrome. 
In “What It’s Like to Grow Up Poor, but Fall in Love with 
Philosophy: A Notice to the Profession in Case it Forgot,”
Elvira Basevich ofers a powerful narrative which traces her 
journey into the world of academic philosophy as someone 
coming from a life of poverty. Basevich shares personal 
experiences as a student of the New York City public school 
system and as a young woman facing homelessness 
throughout her twenties. Basevich highlights the key role 
that support and mentorship from faculty had throughout 
her undergraduate studies as a poor undergraduate student 
who found herself hooked on philosophy. Philosophy 
provided her with the tools she needed to frame and 
make sense of her own life experiences and hardships, 
and also served as an empowering vehicle by which she 
could carve out a path forward for herself. Drawing upon a 
range of Toni Morrison’s work (and in particular Morrison’s 
scholarship on memory and the notion of “rememories”), 
Basevich compellingly argues for the vital importance of 
cultivating genuine forms of inclusion and belonging in 
academic philosophy, and outlines a series of concrete 
recommendations for how to support frst-generation and 
low-income students: through early career mentorship, 
monetary support, and more. 
In “Knowing What to Order at the Conference Dinner,”
Ian James Kidd draws on a story of a post-conference 
dinner to situate broader refections about the confusing, 
exclusionary norms of professional behavior, and how such 
norms can be both terrifying and alienating for those for 
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whom they are unfamiliar. As Kidd’s discussion renders 
evident, a great deal of critically important networking 
and professionalization takes place at these informal 
events (e.g., the post-conference dinner, the wine and 
cheese reception). And yet, these events can be deeply 
uncomfortable for those who either lack the insider 
knowledge of how to behave at such events, or who lack 
the fnancial means to comfortably participate in them. 
While this might seem like a fairly minor concern to those 
who have never had the experience of feeling like an 
outsider at these events, Kidd makes clear why those with 
more seniority and privilege in the discipline (economically 
and otherwise) should slow down and think critically about 
these events and their signifcance: they are potential sites 
for reproducing and reinforcing injustice in the profession. 
This is because opting out of such events (e.g., because 
one cannot aford the expensive dinner or cocktail hour) 
could have negative implications for one’s professional 
prospects, while the opportunity to fully participate can 
have numerous professional benefts. Kidd ofers some 
practical suggestions for how to make these informal 
events more widely accessible by alleviating some of the 
class-coded pressures they often involve. 
In “Epistemic Shame as a First-Generation Scholar,” Lucia 
Munguia ofers an illuminating account of epistemic shame. 
Munguia summarizes recent analyses of epistemic shame, 
which have assumed that this emotion necessarily involves 
the realization that one holds a false belief. Drawing 
upon her personal experiences of navigating between 
the worlds of academic philosophy as a frst-generation 
graduate student, and her previous home life experiences 
of coming from a working-class family in Barrio Hollywood 
in Tucson, Arizona, Munguia calls this assumption about 
epistemic shame into question. She argues for a more 
capacious analysis of epistemic shame, which includes 
one’s failure to possess certain beliefs altogether. In doing 
so, Munguia ofers a series of insightful refections on the 
relationship between epistemic shame and one’s sense of 
self, and how epistemic shame has the potential to make 
salient important elements of one’s personal identity and 
one’s close personal relationships. Munguia’s account of 
epistemic shame also helps to make sense of the need to 
do one’s part in shouldering the “mental weight” of loved 
ones’ hardships (e.g., by lamenting with them through 
fnancial struggles or the demands of care work), even when 
one’s academic lifestyle has distanced one geographically 
from loved ones. 
Ashley Lamarre and Zinhle ka’Nobuhlaluse bring to the 
fore a number of important insights in their journey of 
navigating academic philosophy as Black women from 
working-class backgrounds in “Marginal Disclosures: 
Sisterhood, Standpoint, Community and Thriving.” 
This contribution takes the form of a dialogue between 
Lamarre and ka’Nobuhlaluse, explaining the importance 
of the sisterhood that they have found in each other 
during their graduate studies and how their collaborative 
work functions to resists the racist, sexist, and classists 
norms which entail that students, especially those from 
marginalized background, and in particular Black women, 
should be in constant competition within the academy. 
Lamarre and ka’Nobuhlaluse also ofer an illuminating 
critique of the common task of writing professional 
documents, such as statements of purpose and diversity 
statements, for applications to graduate school. Drawing 
upon Patricia Hill Collins’s (2009) analysis of “marketplace 
ideologies,” Lamarre and ka’Nobuhlaluse highlight a need 
for admissions committees to take pause and seriously 
consider the value of including diverse practitioners 
in the feld and what it takes to sufciently include 
these philosophers in academic spaces. Lamarre and 
ka’Nobuhlaluse also consider how family obligations often 
fall upon frst-generation students and students from 
low-income families, with insightful connections to how 
the pandemic has exacerbated these obligations further, 
putting increased pressure upon such students as they 
juggle the demands of familial obligations and academic 
progress towards career goals. Lamarre and ka’Nobuhlaluse 
end their piece with an important cautionary note, namely, 
that we need to be careful to avoid objectifying a single-
sided narrative which construes students from working-
class and other disadvantaged backgrounds as always 
struggling in the academy. Their piece itself serves as an 
example which challenges these common narratives and 
refects the importance of sisterhood and solidarity as acts 
of resistance to the constraints of academia. 
Ofering the important perspective of a recently graduated, 
frst-generation philosophy undergraduate student, in 
“Confessions of a Working-Class Student,” Kayla Aceves 
describes the transition from her small, predominantly 
Latinx border-town of Calexico, California, to university life 
as an undergraduate student at the University of California, 
San Diego. Including important insights that administrators, 
professors, and fellow students alike should be aware of 
(e.g., the difcult task of balancing work and academics; 
comparing oneself to their peers; feeling too intimidated 
to speak up in class; experiencing imposter syndrome) 
and advice they should heed (e.g., being aware of the 
discrepancy in available time between students who do 
and do not have to work while in school; ofering fexibility 
where possible), Aceves’s important perspective on the 
“privilege which surrounds academic philosophy” should 
not be overlooked. As Aceves notes, a career in reading 
and writing often looks unrealistic to anyone who does not 
come from a certain level of material wealth. “Sometimes,” 
she writes, ”all of philosophy seems like an activity of leisure 
and/or performance, depending on how you’re doing it and 
who you’re doing it for.” But many people without these 
privileged backgrounds have something important to ofer 
the discipline, if only they can fnd the time. 
In “Abolition University: Mobilizing Black Feminist 
Philosophy to Transform Institutions of Higher Education 
into ‘Vehicles of Decarceration’ that Afrm the Lives of 
First-Generation Students,” Brady Heiner explores the role 
of institutions of higher education in the constructive project 
of abolition. He argues that institutions of higher education 
can become critical sites of decarceration which afrm the 
lives of frst-generation, formerly incarcerated students 
and promote broader social justice. Using his frsthand 
experience as the founder and executive director of the 
California State University Project Rebound Consortium 
as his lens, Heiner presents a series of concrete ways in 
which institutions of higher education can better serve 
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formerly incarcerated students, the majority of whom are 
frst-generation students. Programs like Project Rebound 
simultaneously resist the harms of incarceration while also 
engaging in a positive project of constructing infrastructures 
of care. Importantly, programs such as Project Rebound 
can help formerly incarcerated, frst-generation students 
establish a sense of belonging within the academy and 
their broader communities. Through such “student-
centered, grassroots-oriented empowerment work,” frst-
generation, formerly incarcerated students, faculty, and 
staf can “inspire and reconstruct universities so that they 
begin to crowd out the prison industrial complex, so that 
the prison industrial complex inhabits increasingly smaller 
areas not only of our social and psychic landscape, but of 
our state and municipal budgets.” In so doing, institutions 
of higher education become critically important vehicles of 
abolition and of social justice. 
In the fnal piece, “Supporting First-Generation 
Philosophers at Every Level,” Bailie Peterson refects upon 
her own experiences as a frst-generation student and 
professor to ofer concrete recommendations for how those 
in the profession can better serve their frst-generation 
and fnancially disadvantaged students. She does so by 
making explicit a number of subtle ways in which well-
intentioned professors can unintentionally contribute to 
the challenges and insecurities their frst-generation and 
fnancially disadvantaged students face, and by ofering 
concrete tools for beginning to improve upon them. 
Peterson draws attention to the often overlooked and 
insidious ways in which professors can contribute to the 
myths that underprivileged students are doomed to fail or 
that people “like them” don’t belong in academic spaces. 
She then ofers ways to resist these myths by cultivating 
communities, both within and beyond the classroom, that 
demonstrate respect for others, help students establish 
a sense of belonging, and take students’ comments and 
contributions seriously. All of these, Peterson argues, 
are critical steps towards making philosophy genuinely 
inclusive for students and junior faculty who come from 
disadvantaged class backgrounds. 
In addition to the contributions just mentioned, in this 
issue you will fnd the following book reviews: Nancy J. 
Hirschmann’s review of Margaret McLaren’s Women’s 
Activism, Feminism, and Social Justice, Joan Eleanor 
O’Bryan’s review of Éléonore Lépinard’s Feminist Trouble: 
Intersectional Politics in Post-Secular Times, Vanessa 
Wills’s review of Kate Manne’s Entitled, and Fulden 
İbrahimhakkıoğlu’s review of Laura Roberts’s Irigaray and 
Politics: A Critical Introduction. 
We hope that you enjoy reading and refecting on the 
pieces contained in this issue. But, more importantly, we 
hope that you will continue to bear these things in mind, 
and work to make our discipline more welcoming to and 
inclusive of those who come to philosophy from non-
traditional backgrounds. With that, we proudly bring you 
this special issue. 
Before concluding, we would be remiss without saying 
the following. We are grateful to Lauren Freeman, editor 
of the newsletter, for trusting us with the opportunity to 
guest edit this issue. Her belief in the importance of this 
topic and this conversation means a lot to us, as does her 
support of us. As we both noted above, we would not be 
in the positions we are if not for the patience, guidance, 
and diligent care of our mentors. Though there have been 
many, we want to acknowledge a few people in the feld 
who have impacted us as young philosophers, and have 
showed us what professional philosophy can be: Arianna 
is grateful to Gurpreet Rattan, her undergraduate mentor 
(who is in many ways responsible for having sparked her 
initial interest in philosophy and the desire to pursue it 
professionally), Endre Begby, her MA supervisor, as well as 
Elizabeth Miller and Joshua Schechter, her PhD committee 
members, and David Christensen, her PhD advisor, all of 
whom have been sources of endless generosity, guidance, 
and support. Heather is grateful to the entire philosophy 
department at the University of Louisville, but especially to 
Lauren Freeman, Avery Kolers, John Gibson, and her former 
mentor, Nancy Potter. She is also grateful to her MA advisor, 
Alison Jaggar, and her PhD supervisor, Carolyn McLeod. To 
all of you, thank you for believing in us, often far more than 
we believed in ourselves. In making this issue a reality, 
we are grateful to everyone who responded to our call for 
papers for sharing their stories and experiences with us. 
We are especially grateful for the contributors for allowing 
us the opportunity to publish their important words and to 
share them with a broader audience. Finally, we are grateful 
to those who have shared in this conversation with us along 
the way, including all of the participants and attendees 
at the 2020 APA Eastern Division session in Philadelphia, 
PA, on this topic, members of the APA Graduate Student 
Council, and our own partners and families. 
NOTES 
1. Patricia Hill Collins, “Learning from the Outsider Within,” Social 
Problem 33, no. 6 (1986): S14-S32. 
2. Patricia Hill Collins, “Refections on the Outsider Within,” Journal 
of Career Development 26, no. 1 (1999): 85-88. 
3. Katherine Hawley, “What is Imposter Syndrome?” Aristotelian 
Society Supplementary Volume, 93, no. 1 (2019): 203–26. 
ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER ON
FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY 
The Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy is sponsored 
by the APA Committee on the Status of Women (CSW). The 
newsletter is designed to provide an introduction to recent 
philosophical work that addresses issues of gender. None 
of the varied philosophical views presented by authors 
of newsletter articles necessarily refect the views of any 
or all of the members of the Committee on the Status of 
Women, including the editor(s) of the newsletter, nor does 
the committee advocate any particular type of feminist 
philosophy. We advocate only that serious philosophical 
attention be given to issues of gender and that claims of 
gender bias in philosophy receive full and fair consideration. 
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1. Purpose: The purpose of the newsletter is to publish 
information about the status of women in philosophy 
and to make the resources of feminist philosophy more 
widely available. The newsletter contains discussions of 
recent developments in feminist philosophy and related 
work in other disciplines, literature overviews and book 
reviews, suggestions for eliminating gender bias in the 
traditional philosophy curriculum, and refections on 
feminist pedagogy. It also informs the profession about 
the work of the APA Committee on the Status of Women. 
Articles submitted to the newsletter should be around ten 
double-spaced pages and must follow the APA guidelines 
for gender-neutral language. Please submit essays 
electronically to the editor or send four copies of essays 
via regular mail. All manuscripts should be prepared for 
anonymous review. References should follow The Chicago 
Manual of Style. 
2. Book Reviews and Reviewers: If you have published 
a book that is appropriate for review in the newsletter, 
please have your publisher send us a copy of your book. 
We are always seeking new book reviewers. To volunteer 
to review books (or some particular book), please send the 
editor, Lauren Freeman (lauren.freeman@louisville.edu), a 
CV and letter of interest, including mention of your areas of 
research and teaching. 
3. Where to Send Things: Please send all articles, comments, 
suggestions, books, and other communications to the 
editor: Dr. Lauren Freeman, University of Louisville, lauren. 
freeman@louisville.edu. 
4. Submission Deadlines: Submissions for spring issues 
are due by the preceding November 1; submissions for fall 
issues are due by the preceding February 1. 
ESSAYS 
Flourishing in the Academy: Complicity 
and Compromise 
Jennifer M. Morton 
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL 
From the frst week of graduate school, my friend Richie Kim 
and I were inseparable. People thought we were cliquish 
or dating. Neither was true. We were accused of thinking 
we were too cool for school. That might not have been 
far from the truth. Richie and I were an unlikely pair—he, 
a well-dressed, baseball-loving, club-hopping Kantian; I, a 
slightly disheveled, bespectacled, bookish empiricist. And, 
yet, our senses of humor existed on the same wavelength, 
one inaudible to our classmates. But something far deeper 
anchored our bond. We were both frst-generation students 
and the only two racial minorities in our cohort. When 
Richie would tell me about his complicated family life, I 
was not taken aback. I too had stories to tell. When I would 
roll my eyes at a question during the colloquium, I knew 
that when I looked up Richie would be smirking with me. 
Our friendship was a safe space from an academic world 
that we both wanted to succeed in but which neither of us 
wanted to belong in. This is the paradox for so many frst-
generation and working-class students. 
Academic institutions are social institutions. Our success 
depends not just on our good work, but on the approval, 
support, and acceptance of those who command the 
classrooms and seminar rooms. And, yet, for people like 
Richie and me, that social world feels foreign, sometimes 
hostile, and often kind of dull. We are caught between 
wanting to gain the approval of those who set the terms 
and suspecting that their approval means that we have 
turned into precisely the people we do not want to be. 
I. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL CAPITAL
IN THE ACADEMY 
To understand the dynamics of philosophy as a set of 
institutional practices, we must understand the broader 
social dynamics at play in the educational institutions 
within which our departments exist. Inspired by the work 
of Bourdieu, who argued that social and cultural capital 
is critical to understanding hierarchies of class,1 social 
scientists have been seeking to understand how these 
forces operate in American colleges and universities. 
What they fnd is that these social and cultural dynamics 
often beneft those who arrive on campus already at an 
advantage. 
Nicole Stephens’s work shows us that frst-generation 
college students often experience a mismatch between 
the culture they bring to school and the one that they fnd 
refected within its walls.2 Whereas many students from 
working-class backgrounds grow up with an interdependent 
culture in which they understand their own fourishing in 
relationship to others, upper middle-class students grow 
up shaped by an independent culture that puts their 
individual autonomy at the forefront. She suggests that this 
mismatch is responsible for the achievement gap between 
frst-generation college students and those whose 
parents attended college. Elizabeth Armstrong and Laura 
Hamilton’s devastating ethnography of a fagship public 
university shows us how such institutions are organized 
to satisfy the paying customers—out-of-state students 
seeking “the college experience.”3 The collateral of this 
model are women from working class backgrounds who 
end up falling through the cracks of a set of institutional 
pathways that are not designed for them. And, fnally, 
Anthony Jack’s incisive work uncovers the work that culture, 
as distinct from economic class, plays. He fnds that not all 
low-income students of color face the same challenges at 
selective universities.4 Some attend private, well-endowed 
high schools that prepare them for the culture of the 
upper middle-class milieu that dominates highly selective 
universities in the United States. These privileged poor 
students fourish, while their disadvantaged counterparts 
have trouble making friends, developing mentoring 
relationships with faculty, and feeling at home on campus. 
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This research shows us that the internal social and cultural
forces at play in academic institutions determine how social
and economic background infuence students’ experiences.
That feeling of discomfort many frst-generation and low-
income students feel refects the social dynamics that
dominate many academic institutions, in particular, the
sort of elite places that are a fast-track into positions in
the academy. Those who grow up with parents, neighbors,
and peers who resemble the faculty, administrators, and
students at those universities, unsurprisingly, fnd them
comfortable and welcoming places in which to fourish
academically and socially. For those of us who do not
come from that world, the experience is that of being an
outsider.
In theory, being an outsider should be an advantage. 
Universities are devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and 
insofar as they draw the people carrying out that research 
from a narrow slice of the population, the resulting work will 
be epistemically impoverished. Because students from frst-
generation or low-income backgrounds arrive on campus 
with diferent cultural models and diferent educational 
trajectories, they have the potential to contribute to 
diversifying the epistemic viewpoints that are represented. 
That is, if educational institutions are an important site of 
epistemic injustice,5 then redressing our epistemic blinders 
requires that we actively recruit those whose capacity to 
contribute knowledge has historically been sidelined. Or 
so the theory goes, and many eforts to diversify faculty are 
driven by something like this argument.6 
Yet, there is a disconnect between this widely accepted 
argument and the social reality. The institutional practices 
of admission, hiring, promotion, and the rest are often 
driven by word of mouth, social networks, and institutional 
reputation: all factors that contribute to the entrenchment 
of those with the economic, social, and cultural capital in 
positions of power.7 In advertisement after advertisement, 
working-class, frst-generation, and minority students are 
encouraged to apply for faculty positions, but their success 
in getting the job and succeeding at it is often a function 
not only of their work but of how well they play along with 
the expectations and interests of those who dominate the 
profession. 
My impression from being a part of many a hiring 
committee at both less selective and highly selective 
places is that the ideal candidate for a philosophy job is 
a woman of color who has been trained at Princeton or 
MIT and works in metaphysics, epistemology, or, maybe, 
philosophy of language or science. Pedigree, in the words 
of sociologist Lauren Rivera, attests to one’s capacity for 
the kind of work that is seen as “core” to philosophy. As 
sociologists Sam Friedman and Daniel Laurison argue in 
The Class Ceiling: Why It Pays to Be Privileged, the path into 
elite professions for those who come from working-class 
backgrounds is not just a matter of merit, but of having the 
social and cultural capital to present one’s merit in a way 
that is easily recognized by senior fgures many of whom 
come from more privileged backgrounds.8 Faculty on hiring 
committees often want to diversify their faculty not by truly 
diversifying the educational experiences and perspectives 
of those they hire, but by hiring someone who broadly 
shares their perspective of the world despite coming from 
a diferent background than them. 
II. THE HIERARCHY OF RESEARCH AGENDAS 
The social and cultural forces that entrench advantage not 
only infuence who is in the profession and who receives 
prized academic positions, but which research agendas are 
celebrated. The profession confers prestige on projects that 
have little to no connection with issues that matter to the 
public and often marginalizes projects that do—practical 
ethics and applied philosophy of all sorts. (Though I am 
happy to see that this is changing, albeit slowly.) To be 
clear, I am not simply talking here about the prestige of 
ethics over metaphysics or philosophy of language. Even 
within philosophy of science, for example, some projects 
have more practical relevance than others, but the prestige 
is not conferred on this basis. This happens both at the 
level of which research topics are deemed “important” but 
also at the level of how this research is conducted. 
It’s true that in most years there are more faculty jobs in 
practical subjects, but this is because students want to 
take those courses and departments need somebody to 
teach them. Most of the people who teach these courses 
end-up having to prove their philosophical mettle by doing 
research in areas that are considered more “serious.” So 
even within ethics and political philosophy, the prestige 
falls on those whose work is opaque to your average 
intelligent person. The vast majority of philosophers write 
for other philosophers who uphold standards of good 
scholarship that have little to do with, and in some cases 
are diametrically opposed to, standards of relevance, 
accessibility, or even sheer interestingness. We claim to 
aim for clarity and rigor, but, in fact, what we aim for is 
work that is only intelligible to those who are already in 
the profession. For all the talk of clarity, few educated non-
philosophers can pick-up an article in Mind or Noûs and 
fgure out what the central argument of a given research 
paper is or, crucially, why it matters. Work that is written for 
a non-specialist audience or the general public is tolerated 
as long as the person can show that they can play by the 
rules of the specialist audience. 
It is no coincidence that the elite institutions who play a big 
role in conferring prestige have an interest in incentivizing 
the kind of work that has little connection to those outside 
of those institutions. This is part of how we stay complicit 
in an ideology that sustains exclusivity. Plato argued that 
philosophers who had gained knowledge by becoming 
familiar with the forms had a duty, as citizens, to come 
back and explain what they knew to others. In the ideology 
that dominates our profession, we are encouraged to 
fail to fulfll this duty. Our research keeps elevating and 
perpetuating the importance and centrality of projects 
within the profession that keep us in the cave. 
As philosophers we are reluctant to think that our interests 
and preferences could be infuenced by non-rational 
factors, but, of course, they are.9 The social and cultural 
forces at play in educational institutions play a role in what 
we fnd interesting, important, and a “contribution” to the 
literature. 
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When I frst started taking philosophy classes as an 
undergraduate, I was also taking classes in anthropology, 
sociology, and women’s studies. But I wanted in on 
philosophy, mostly, because I felt that philosophy 
classrooms were a place in which I was respected just 
in virtue of my intellect, not my class, race, gender, or 
anything else. This is the seductive promise of philosophy, 
in particular, for those of us whose identities, far too often, 
lead others to fail to see us as individuals. As I started 
taking more philosophy courses, I realized that the tacit 
culture of the department was that the “smart” students 
shied away from ethics or political philosophy and went 
in for the “heavy” stuf—philosophy of language, mind, 
metaphysics. As a curious undergraduate, I was interested 
in all of it. But I could tell that if I was going to show that I 
could do the hard work, I needed to cultivate my interest in 
some felds and not others. As a frst-generation woman of 
color, I was particularly keen to gain respect and standing 
with this world by showing that I was capable of doing 
the most “difcult, rigorous, and abstract” work. I was 
genuinely interested in philosophy of perception, but I was 
also interested in doing well in the eyes of my professors. 
This ambition culminated in my enrollment in Philosophy 
Analysis in the Twentieth Century. It was known, informally, 
as a kind of analytical philosophy bootcamp and students 
interested in graduate school were encouraged to take it. 
Forty or so unsuspecting undergraduates signed up for the 
year-long course and by the end of the spring term, fewer 
than ten of us remained, mostly white men, but for my good 
friend Vanessa Wills, now also a successful philosopher. Of 
course, I was proud to have made it through the grueling 
experience. I learned a lot about how to do the kind of 
philosophy that got rewarded in the profession at large. 
I also learned to act assertively and confdently in class. 
The professor who taught that class brought me close to 
tears enough times that I developed the kind of thick skin 
that would serve me well professionally. But this training 
also shaped my philosophical instincts in a way that made 
me complicit with a professional hierarchy that often 
marginalizes rather than welcomes diverse points of view. 
I admired women who did the kind of philosophy that was 
seen as typically male—abstract, rigorous, and difcult. I 
found it insulting if someone suggested that gender, race, 
or class played a role in what I thought or why I thought it. In 
seminars, I acted confdently and aggressively even when I 
didn’t feel either. I looked down on work that was practical 
in any way. I’m ashamed to admit all of this, but I don’t think 
I was the only one because I saw many students who went 
through the kind of “elite” education I did develop many 
of the same attitudes and behavior. Nobody told us what 
the norms of the profession were explicitly, but we picked 
them up and internalized them, often to our own detriment. 
I felt torn when, in graduate school, I realized that I was 
more interested in moral psychology than the philosophy 
of perception. As my work took me further and further 
from the philosophical mainstream, I thought that maybe 
I should leave the profession. The nagging feeling that the 
work I was supposed to be doing didn’t matter was only 
made worse by my sense that I wasn’t doing a particularly 
good job at doing it, even as I succeeded enough to stay 
on the path. 
This is only my experience, but the way in which the 
hierarchy gets reinforced is all around us if you pay 
attention. I was talking to a colleague recently who was 
telling me about how a woman in her department was upset 
that fewer people seem to attend colloquium talks when 
the speaker was a woman. Her colleagues agreed that it 
was unfortunate but that the topics that these particular 
women were talking about were just less “interesting” to 
them. Or, when I recently attended the frst in a series of 
talks by one of my philosophical heroes and overheard 
other philosophers after the talk say that what she was 
doing “wasn’t philosophy.”10 I take that they meant this as 
a disparaging remark because they didn’t show up to the 
next lectures in the series. 
These little comments that the talk was just not “interesting” 
enough to attend or that the talk was “not philosophy” 
pervade our profession. And yet, as I grew tired of the sort 
of topics that were deemed worthy by philosophy’s elite, I 
found those ignored topics more exciting and compelling. 
In fact, if I hadn’t gotten interested in the philosophy of 
education, I might not have stayed in the profession. 
III. LEARNING TO TEACH 
My work in the philosophy of education grew out of
my dissatisfaction with my teaching. As a newly minted
PhD, my frst job was as a visiting assistant professor
at Swarthmore College. And like many a graduate of a
well-regarded PhD program, I started teaching without
any knowledge of how to teach efectively. I fumbled. I
lectured too much. I let the most vocal students dominate
discussion. In sum, I was not really teaching as much as
mimicking what I had seen my own professors do. Worse,
I was replicating the sort of classroom dynamics that
privilege those students who come to college knowing
how to take advantage of it. A few months in, one such
student came into my ofce to calmly tell me that what
I was doing in the classroom wasn’t working for her. She
was right. But it was the fact that this student had the
courage to talk to me and the knowledge about how to
make her point in a polite yet frm way that stunned me.
I would have never, ever had the courage to do what she
did as an undergraduate. I did not know that I could take
ownership of my own education in that way. In an efort to
understand why, I started reading more about education
and the ways in which social and cultural capital operate
in educational institutions. I realized, perhaps for the frst
time, that I was a frst-generation college student and that
this had afected my own educational experience.
When I took a position at the City College of New York, my 
lack of pedagogical training became ever more apparent, 
but so did the ways in which my experience of college had 
been an anomaly. CCNY was full of ambitious working-class 
kids striving to realize the promise of higher education. 
Teaching, which I had dreaded, became a joy. My students 
reminded me time and time again of how narrow and 
constrained my academic experiences had been thus far 
and how valuable being a good teacher was. I had received 
my education at the most elite institutions and yet I had 
never been so challenged in the classroom. My students 
pushed back on many of the core assumptions of the 
philosophical mainstream with humor. And to teach them 
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well, I had to make explicit many of the implicit norms and 
expectations that I had been operating under. 
Yet, by far the most important thing I learned in the ten 
years I spent teaching in the City University of New York 
system was that the way we talk about higher education 
is distorted. We focus too much on admissions into elite 
colleges and not nearly enough on what is happening to 
students attending the institutions that are the real engines 
of transformative education—our public colleges and 
universities. The challenges I saw my students face had 
little to do with afrmative action, free speech, or the other 
‘hot topics’ in the public discourse around higher education 
and much more to do with how to succeed at college while 
playing critical roles in their families and communities. The 
fnancial and academic challenges working-class and frst-
generation students face is but a piece of a broader set 
of hurdles. What I saw was that they often had to make 
painful ethical compromises in order to succeed in college 
and transform their life prospects. The students I taught 
were caught between, for example, taking a grandparent 
to the doctor or working fulltime to support their families 
and studying for an exam or attending class. Whichever 
choice they made, they felt like they were letting someone 
they loved or themselves down. This insight became the 
basis of my book Moving Up Without Losing Your Way: The
Ethical Costs of Upward Mobility: a book that I would have 
never been able to write had I only been at the sort of elite 
institution I attended as an undergraduate and graduate 
student. 
IV. DOUBLE BINDS 
Sukaina Hirji has recently written a thoughtful paper about 
how people from oppressed social groups are often caught 
in oppressive double binds—no matter what they do they 
become complicit in the oppressive mechanisms that 
function to oppress them.11 She argues that what is bad 
about such situations is not simply that they undermine our 
autonomy, but rather that they present us with choices that 
are self-undermining no matter what we do. 
To truly diversify the academy would require that we 
welcome people that have backgrounds, experiences, and 
perspectives that are truly diferent than the philosophical 
mainstream. And yet those who ft this description must 
convince those who are in positions of power to recognize 
their contributions in order to be given the positions and 
support required to advance their intellectual agenda. 
This pushes us to contort ourselves to ft into a social 
world in which we do not feel at home. To pursue research 
agendas that are more connected to the concerns of those 
outside of the academy, we need to embrace and pursue 
those projects that relate to aspects of our experiences 
that make us diferent. And yet those are the sorts of 
projects that will not be seen as valuable or understood as 
properly philosophical within our profession. This pushes 
us to pursue other projects that will make it easier for 
us to succeed professionally. To resist the ways in which 
colleges and universities privilege those who already 
arrive on campus with the skills and knowledge critical 
to thriving in the academy, we need to invest time and 
energy in learning to truly teach all students. And yet the 
institutional incentives are set up so that doing so comes at 
the expense of our own position in the academy.12 As Hirji 
argues, whether we give in or resist, we are compromising 
our own success in the long run. 
I write this as a professor with tenure at a well-regarded 
research institution. In what ways have I compromised? It 
is too early in my career to provide a defnitive autopsy but 
let me provide a preliminary one. 
First, I beneft from and my success reinforces a system 
whose continued existence makes it harder for people 
from marginalized backgrounds to succeed. I am a person 
of color and a frst-generation college student, yet I have 
been credentialed at elite institutions and been mentored 
by people whose word is trusted by the gatekeepers. This 
has been critical to my success in the academy. This is not 
to diminish the work I’ve done, but to acknowledge that I 
am a part of a system that is exclusionary and elitist. I know 
that my mere presence within these institutions makes 
those around me feel better about the fairness of the fawed 
system that brought them there. I made instrumentally 
rational choices in the pursuit of my professional goals, 
but nonetheless my success in doing so buttresses the 
prestige economy that pervades much of higher education. 
Second, I have chosen to take up opportunities for career 
advancement at the expense of being in a position where 
my teaching had a direct impact on frst-generation, low-
income, and minority students. When I was at the City 
College of New York, my teaching mattered. I became a 
more empathetic, open, and motivated teacher and I could 
see that in doing so I was making a concrete diference in 
the lives of my students. And yet, I no longer teach there. 
I chose to pursue opportunities that had more research 
support and prestige. In part my choice was a response to 
institutional constraints at CUNY that made it increasingly 
hard to be a good teacher—larger classes, crumbling 
infrastructure, and less support for students. It was also an 
intentional move to ensure my work was taken seriously. 
But though I think my choice was reasonable, it too was a 
compromise. 
The third and fnal example is the most painful. I have 
continued to increase the distance between myself and 
those I love for the sake of my career ambitions. Not only 
did I decide to pursue higher education thousands of miles 
away from home, but I became more and more like the 
people I could not understand growing up—the ones that 
prioritize work over much of their lives. The pandemic has 
made this all the more apparent as I am now unable to go 
see my mom, grandmother, or sister even if I want to. My 
family doesn’t quite understand my drive and I don’t know 
how to explain it. We love each other, but I am now part of a 
world whose logic is mysterious to them. This makes it hard 
for us to be a part of each other’s lives in the intimate way 
that we used to be. 
Despite having compromised in these ways, I have 
also refused to compromise in others. I have pursued a 
research agenda that is, by the professional standards of 
many philosophers, peculiar. I read more social science 
than I do philosophy. I value becoming a better teacher 
and invest my time in doing so. And I make no secret that I 
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think all academics should invest much more of their time 
in improving as teachers instead of writing papers that 
hardly anyone reads. I have gladly taken on many “service” 
jobs within the profession that focus on teaching even as 
this is seen as a professional dead-end by some. I care 
about the profession becoming more inclusive and do my 
best to mentor students who need it inside and outside 
of my university. I try to extend the excellent mentorship 
I received to others even as it takes time from so much 
else on my plate. Even as my career has played out largely 
within the confnes of academic practices that too often 
exclude and marginalize, I have tried my best to push on 
some of those boundaries from within.13 
To be the frst person in your family to pursue higher 
education is to embark on an exciting, but, in many 
ways, obscure path. You really do not know what you are 
going in for—the compromises you will have to make, 
the challenges you will confront, and the person you will 
become in the overcoming. The way to get through is to 
fnd your Richies—those people that can laugh along with 
you at the absurdity. 
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Ethical Narratives and Oppositional 
Consciousness 
John D. Proios 
CORNELL UNIVERSITY 
. . . there was no place in academe for folks from 
working-class backgrounds who did not wish to 
leave the past behind. That was the price of the 
ticket. Poor students would be welcome at the 
best institutions of higher learning only if they 
were willing to surrender memory, to forget the 
past and claim the assimilated present as the only 
worthwhile and meaningful reality. . . . Students 
from nonprivileged backgrounds who did not want 
to forget often had nervous breakdowns. They 
could not bear the weight of all the contradictions 
they had to confront. They were crushed. More 
often than not they dropped out with no trace 
of their inner anguish recorded, no institutional 
record of the myriad ways their take on the world 
was assaulted by an elite vision of class and 
privilege. 
– bell hooks, Where We Stand: Class Matters, 
Routledge, 2000, 36-37 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, I explore some of the contradictions exposed
in my experience pursuing a philosophy PhD, in light of
scholarship highlighting challenges for low socio-economic
status (SES) undergraduate students. I evaluate the proposal
from the philosopher Jennifer M. Morton (2019) that low-SES
students need “clear-eyed ethical narratives” to navigate
higher education. I argue that, in order to develop these
narratives, low-SES graduate students must self-conceive in
a way that incorporates “oppositional consciousness.” 
II. HIGHER EDUCATION AND SES 
In the last few decades, higher education has sought to 
foster diversity through recruitment and fnancial support 
for low-SES undergraduates,1 but it has struggled to 
achieve genuine inclusion. Low-SES undergraduates often 
strain to navigate the “hidden curriculum,” such as the 
norms governing networking, classroom behaviors, the 
use of ofce hours, or student groups.2 They can also be 
confronted with their comparative disadvantage through 
common displays of expensive clothing, being unable 
to aford participation in student clubs, or being hired to 
clean up after wealthier students.3 They may be forced to 
choose between school and caring for an ill relative, or 
face hunger in light of the need to stay on campus over a 
break.4 Although many social forces (e.g., race, citizenship) 
structure these challenges, the problems represent a broad 
failure to take account of SES as a factor in a student’s 
ability to participate in higher education. 
Morton focuses on how low-SES students are burdened with 
special “ethical costs” that arise from the combination of 
their backgrounds and the norms of higher education.5 On 
the one hand, where they are from—their neighborhoods, 
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families, friends—are parts of who they are and often 
present demands on them while they are in school. On 
the other hand, in order to escape the socio-economic 
conditions that are the pretext for seeking a degree, they 
are pressured to forgo these ties. For example, Morton 
describes a student who feels that “one of the more 
difcult aspects of his path upward had been not allowing 
himself to be ‘dragged’ back down by those who mattered 
most to him—family and friends . . . strivers trying to 
move upward can be held back and pulled on by those 
whom they love.”6 Social alienation from their homes is 
one dimension of the challenges low-SES students face, 
but others may be more straightforwardly economic, for 
example, being compromised by obligations to support a 
family member who cannot aford medical care or faces 
chronic food insecurity.7 In this way, low-SES students must 
make personal sacrifces to satisfy norms that refect the 
middle- and upper-class culture of higher education. Yet, 
this dynamic undermines traditional narratives of higher 
education as a straightforward path of upward mobility, 
in which students bear only the costs of tuition and hard 
work.8 Any attempt to correct this situation requires new, 
more informed narratives.9 
One reason I am interested in this issue, and Morton’s 
work, is that it captures aspects of my experience as an 
undergraduate. I grew up in a gentrifying small town 
in New York, where my father had grown up in working 
poverty. He earned the sole income for our family of four 
as a self- employed house painter; renting run-down old 
homes that he tried to make safer allowed us to hide in a 
white area above our SES.10 Around the time I left, my father 
became unable to paint due to work-related illness, my 
mother became the sole income earner as a housekeeper, 
and my only sibling dropped out of high school. I strongly 
considered going to work as a painter full-time, but I settled 
for taking my sibling in, and ofering my parents, who 
relocated to a poorer area, limited support as a student. 
In order to succeed as a student, I often felt that I needed 
distance from my family’s habits and ways of thinking, 
which I saw as trapped in cycles of desperation. Yet, I was 
also alienated from my student peers, whom I perceived 
to be better educated, more adept in classrooms, more 
fnancially secure, and generally happier. I was conscious 
of the fact that I cooked them breakfast in the morning 
and burgers at night and listened to their conversations as 
I drove them to the movies so that I could secure basic 
necessities. I felt caught between my obligations to my 
family, my attempt to transcend the conditions of our lives, 
and the sense that this part of my identity created a barrier 
between me and my learning community. 
Hence, I am interested in Morton’s alternative to the 
traditional “ethical narrative” about upward mobility in 
higher education: the “clear-eyed ethical narrative.”11 In 
contrast to the traditional narrative of higher education as a 
straightforward path of upward mobility, Morton proposes 
that low-SES students develop narrative self-conceptions 
that foreground how, as a condition of mobility, they will 
have to make personal, compromising sacrifces—”ethical 
costs.” On the other hand, a clear-eyed ethical narrative 
connects these costs to hope for improvement of the 
social conditions that create them through the resources 
of mobility.12 This commitment is an important domain for 
a low-SES student to consider in order to avoid one of the 
ethical costs they will encounter: complicity.13 By refecting 
on the needs brought to light in their personal experiences, 
and by using the resources they acquire once they have 
graduated to try to meet those needs, a low-SES student 
can work to undo the social conditions that created their 
own struggles, rather than perpetuate them. 
While Morton focuses on undergraduate education, her 
account ofers a useful frame of inquiry into similar issues 
in graduate education, which will be my focus for the 
rest of the paper.14 When a low-SES student moves from 
undergraduate to graduate education, their pre-college 
communities will likely sufer from similar problems. 
Moreover, barriers to undergraduate inclusion persist 
in graduate school, and may even be intensifed—for 
instance, graduate education is likely to increase high-
SES representation; universities frequently ofer less 
resources for low-SES graduate students than they do for 
undergraduates (e.g., grant and loan programs, student 
unions, and support ofces); graduate professionalization 
is often personally costly and, for example, a disabled low-
SES graduate student may struggle to meet their own needs 
on a low-paying stipend and university health insurance. In 
the next section, I argue that the threats of complicity in 
graduate school ofer resources to critique Morton’s model 
of an ethical narrative. 
III. EXTENDING THE NARRATIVE 
When I went to college, I sometimes confronted more 
hunger than I could aford to feed. At some of the lowest 
points, I survived on the cheapest grocery food and meals 
that I took through my job in the cafeteria. Even then, I lost 
weight. 
Being a graduate student has meant facing conficts with my 
relationship to food. The frst time I attended a department-
paid dinner at a fancy restaurant, I was overjoyed—but 
this feeling eventually turned into an uncomfortable 
acknowledgement about academic food culture. I once 
organized a workshop involving many well-regarded 
scholars. For the fnal night, I planned, delivered, and set up 
the catered dinner from one of the local faculty-favorites. I 
was somewhat uncomfortable from the behind-the-scenes 
look I had been given into the dinner, particularly how 
expensive and lavish it felt. Yet, what troubled me more 
was that this dinner went largely uneaten by the end of the 
night. Cleaning up afterward, I was overwhelmed by anger, 
sadness, and a feeling of guilt. I remembered the way my 
father would take leftover or expiring food and cook it into 
scrambled eggs; the bowls of pasta that got me through 
the worst times as a student; how SNAP benefts were 
feeding my infant nephew. This contrast made me feel that 
the use of departmental resources for feeding academics 
acknowledges no moral limiting conditions stemming from 
the material realities of poverty. Yet, I had attended the 
same workshop with the same catering in previous years 
and never cared to think about the food. Now I had helped 
provide it. 
In my experience, this example refects the fact that 
attitudes toward material scarcity and plenty in academia 
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are rooted in middle- and upper-class culture. Common 
professional norms governing food and drink refect 
the dominant, high-SES perspective. As a result, low-SES 
graduate students risk being complicit in practices that 
perpetuate the inequalities that harmed us, may still harm 
family and friends, and for many graduate students without 
outside fnancial support, us, too. 
To underscore how threatening this can be to one’s sense 
of integrity, I will relay another story. In my second year 
in graduate school, barely a year after earning a BA, I 
received several teaching related assignments that made 
me extremely uncomfortable. I was in a program that 
supported many of its students and faculty through a private 
think-tank attached to the University (the “Center”), which 
focused on libertarian political philosophy and economics. 
I was given a TA assignment for a class organized by the 
Center on ethics and economics. Throughout the semester, 
students were taught that markets are good, governments 
are inept and corrupt, and the best way to help poor people 
is to deregulate the economy. The little attention paid to 
alternative views made them into caricatures. A survey at 
the start and end of the term asked the students a series 
of questions about regulation and markets in order to 
measure how much the course shifted their beliefs—it was 
rumored that this was for attracting donors. At the same 
time, I was asked to participate in a program that involved 
teaching versions of these lessons to high school students. 
I felt that I was being called on to participate in upholding 
class hierarchies through teaching a harmful ideology. 
Moreover, these were my ofcial assignments in exchange 
for my stipend, health insurance, tuition waiver, and status 
as a PhD student. At that point in my life, my stipend was 
around what my family earned, and I had been uninsured 
before. I saw the relationship I was being asked to enter 
as refecting, personally, the social inequality it would 
perpetuate in the classroom. 
I suggest that Morton’s “clear-eyed ethical narrative” runs 
into two families of problems when applied to situations 
like these. First, her strategy for identifying ethical costs 
fails to account for the ways that low-SES graduate students 
are pressured to conceptualize their challenges in ways 
that erase the moral framing necessary to identify them 
as injustices. She suggests that constructing a clear-eyed 
ethical narrative is a personal, refective process, but it 
should also be cultivated through a community, including 
spaces for sharing experiences.15 Yet, for example, while 
I spoke to other graduate students about my teaching 
assignments, the common reaction was to sympathize 
with my discomfort but ofer some excuse: this is part 
of the price of graduate school, which is a privilege, and 
it is OK to take “dirty money” as an already marginal 
graduate student. I felt that similar barriers prevented me 
from sharing my discomfort about the food. Hence, being 
“clear-eyed” requires that one be able to navigate the 
ways that peers, mentors, and norms in higher education 
exert pressure on a low-SES graduate student’s own self-
conception in ways that implicitly or explicitly obscure the 
class hierarchy such a student confronts. (And there may 
be intersectional issues that further winnow a student’s 
socio-economic community, such as an LGBTQ+ student 
who is isolated from their home community due to their 
sexuality.) This is a missing factor in Morton’s proposal. Yet, 
it is plausible that this pressure must be made explicit in 
a student’s self-conception in order for the student to be 
able to develop clear-eyed sight of their situation. 
Second, Morton’s suggestion for avoiding complicity is 
inadequately long-term and focused on individual action. 
For example, using Morton’s model, I could address the 
costs I bear in both cases by hoping to use an eventual 
position as a faculty member to infuence food norms in my 
(future) department, defend left-wing political philosophy, 
and avoid putting TAs in compromising positions. While I 
would value these goals as part of my long-term identity 
as an academic, I still fnd this a disempowering response. 
The food is expiring; the ask to teach is present. On 
Morton’s model, the ability to mitigate these costs lives in 
an uncertain future requiring my own ingenuity and access 
to elite goods. But this provides no concrete guidance in 
the immediate present. Moreover, it assumes successful 
acquisition of access to elite goods in the future, which is 
far from certain, especially for a low-SES graduate student 
whose mobility is itself in question (and could be disrupted, 
for instance, by an unstable economic situation). Finally, 
Morton’s model places the burden on individual students. 
Of course, individuals must think about what they can do, 
but as I hope to show below, there are alternatives that 
center the collective nature of both the problems and 
the solutions. Insofar as the purpose of Morton’s model 
is ameliorative, these issues suggest that the clear-eyed 
ethical narrative must be able to do more than center what 
an individual can do for long- term reform. 
IV. OPPOSITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
In response to these challenges, I claim that an adequate 
clear-eyed ethical narrative for a low-SES graduate student 
incorporates “oppositional consciousness,” an adversarial 
self-conception in which one sees oneself as a member of 
a subordinated group in an unjust hierarchy that calls for 
resistance and displacement with new, non-hierarchical 
relations. Sociologists Aldon Morris and Naomi Braine ofer 
the following defnition: 
An oppositional consciousness is an empowering 
mental state that prepares members of an 
oppressed group to act to undermine, reform, 
or overthrow a system of human domination. 
Minimally, that mental state includes identifying 
with a subordinate group, concluding that the 
mechanisms that have produced at least some of 
the group inequalities are unjust, opposing the 
injustice, and seeing a common interest within the 
subordinate group in eliminating the injustice. . . . 
A more full-fedged oppositional consciousness 
includes seeing some actions of the dominant 
group as forming in some way a “system.”16 
Oppositional consciousness, as a form of subjectivity, 
is a way of making sense of reality. The core idea is for 
members of a group demarcated by shared injustice to 
develop an awareness of their situation as an oppression 
by undermining the dominant practices and concepts 
obscuring it, for example, through creatively formed 
SPRING 2021 | VOLUME 20  | NUMBER 3 PAGE 13 
APA NEWSLETTER  |  FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
 
conceptual tools for naming and making sense of the 
injustice.17 Oppositional consciousness allows members of 
the group to vindicate their shared experience by bringing 
it to light in its capacity as unjust, including the various 
grassroots forms of resistance that might otherwise seem 
mundane. As political scientist Jane Mansbridge puts it, 
oppositional consciousness provides an “injustice frame” 
for making sense of oppression, often frst felt as a “gut 
refusal to be subordinated.”18 
In the context of SES in graduate education, oppositional 
consciousness means recognizing one’s subordinated 
place in the SES hierarchy in higher education, identifying 
the network of factors perpetuating that hierarchy, and 
aspiring to transform the power relations among members 
of the institution to end the hierarchy. In this way, a low-SES 
graduate student can turn their experiences of injustice, 
which are likely otherwise only damaging to them, into an 
important, proactive part of their identity. This can obviously 
take a number of diferent forms, and I do not suggest 
that every low-SES graduate student must see the SES 
hierarchies they confront in the same way. However, I will 
ofer some ideas about how oppositional consciousness 
might manifest for a low-SES graduate student and what 
benefts it could provide. 
For example, in my leftover food story, I felt anger, hurt, and 
guilt, through a connection to those in my socio-economic 
class, in opposition to the class around me. This provided 
the moral framework for evaluating possible courses of 
action. Out of a sense of duty to myself and to people 
in my life, I decided to take the leftovers home, package 
them, and give them away to graduate students and staf. 
Similarly, feeling connected to benefciaries of tax-funded 
social programs, I refused to participate in the high school 
teaching program, and as a TA, I spent the semester trying 
to convince the students in my three discussion sections 
to resist the ideas presented in class; when I had the 
opportunity to teach the class the next summer, I focused 
it on socialist and egalitarian political philosophies. These 
were not necessarily the right responses, but, for me, the 
ability to fnd a response that met my immediate needs 
in any way was possible only by creating group-based 
distance between myself and the community in which I 
lived and worked. If my experience can be generalized, 
it suggests that oppositional consciousness, and the 
collective nature of its division between “us” and “them,” 
is needed for this clearing of space in which to articulate 
values and other moral commitments and identify actions 
that refect them. 
Moreover, oppositional consciousness can address the 
problems I articulated above. First, it calls for students to 
fnd a way to draw a frm boundary between themselves and 
the elite culture and practices of higher education, because 
this is necessary for acquiring the moral clarity to identify a 
socio-economic injustice as such. This partially addresses 
the lack of recognition of the conceptual pressures a low-
SES graduate student faces in Morton’s original model. 
While there is no simple recipe, oppositional consciousness 
implies that the kinds of audiences that will be receptive 
must reject usual ways of thinking and acting as aspects 
of the existing system of domination. In my experience, 
departmental or professional advocacy groups, graduate 
worker unions, and other (often marginalized) graduate 
spaces can provide this audience. Once a graduate student 
has practiced oppositional consciousness, they will be 
more inoculated against the conceptual pressures I outlined 
above: a network of beliefs, concepts, and practices will 
help to name and make sense of SES hierarchies, often or 
ideally in a way that connects them to other interlocking 
forms of injustice. 
Second, the goal of oppositional consciousness is to end 
the source of opposition, that is, the existing system of 
domination. This is a collective confict between two social 
groups. From this perspective, upward mobility is a form 
of infltration: one moves closer to the resources of the 
dominant group in order to disrupt the existing system. 
This is an important perspective to inhabit, as it speaks 
to one of the concerns that an upwardly mobile student 
might have, namely, that their mobility is ultimately only 
a further form of domination, by taking them away from 
their communities and assimilating them into the elite. 
While Morton highlights the importance of individuals 
seeking long-term reform to resist this form of complicity, 
oppositional consciousness allows an individual to see 
their eforts as part of a larger struggle requiring solidarity. 
Moreover, it locates that struggle in the immediate present, 
which can allow a low-SES graduate student to see how 
they presently occupy unjust relations (e.g., earning 
poverty wages). Relatedly, oppositional consciousness can 
provide the psychological fortitude to push the boundaries 
of what is considered acceptable in order to identify actions 
that have immediate efect. As I outlined above, to decide 
on certain courses of action and to maintain conviction, I 
thought about how I could express my loyalty to people 
from my class background who weren’t there with me 
precisely because of class, with less regard to how this 
would be received by my peers and supervisors. 
Indeed, oppositional consciousness can cultivate a durable 
sense of hope for improvement grounded in a radical 
honesty. It arises out of the realization that the only path 
to well-being comes from confrontation and solidarity. In 
this way, oppositional consciousness is an aspect of being 
“clear-eyed” about the sources of the costs of mobility. 
Moreover, as I suggested above, Morton’s assumption that 
the sources of these costs are capable of being changed 
in a fundamental way, and that a low-SES student will fnd 
durable mobility, can be undermined by the same system 
they seek to inhabit and transform. The long-term vision of 
oppositional consciousness can help mitigate these forces 
by providing a larger picture in which to embed individual 
sources of ethical costs, and an expectation of resistance to 
change as part of its analysis of power struggle. Even if the 
pathway upward is thwarted, oppositional consciousness 
provides a framework for understanding why, and for 
maintaining resolve in a long-term struggle. Thus, the 
radical honesty of oppositional consciousness creates a 
foundation for renewing hope. 
Yet, I recommend oppositional consciousness as one area 
of the space comprising a clear- eyed ethical narrative. 
This is important, for example, because oppositional 
consciousness is risky— e.g., being adversarial could risk 
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losing the favor of an advisor who can provide access 
to professional opportunities. Low-SES students are 
inherently more economically vulnerable and often more 
socially isolated; and many low-SES students face multiple 
oppressions and sources of vulnerability. These challenges 
require being able to evaluate oppositional consciousness 
itself, as one factor in a low-SES graduate student’s attempt 
to make sense of their mobility. Still, upwardly mobile 
individuals have a broad matrix of reasoning that is capable 
of taking into view competing personal considerations 
regarding their mobility like these. As the feminist writer 
bell hooks writes, in a similar context: 
When I fnished my doctorate I felt too much 
uncertainty about who I had become. Uncertain 
about whether I had managed to make it through 
without giving up the best of myself, the best 
of the values I had been raised to believe in— 
hard work, honesty, and respect for everyone no 
matter their class—I fnished my education with 
my allegiance to the working class intact. Even so, 
I had planted my feet on the path leading in the 
direction of class privilege. There would always 
be contradictions to face. There would always be 
confrontations around the issue of class. I would 
always have to reexamine where I stand.19 
My suggestion is that oppositional consciousness is an 
essential moral goal for giving shape to this reexamination; 
it can help graduate students from non-privileged 
backgrounds orient themselves as they undergo the 
continued transformation arising from their mobility. 
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What It’s Like to Grow Up Poor, but Fall 
in Love with Philosophy: A Notice to the 
Profession in Case It Forgot 
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“So if it’s all love, show me love then.” 
– Cardi B. 
Perhaps no issue is more widely debated in feminist 
philosophy and critical race theory than the role that the 
experience of oppression should play in our theories. It 
inspires original, exciting research. Yet in spite of a nominal 
commitment, our profession struggles to confront the 
personal experiences of oppression of our students and 
colleagues. Among academic philosophers, just as in the 
world at large, group-based vulnerabilities vary widely: 
racist exclusion and disrespect, statelessness and a lack of 
formal legal status, sexism, ableism, heteronormativity, and 
childhood poverty. It is vital to respect our diferences to 
build inclusive professional networks and welcome a rising 
generation of young philosophers whose backgrounds 
do not align with the privilege, wealth, and whiteness 
that defne academic philosophy. Like fsh swimming 
in poisoned waters, it is hard to notice the background 
conditions that both sustain academic life and undermine 
the wellbeing of its participants. 
In this short essay, I refect on my personal experience 
of what it’s like to grow up poor, but to fall in love with 
philosophy. My motivation is not just to share anecdotes. 
To be sure, the more we share our stories of hardship, the 
less the most vulnerable among us will feel like we live 
with a shameful secret or a chip on our shoulders or are 
pariahs. Rather, my objective is to defend the imperative of 
welcoming diverse backgrounds into academic philosophy. 
Our personal experiences are valuable for refning 
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philosophical research agendas and challenging status quo 
perceptions of intelligence and prestige. The profession is 
lucky to have us: we foster its growth and hold the promise 
of its future. I also make some recommendations to guide 
inclusive practices for students and colleagues. 
I. IN THE BEGINNING 
I graduated from a public high school in NYC a month 
before I turned sixteen years old. I was the only one of my 
friends to graduate and resigned myself to being “the smart 
one” among a close-knit circle of drug addicts, musicians, 
and autobody mechanics—some who embodied all three 
identities at once—but all of whom lived and worked on 
Coney Island Avenue in the southern most coastline of 
Brooklyn, New York. We drifted for about a year. After a 
particularly bad night out, I woke up alone in a stranger’s 
apartment. He had pink hair and tattoos and walked me to 
the train station. As we walked, I felt a wave of gratitude, 
my eyes welling. I somehow sensed that he had not 
touched me while I was blacked out. As the train climbed 
its elevated tracks, I watched the morning sun pour into 
the faces of the women beside me on the train. I wanted 
more than anything to be a little more like them. They had 
somewhere to go. They were busy and dignifed in the life 
they were building for themselves; however modest, it was 
theirs. Above all, I wanted my body, I wanted my mind. I 
decided that morning that I would get to college, one way 
or another. And so, the weird gratitude to a stranger for not 
violating me in the context of a functional homelessness 
that would last into my early twenties was the impetus for 
my philosophical studies. 
I was in and out of my mother’s home in my late teens, 
before I left for good after we lost our home to the housing 
market crash during which over nine million American 
families lost their homes from 2006 to 2014.1 I took one of 
two paths available to most women from my neighborhood 
of Slavic and Central Asian extraction: sex work or domestic 
work. Because I fgured I had some kind of skillset in the 
latter department, I became a live-in nanny for a philosophy 
professor, of all people. A stark representation of the 
realities of who I was and of where I wanted to be and 
might yet still go. But even if I couldn’t believe it then, I was 
already on my way. 
For me, poverty was an immense feeling of aloneness. A 
kind of drifting into a cosmic void, like being lowered into 
a sensory deprivation tank. The future, at best, is a promise 
that won’t be kept and that you don’t believe in anyway. 
At worst, it’s a threat. Most days you don’t feel anything. 
Not knowing what to do with one’s own body—that my 
physical body was a burden to bear, fnding a place for it 
to sleep, eat, pass the hours of the day and night, safely. 
It wasn’t the condition of my existence, but a stubborn, 
ever-present obstacle. An obstacle that in Hunter College 
I assailed by staying in the library until it closed. I flled 
every research and editorial opportunity in the philosophy 
department until the chair (and longtime beloved mentor 
Frank Kirkland) gave me a key to an ofce. Once I walked 
out of a local supermarket with an entire “party-size” tray 
of shrimp cocktail for an end-of-semester class party. 
The instructor had asked us to bring “snacks.” I probably 
could’ve just brought nothing but didn’t want to be outed 
as poor. She was a harbinger of all those to come who 
would unintentionally exacerbate my insecurity before— 
and arrogant disdain for—those who were better of. It 
illustrated how much one person has to sacrifce for what 
someone else can take for granted. 
My formative experiences refected in my philosophical 
studies by forming a constructive outlet for my anger. With 
philosophy, I had my frst chance to refect on my life, a 
tightly wound knot of bad memories to which I had become 
numb. Even if anger predominated, an entire range of 
feelings returned to me as I uncoiled memories and used 
them to sustain my focus to study ethics and politics. I found 
the concepts to make sense of my experiences. I formed 
a strong voice and a sense of self. I became passionate. I 
had a way to understand and condemn the world. Even if 
I couldn’t change my immediate circumstances, at least I 
could explain why my anger was justifed. And for that I will 
always be grateful to and love philosophy. 
My anger has now mostly dimmed. The further in time and 
space that I move away from my past and my hometown, 
respectively, the less my memories hold my attention. I get 
scared sometimes that I will forget, get comfortable and 
complacent. Yet just as falling in love makes you want to 
be a better person, my love for philosophy has, with time, 
driven me to rise above myself. It is important for me to hold 
onto the parts of myself that had inspired my philosophical 
imagination. But it’s just as important to me to learn to see 
the world from the perspective of others who can complete 
and refne my philosophical imagination. For there are 
even greater sacrifces so many are forced to make for 
the privileges I can take for granted in the profession 
and in the world at large. Though my own experiences 
have primed me to empathize with others, the frsthand 
experience of hardship is absolutely not necessary to stand 
in compassionate solidarity with others and to appreciate 
their perspective and advocate—and even sacrifce—on 
their behalf. 
And so, I don’t want to forget my own memories. I also don’t 
want to forget what Toni Morrison in Beloved describes as 
“rememories” that belong to somebody else and that never 
happened to me: 
“I was talking about time. It’s so hard for me to 
believe in it. Some things go. Pass on. Some things 
just stay. I used to think it was my rememory. You 
know. Some things you forget. Other things you 
never do. But it’s not. Places, places are still there. 
If a house burns down, it’s gone, but the place— 
the picture of it—stays, not just in my rememory, 
but out there in the world. What I remember is a 
picture foating around out there outside my head. 
I mean, even if I don’t think it, even if I die, the 
picture of what I did, or knew, or saw is still out 
there. Right in the place where it happened.” 
“Can other people see it?” asked Denver. 
“Oh, yes. Oh, yes, yes, yes. Someday you will be 
walking down the road and you hear something or 
see something going on. So clear. And you think 
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it’s you thinking it up. A thought picture. But no. It’s 
when you bump into a rememory that belongs to 
somebody else. Where I was before I came here, 
that place is real. It’s never going away. Even if the 
whole farm—every tree and grass blade of it dies. 
The picture is still there and what’s more, if you go 
there—you who never was there—if you go there 
and stand in the place where it was, it will happen 
again; it will be there for you, waiting for you.”2 
Morrison suggests that some memories of hardship are so 
acute and so neglected that they become “rememories.” 
They become something like orphaned memories, outside 
of received histories and day-to-day conversations, and 
they linger after the persons who experienced them 
frsthand are gone. Morrison suggests that it should be 
the burden of the world to bear rememories and to change 
the institutional structures that had generated them in the 
frst place. In other words, orphaned memories should 
eventually fnd a home in a discursive community. What is 
more, even if we continue to ignore rememories, they will 
remain palpable enough that we will “bump” into them. But 
for philosophers, of course, the goal is not to “bump” into 
that which holds ethical signifcance, like hands groping in 
the dark: it is to mediate, build, and invite community. We 
just need to fgure out how to. 
In a collection of essays published in 2019 shortly before 
her death, The Source of Self-Regard, Morrison discusses 
drawing on slave narratives in her research for her exquisite 
novel Beloved. Received narratives of American history had 
elided the black historical perspective on slavery. Morrison 
pieces together what was left unsaid in US history books 
written by whites to uphold white-power regimes for 
centuries. She looks to enslaved persons’ own accounts of 
what had happened to them. Her work is the site of a “pitched 
battle between remembering and forgetting.”3 She notes 
that the notion of rememory confronts an unspoken past 
and the untold experiences of hardship that it conceals in a 
new way: it amounts to “the efort to remember and not to 
know.”4 What I take Morrison to mean here is that “knowing” 
is an open-ended, incomplete, and imperfect process. She 
cannot “know” the personal experience of slavery in the 
sense that the mechanisms for constructing knowledge 
are profoundly unreliable. However, without amounting to 
“knowledge,” her fctionalized representations honor the 
ethical demands of memory. They partially fll in the “truth” 
to represent the millions of enslaved persons who never 
had a chance to speak for themselves and who perished 
nameless and forgotten in the Middle Passage and on 
plantations. 
II. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Morrison’s notion of “rememory” is a useful normative 
signpost for thinking about the ethics of inclusion that 
can guide the redistribution of power and prestige in 
academic philosophy. In order to build inclusive discursive 
communities, we must accept that the missing pieces of 
our collective knowledge require an ever-expanding circle 
of interlocutors whom we have historically excluded as 
credible epistemic agents. In a real sense, our profession 
does not “know” and will never “know” the rememory of 
those it seeks to welcome. But it must nevertheless attempt 
to carry that epistemic weight anyway. That is a tall order for 
a profession that resists mitigating the illicit authority of 
those who hold de facto power and privilege. And yet it 
should be the responsibility of the profession to ease the 
burden—and even sacrifce—for those it nominally seeks 
to welcome. 
In my view, following Morrison, the ethics of inclusion 
involves cultivating both deliberative reciprocity and an 
inclination to foreground the voices of the excluded. On the 
one hand, if we expect to be heard, we must reciprocate, in 
return, an open disposition to listen and to engage in good 
faith. That is, treat others like real philosophers. Read their 
work. Disagree in meaningful and helpful ways. And above 
all: read and assign in syllabi historically excluded voices 
and canonical fgures. As a Du Bois scholar, I can’t say how 
many times I’ve been on a panel with commentators who 
preface their remarks, “Never read Du Bois, but skimmed 
Souls on the fight over—interesting stuf!” Or, “It seems 
to me that you’re making a mountain out of a molehill— 
there’s just not enough ‘there there’ in his writings.” I can’t 
imagine someone on a Kant panel making similar claims 
about Kant’s worst and most notorious writings, such as his 
lectures on anthropology and geography. 
On the other hand, the project of building inclusive 
discursive practices is even more demanding than merely 
cultivating genuine deliberative reciprocity. It asks us to
foreground the persons excluded by our profession as 
holding the promise of its future development. As such, we 
must accept that those who fnished public or community 
colleges, or who were the frst in their family to graduate 
high school and go to college, or enter the middle class
are the potential future leaders of the profession. They 
too are philosophical powerhouses to whom we owe our 
respect and gratitude for bothering with a profession that 
for too long and for no good reason has made no room 
for them. I have been lucky enough to teach in public 
universities for many years now. I enter my classroom 
with all the seriousness that my students—who tend to be 
socioeconomically and racially diverse—hold the key to 
what our discipline could one day become. We must attend 
to the needs of a diverse student body not just for the 
sake of inclusion, but for the sake of the potential vibrancy 
of philosophy itself. Moreover, we owe our students as 
a matter of moral respect and justice the opportunity to 
pursue their chosen profession with dignity. Without 
accepting these claims about the ethics of inclusion, I 
believe that it will be difcult to garner the collective will to 
enact the recommendations I outline below. 
Early mentoring. First, it is vital to start cultivating early 
informal support networks for students, with a special focus 
on teaching philosophy efectively to undergraduates. For 
good reasons, we tend to focus on our graduate students 
in whose intellectual development we are directly invested. 
Yet there are serious limitations to this approach. Being 
admitted into a competitive graduate school often signifes 
that a student has already scaled a formidable obstacle that 
many talented but poorer students cannot scale on their 
own. Unfortunately, admission into graduate philosophy 
programs often requires an undergraduate degree from 
some of the most expensive colleges in the world. For 
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example, as my alma mater The Graduate Center, CUNY 
moves up in rank, admissions committees draw more 
seldomly on the student body that CUNY is supposed to 
serve: students like me who attended New York City public 
schools and CUNY colleges. I have found the same trend in 
large public research universities across the country. 
I suggest we start modelling informal support networks 
at the undergraduate level that we’d like to see grow in 
the profession. At least in my case, efective mentoring 
entailed long mentoring relationships that kept me on track, 
alerted me to opportunities, and advocated for me when I 
felt like I was losing ground in difcult circumstances. Just 
to have someone who is ready to talk philosophy—I mean 
to really get into it—was extremely dignifying when I was 
losing heart. In order to build these kinds of transformative 
mentoring relationships, potential mentors must earn 
students’ trust and this takes time. Instead, we often 
show a weird formal distance from our undergraduate 
students that leads the more vulnerable to turn away from 
philosophy because they intuit that few will be there for 
them when they will need it most. Moreover, it is of course 
vital to continue nurturing students’ development once 
they enter graduate school. 
Monetary Support. Access to resources for economically 
disadvantaged students is perhaps most helpful of all. 
Usually, the less a student has, the more likely they will 
work while in college. Some students raise children or take 
care of family members, particularly in public colleges. The 
discrepancies in pay faced by women, people of color, and 
women of color in particular are well known. The attack on 
FAFSA, Pell, and TAP student aid programs further burdens 
an already cash-strapped student body reeling from the 
efects of a string of economic crises. Federal and state 
subsidies for fnancing needy students’ college degrees 
are being depleted by rightwing profteers. The cost of a 
college degree is prohibitive, even in a public university 
system such as CUNY, which was free until 1976.5 The 
escalating costs of higher education tightly knits whiteness, 
power, and prestige, which then seeps into the culture and 
material reality of academic philosophy. Albeit a small step 
in the right direction, in my experience, the commitment 
of a philosophy department to hire research or editorial 
assistants can provide students with much needed cash 
and help foster the mentoring relationships that are vital 
for their long-term success. Even the rare monetary essay 
prizes for majors can go a long way. For the solidly middle 
class, it is easy to overlook the diference an extra $300 or 
$500 can make for a student living paycheck-to-paycheck. 
My mentors also nominated me, again and again, for 
grants and national awards when I lacked the cultural 
capital to discover them on my own. Finally, full-time and 
tenured faculty should consider subsidizing departmental 
conference travel funds for undergraduate and graduate 
students, as well as co-writing talks with students, who can 
then begin accessing our professional networks. 
The politics of public schooling. What is more, inequalities 
in academic philosophy refect the staggering inequalities 
not only in higher education but at schooling at the pre-K 
and K-12 levels across the US. The under-resourcing of 
public schools disproportionately impacts communities 
of color and black and brown students. Recently, public 
school students in the worst performing high schools 
in Detroit won a class-action lawsuit against the state of 
Michigan because they graduated high school unable to 
read.6 The New York Times reports: 
The ruling came in response to a class-action 
lawsuit fled by a group of Detroit public school 
students that cited a litany of severe defciencies: 
Rodent-infested schools. Unqualifed and absentee 
teachers. Physics classes given only biology 
textbooks. “Advanced” high school reading groups 
working at the fourth-grade level. 
[. . .] The overwhelming majority of students in the 
Detroit public schools are black or Hispanic and 
come from low-income families. Judge Clay noted 
that through the nation’s history, white people 
have repeatedly withheld education to deny 
political power to African-Americans and others, 
most notably under slavery and segregation.7 
A federal court ruled that Americans have the constitutional 
right to literacy, without which they are unable to participate 
in democratic public life. The ruling in the Detroit case 
occurred in April 2020. It follows class-action lawsuits fled 
by former public school students in New Hampshire and 
California. Note: This trend is the national context of debates 
about the ethics of inclusion in academic philosophy. 
Obviously poor educational outcomes in high school 
leave students unprepared for college. It also prohibits 
economically disadvantaged students from pursuing 
any profession at all and locks them into grinding, soul-
crushing poverty. If we are serious about welcoming 
diverse backgrounds into academic philosophy, we must 
contextualize the inequalities in our profession in the light 
of the grossly unequal access to a quality higher education 
and public schooling at all levels. In other words, our 
commitment to inclusion cannot be myopic. It ultimately 
entails getting involved in messy political debates that 
seem prima facie unrelated. As a profession, we must
defend public schools, as well as afordable—heck, free!— 
college education as an essential public good. 
Moreover, given extreme structural inequalities, our most 
vulnerable students and their families also require quality, 
publicly funded childcare, fair compensation for their labor, 
health care, adequate shelter and nutritious food, resources 
without which focusing on one’s studies takes a herculean 
efort—the kind of efort that drives the heroines of epic 
poems to battle sea monsters and pagan gods. To be blunt, 
the profession needs a clear progressive politics. Even if 
there is reasonable disagreement about which variety of 
a socialist or liberal democracy best exemplifes justice, 
there must be a consensus about the crucial importance of 
public schools and the universal satisfaction of basic needs 
for all children, including our historically excluded, brilliant, 
and hardworking philosophy students. 
Refecting on post-WWII Germany, Hannah Arendt observes 
that “There are more than a few people, especially among 
the cultural élite, who still publicly regret the fact that 
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Germany sent Einstein packing, without realizing that it was 
a much greater crime to kill little Hans Cohn from around 
the corner, even though he was no genius.”8 In our efort to 
build an inclusive community in academic philosophy, we 
must commit to the right of all children to live dignifed and 
fourishing lives, with access to quality public schools at 
all levels and basic resources, regardless of the benefcial 
efect it will have downstream on enriching academic 
philosophy, which it inevitably will. At the very least, it 
cannot remain a matter of a random draw that a child is 
fated to attend a local public school district that will teach 
her how to read. Whatever obstacles I faced, I am somehow 
left feeling lucky. In fact, I am in awe of my good fortune 
that even as I drifted after high school, reading was my frst 
love, one that would make it so sweet and empowering to 
later welcome philosophy into my life. 
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Knowing What to Order at the Conference 
Dinner 
Ian James Kidd 
UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM 
Here’s a story about a familiar scene. A group of philosophers 
in a restaurant at the end-of-the-frst-day conference dinner. 
One of them, I notice, is clearly uncomfortable. During 
earlier sessions, they’d been confdent and cheerful. Now, 
they’re anxious and quiet. Sitting by them, I asked if they 
were okay. Hesitantly, they explained they’d never eaten 
at a restaurant before. Everything about the experience 
was unfamiliar—the place was pulsing with uncertainties. 
Where to sit. Who the water on the table is for. Whether you 
ask to get up and go to the bathroom. How long the meal 
lasts. When you pay. Whether there are speeches. 
Alongside this uncertainty about the rules and format 
of the evening, the philosopher was deeply struck by 
how obviously comfortable everyone else seemed. Folks 
were relaxed—jackets of, pouring wine, laughing away 
at favourite stories and old jokes. Everyone else, they 
said, was so obviously at home in this environment. They 
were utterly competent in all these little actions—clearly 
rehearsed in hailing a waiter, perusing a menu, knowing 
which glass was theirs. Speaking phenomenologically, 
what struck the philosopher was that everyone else was 
embedded in a space of possibilities they were able to 
navigate with unrufed spontaneity. It was an environment 
in which they felt at home. By contrast, the philosopher 
lamented, they lacked the most elementary knowledge 
and understanding. How do you call a waiter? What can I 
ask them for? Is there a charge if I ask for more water? 
I ofered to help, and, after a pause, they held out their 
menu to me. 
“What do I order?” 
That question totally threw me. I was so familiar with 
restaurants; it hadn’t occurred to me someone might not 
know that you can choose what you like. My parents took 
my sister and I to restaurants when we were little. Since we 
couldn’t always aford holidays, it was one way to give us 
nice experiences my parents had never had. None of them 
were Michelin-star places—my post-industrial hometown 
had none of those. But I knew enough to know how to act 
in restaurants. I’d read a menu, asked my parents to explain 
the words, and seen people picking out their glass from 
the array of options. I knew that specials are usually pricier, 
knew how to act when someone was serving me, knew not 
to stack and carry the plates at the end of the meal. By 
contrast, said the philosopher, they’d never even entered
a restaurant. 
When they asked what they should order, I realised they’d 
assumed that there was an item they were supposed to 
select—as if all conferences attendees had been assigned
a meal. They thought they’d missed that bit of information 
(was it in the conference pack?) and were feeling that hot 
fear of not knowing what to say, like an actor forgetting 
their lines. It wasn’t clear to them that they could choose 
anything they liked. Obviously, once I explained, things 
became tougher in a diferent way. Your choices depend 
on your wallet. Moreover, you need to fnd some dish you 
understood enough to be confdent in choosing. Like many 
restaurants selected for conference dinners, this one was 
fancy—the cheapest main was about twenty dollars and 
the mark-up on drinks was steep. 
Unfortunately, the rest of the table went for three-
courses—which, I explained, meant starter, mains, and a 
dessert. Automatically totting up prices, the philosopher 
was then aghast when I warned that there was the risk 
of someone suggesting splitting the bill “equally.” Their 
carefully constructed $27.85 bill could infate into a cross-
subsidising $100 bill. (Luckily, the conference organisers 
later passed around to advise against splitting—a crucial 
intervention, since power dynamics make it hard to resist 
by saying, “Actually, could we not. . .”) 
I tell this story because, a few days later, on returning 
home, I happened to tell it to a colleague. 
SPRING 2021 | VOLUME 20  | NUMBER 3 PAGE 19 








They burst out laughing. 
“Ha ha ha! How can you not know how to order at a 
restaurant!” 
Years later, I’m still struck by the stupidity of this statement. 
Stupid in the sense of a culpable failure to exercise 
one’s intelligence. For a start, it’s perfectly obvious why 
a person might not know the myriad norms, rules, and 
micropractices relevant to restaurants. You may be from a 
family too poor to enjoy the luxury of paying professionals 
to prepare and serve you food. You may have always lived 
in socioeconomically impoverished areas that don’t have
restaurants. You may not have the luxury of regarding food 
as an opportunity for outsourcing your culinary labour and 
enjoying an evening of recreational consumption. If you’re 
poor, you wait tables, you don’t sit at them. 
Since none of these possibilities is difcult to generate 
intellectually, my colleague’s failure lay somewhere else. If 
stupidity is a culpable failure to exercise one’s intelligence, 
then we ought to ask what motivates those failures. Some 
obvious candidates are the epistemic limitations built 
into the structured pathways of experience and activity 
characteristic of socially and materially privileged people. 
From my colleague’s perspective, those possibilities really 
were just possibilities—abstract options, generated by 
imagination, not drawn from painful memory. 
If my colleague’s earlier life aforded the consistent 
possibility of fun meals out, that’s a good thing. From 
experience, I know that being poor and hungry sucks, not 
an experience that I’d wish on anyone. But that sets up 
the challenge—to maintain an empathic understanding of 
realities of life that lie outside the particular course of one’s 
own experience, to resist the stupidifcation that poverty of 
experience breeds, to constantly act to resist the ossifying 
patterns of obliviousness to the heterogeneity of human 
life sustained by one’s privileges. It is the challenge— 
moral as much as epistemic—to inhabit a particular style 
of life without it gradually narrowing our receptivity to 
other kinds of life, to the wider realities of how our fellow 
humans live, or try to. It’s easy for our imaginations to 
become dampened, leading to contemptuous snorts of 
laughter at the fumbling uncertainties of others. (The 
Britpop band, Pulp, put it well in their song “Common 
People,” which describes a wealthy girl who “wants to live 
like common people.” Upon being taken to a supermarket, 
“I said ‘Pretend you’ve got no money’ / She just laughed 
and said, ‘You’re so funny’”). It may seem hard to imagine 
someone getting to their twenties without having eaten in 
a restaurant—but it’s not, really. 
Back to the philosopher in the restaurant. I didn’t laugh at 
their uncertainty and their ignorance because, thanks to 
the forethought and determination of my parents, I’d had 
some experience of restaurants. They were poor for a lot of 
my early life, but hid it very well. Even now, the economic 
precarity that structured my earlier life remains well-
concealed, as I half-remember bags of ‘hand-me-downs’ 
and assurances on Christmas Day that my parents spent 
the same amount on my sister and I. Such experiences 
help me do the work to avoid the fault of that colleague 
who gufawed at the sad ignorance of someone who didn’t 
know how menus work. 
Obviously, we can make it easier for philosophers to 
exercise their intelligence and imagination, not least 
diversifying our disciplinary demographics. If departments 
are stafed by those from wealthier backgrounds, 
that sustains expectations about what sorts of social 
experiences and activities can be taken as the norm. A wine 
reception—never one with beers. A conference dinner at a 
smart restaurant—never something informal in someone’s 
home. Upon describing a typical conference dinner to a 
friend, they said it’d be more fun to have a few beers in 
someone’s garden with homecooked food. He regarded 
visits to restaurants as complexly demanding trials, course 
after course of class-coded challenges with constant risk of 
subtle normative censure. 
I’m not urging abandonment of the swanky conference 
dinner, nor suggesting frst-generation philosophers 
from socioeconomically underprivileged backgrounds are 
incapable of enjoying them and mastering their nuances. 
That would be invidious snobbery, of a sort liable to mutate 
into horrible contemptuousness. What can help, though, 
are changes to our social practices in specifc contexts 
like restaurants. Some of the changes are obvious. Don’t 
choose pricier restaurants, unless you have budget to pay 
for all the attendees (and beware well-meant systems 
that require people to reveal that they need fnancial 
assistance). Sometimes, there are collegial delegates who 
ofer to subsidise the unfunded and underfunded. That’s 
a nice practice, albeit too dependent on the generosity of 
attendees to be any real solution. Proscribe the practice 
of ‘splitting the bill’, which really forces the involuntarily 
abstemious to subsidise those who enjoyed three courses 
and expensive wine. Choose restaurants that ofer special 
deals—“$30 dollars for two courses if you order between 
5 and 7!” If they don’t, try to negotiate a deal, or else take 
your ffty-person party elsewhere. 
Crucially, communicate all these costs to attendees 
in advance. Some will have to save up in advance for 
conferences. Being told three months in advance that the 
conference dinner will cost thirty dollars total including 
your frst drink helps them to budget. Moreover, if you’re 
the organiser, provide information on hidden costs, like the 
tip at the restaurant and the cost of a taxi: when I was a 
postgrad, my heart sank when someone suggested sharing 
a taxi, since I could never aford one, unless I gave up on 
having an alcoholic drink over dinner. If you can, cover costs 
of taxis to and from the restaurant. Provide information on 
public transport—too many conference organisers forget 
about buses. Conference packs, in my experience, rarely 
include bus schedules. If you’re a fnancially privileged 
delegate, consider inviting those who need a ride to join 
your taxi. Be clear you’re not expecting them to chip in for 
the fare. 
A conference dinner at a restaurant represents a whole
structure of socially, culturally, and materially complicated
relationships. Some people are comfortable in those
structures, since they’ll be as efortlessly able to pay the bill
as navigate the menu. They’ll have a lovely evening. But for
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others, those structures impose anxiety, uncertainty, and a
bill that can’t be allayed with a wave of a credit card or the
keeping of receipts for reimbursement—a privilege that can
also be co-opted, of course, by delegates inclined to support
their fellow diners who use their fnancial privileges to help
others. And remember that some can’t aford the upfront
costs in the way assumed by the reimbursement model. 
Some of this is the work of the organiser, some is the work 
of the attendees. Some of the work is rewarding. Many 
enjoy their generosity and public acts of magnanimity. 
Some of the work is dull or demanding. Some delegates 
get grumpy if told they can’t water down their own bill. 
Arranging taxis is more work than just expecting people 
to call an Uber. Telephoning the restaurant to negotiate a 
deal is more work than not. But taking such measures are 
ways of trying to make the social and fnancial experience 
of a conference easier for low-income and frst-generation 
philosophers—indeed, for anyone whose experiences and 
resources don’t automatically make a conference dinner 
the chilled, enjoyable experience it is for so many. That 
young philosopher had a rough time at that restaurant. A 
lot of their discomfort could have been allayed—but not by 
someone, like my colleague, inclined to laugh at the very 
idea of not knowing how a restaurant works. 
A conference dinner at a restaurant is a good place for 
considering the interactions of class, race, economic 
privilege, professional comportment, and the culturally 
coded forms of sophistication that have been built into the 
discipline. Much needs to be changed and a really good 
place to start is by appreciating these realities—to grasp 
that when you’re happily sitting choosing a starter from the 
menu, the person sitting opposite may be wondering if the 
acute uncertainty they’re feeling at that moment means 
they chose the wrong profession. 
Epistemic Shame as a First-Generation 
Scholar 
Lucia Munguia 
WILLIAM PATERSON UNIVERSITY 
Once, during my time as a graduate student at Cornell 
University, I was reading in its iconic “Big Red Barn” when 
a few undergraduate students sat down at the table beside 
me. They were discussing the various ways their parents had 
protected them from bits of information that were deemed 
too burdensome for them to bear as busy college students. 
The examples ranged. One family hid a large-scale home 
renovation so their child would not worry about their life 
without a fully functional kitchen. Another set of parents 
kept the fact that their child’s ex-partner had moved on to 
another while the child was away in Ithaca. The students 
shared their feelings about these omissions with humor 
and lightheartedness. The overall mood seemed to be one 
of mild annoyance, colored with understanding. I gathered 
my book and set of for my shared TA ofce down the hill. 
My mind veered towards the question, “What is my family 
keeping from me?” 
Three years prior, when I left Barrio Hollywood in Tucson, 
AZ for New York state, I knew there would be information 
kept from me. I was leaving at the onset of big things in my 
family: my parents took on a restructuring of debt earlier that 
year and each of my three younger siblings welcomed their 
frst child, which I knew would raise fnancial and emotional 
stress given that my siblings ranged in age from 19 to 23 
and only two of them had a high school degree. Although 
it was safe to assume that difculties similar to the ones 
we faced while I was growing up would arise, weekend 
calls regularly failed to mention those things. My family did 
not divulge their worries about the cost of childcare. They 
did not discuss their difculty getting the correct amount 
of peanut butter through WIC (i.e., Special Supplemental 
Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children), the 
status of my parents’ bankruptcy, whether there were any
broken-down vehicles, whether any of my siblings were 
stuck waiting for public transit in the scorching Southwest 
sun while carrying a cranky toddler, or anything like that. 
When I asked how things were on those fronts, the topic 
quickly changed. On that short walk, I began to identify 
what I was feeling by the omissions I knew were present 
in my life: shame. I now take this experience to be one of 
epistemic shame. 
Here, I sketch a short rationale for this claim. I briefy 
summarize recent accounts of “epistemic shame,”
highlighting two features of them: (1) epistemic shame is 
an afective state that necessarily has a false belief as its 
object and (2) the intensity of an experience of epistemic 
shame is a function of the judgments other people make 
about one for holding a false belief. I suggest that the 
experience of epistemic shame described above is some 
motivation to reject both (1) and (2). As I hope to show, 
epistemic shame does not require a false belief as its 
object. Nor does it require one to hold any specifc belief at 
all. Epistemic shame may occur when any feature of one’s 
epistemic life is shameworthy. This is because holding 
true beliefs is not the only quality one might strive for in 
an epistemic life. Here, I highlight how sometimes one 
may strive to share epistemic burdens with those they 
love because doing so is the basis upon which meaningful 
bonds with them are sown and strengthened. When one 
fails to do this, an experience of epistemic shame may 
follow. Further, I show that the intensity of one’s feeling of 
epistemic shame can also be a function of the importance 
one places on certain features of their epistemic life. It is 
not always the case that external observers infuence how 
this epistemic emotion is felt. 
Current work in philosophy and psychology takes epistemic 
shame to be the shame that one feels as a result of holding 
a belief that leads to contradiction or holding a false 
belief. Of course, the specifcs are put forth using diferent 
theoretical tools and concepts special to the relevant 
disciplines. For instance, Ancient Greek theorist Laura 
Candiotto ofers an account of epistemic shame based on 
the role it played in the process of belief purifcation in 
Plato’s Socratic dialogues. Candiotto shows that shame, 
captured by the Greek terms aidôs and sometimes 
aischynê, was an afective state that some of Socrates’s 
interlocutors would enter upon fnding themselves in the 
unpleasant state of aporia (i.e., fnding themselves lost 
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or without a path forward towards knowledge). However 
unpleasant, the result of discovering that one of their own 
beliefs lead to contradiction, and the shameful feeling 
following, Socrates’s elenchus were necessary components 
of improving one’s beliefs.1 Candiotto writes, 
This feeling of inferiority is a prerequisite for 
purifcation. Shame was a virtue, the one that 
allows an agent to recognize their inadequacy, and 
through it to purify them from wrong behaviors— 
from those wrong behaviors that are false beliefs 
according to the Socratic tradition—and, thus, to 
activate a process of purifcation.2 
That is, to experience epistemic shame one must hold a 
false belief and believe that one is an inferior thinker 
when compared to others. These beliefs are necessary 
prerequisites for one to feel motivated to improve their 
beliefs. Furthermore, Candiotto notes that the degree of 
shame one feels as a result of being brought into a state of 
aporia from one’s own beliefs is often a function of other 
people’s judgments. 
Specifcally, Candiotto notes that the level to which 
one feels ashamed for their false beliefs difers across 
group-facilitated processes of belief improvement (e.g., 
discussion-based inquiry) and individual processes (e.g., 
private meditation). They write, “[. . .] group aporetic states, 
described as the social procedure of belief-purifcation, 
may be more painful than the recognition of our faults while 
ruminating alone [. . .] they unmask the agent’s inadequacy 
to the other members of the group that are evaluating the 
agent’s beliefs [. . .]”3 
In psychology, Elisabeth Vogl et al. (2019) treat epistemic 
shame this way as well. They liken it to an achievement 
emotion. Achievement emotions are those arising as a 
result of some agent’s partaking in an action at which they 
can fail or succeed. Two prototypical achievement emotions 
are pride and shame. Put simply, many psychologists think 
that we tend to feel prideful when we win and shameful 
when we lose. The epistemic variants would be emotional 
states arising when one learns whether or not one has 
achieved true belief or succeeded at some cognitive task, 
like correctly answering a math question.4 
In the above accounts, we get a sense that epistemic shame 
is an emotion arising in someone as a result of holding a 
belief that is false. Simply put, an experience of epistemic 
shame has a belief as its object. However, there are many 
features of our epistemic lives that may give rise to an 
experience of epistemic shame. Some examples include 
the following. 
In addition to one caring about holding true beliefs, one 
may care about the way one arrives at their beliefs. For 
example, one may strive to have beliefs that do not depend 
on epistemic practices which are prejudicial or biased in a 
harmful way. One may also care about having beliefs that 
are not arrived at on a whim, for example, by a lucky guess. 
Further, in addition to holding true beliefs, one may care 
whether they have certain skills that are important to their 
cultural identity. For example, in the English-Only Latinx 
community (i.e., the community of Latinx individuals who 
speak English only) some report shame for not knowing 
how to speak Spanish.5 Rightfully or wrongfully, the way 
beliefs might make us feel, the questions or doubts 
that beliefs might raise in us about our belief gathering 
practices, and the connections they help us form with the 
people around us, are all things we care about as epistemic 
agents.6 In addition to whether the content of a belief is 
true, any of these features of our epistemic life can inspire 
epistemic pride and epistemic shame in us. 
Specifcally, my experience of epistemic shame (possibly 
one shared by many frst-generation scholars whose 
families tried to support their focus on education in similar 
ways) illustrates how this form of shame can result not 
from having a false belief, but from lacking certain beliefs 
altogether. In this case, a state of lacking beliefs refers 
to those instances in which an epistemic agent has some 
reason to believe there is information out there that to 
which agent could have access (information about which 
they could form beliefs), but does not. As epistemic agents 
we are constantly in a state of lacking beliefs in this way. A 
relatable example of this is the state we are in while reading 
a novel. Prior to completing a novel, we understand it has an 
ending that is available to us, but we do not yet know what 
it is, nor do we have beliefs about it. One might wonder 
what makes this a shame-inducing state. After all, how is 
this state interestingly distinct from the state we default to 
after the simple acknowledgment that there are an infnite 
number of possible beliefs we lack at any moment? 
I have come to believe that there are some beliefs I think I
ought to have because carrying the burden of these beliefs
is an ingrained component of my identity. Moreover, in
some cases, sharing the burden of certain beliefs with other
people is the way in which bonds with those people are
sown and sustained. In part, this is because without carrying
those burdens, I am powerless to alleviate the circumstances
which give rise to these beliefs. Further, I am powerless to
help my loved ones cope with the emotional realities these
beliefs bring them, like worry, stress, or their own shame for
their circumstances. By not sharing the load of those beliefs
from which my family was protecting me, I was letting myself
down on some level. That is what was shameful. I believe I
ought to carry some of the mental weight that they do. I
believe I ought to share in it because if I don’t, my identity
and my purpose have ventured too far away from them. 
My family and my roots in Tucson have been and continue 
to be a huge motivator in continuing my scholarship; but 
the connections between these two aspects of my life felt 
impossible in my frst three years of grad school. The only 
connection I could feel at frst was one of using my past as 
a source of inspiration. Every time the vulnerable process 
of submitting work was too immense, I would quickly think 
back to the days when my dad would bring all four of us 
kids to his weekend construction jobs and have us help 
smooth grout in cracks between terra-cotta bricks and hold 
rebar steady while he checked foundations for levelness. 
The work of my people is a diferent form of hard work. They 
dug holes in 90-degree weather to subsidize my education 
in any way they could. They cleaned houses and designed 
landscaping so I could have a bike to get to my classes 
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and textbooks about topics like unrestricted quantifcation. 
When I thought back to that, I could fnd inspiration to dig 
deeper and try to be confdent in my work (although, this 
is still a huge challenge). It was not until the second year 
of my PhD program when I realized that the burdensome 
beliefs I felt shame for not having might actually matter in 
a philosophical sense. 
Cornell lucked out when, during my second year of grad 
school, a young professor joined our department and 
taught (what I believe to be) one of the frst courses in 
non-ideal theory (besides our feminist philosophy course). 
Simultaneously, a close friend and I started a chapter of 
Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) at Cornell. All of a sudden, 
the world of philosophy looked really diferent to me. 
Philosophy’s distance to those real-life worries experienced 
by people like my family members felt a bit shorter. 
The epistemic shame I had for escaping burdensome 
beliefs began to look more like the kind of shame anyone 
who cares about understanding good action, good 
character, and justice ought to feel on some level. I was 
fnally learning that in writing for all, many of the ideal 
theorists I had read through the years were failing by their 
own estimation in the same ways I was. They were trying 
to answer these important questions about the role of a 
human being in supporting goodness and justice, but for 
some reason they were not considering the burden of the 
practical injustices and misfortunes that these answers 
depend on. They were simply avoiding these possible 
beliefs that were burdensome in the name of ideal theory. 
They were setting them aside for the sake of philosophical 
ease. I would not do that anymore. I decided to share the 
epistemic burdens with my family, to relate to them in this 
important way. I would push (with a “gently obnoxious” 
approach, as my sister describes it) for the full picture and 
try to help. I would no longer allow burdensome beliefs to 
be omitted from me. 
This refection illustrates reasons to reject both features 
of the current accounts of epistemic shame. First, one can 
feel epistemic shame because of beliefs they lack and 
the avoidance of the burdens those beliefs might give 
rise to (i.e., not merely because they hold a false belief). 
In my case, these were burdens I found important to bear 
because doing so felt like part of my identity and because 
bearing these burdens had instrumental value. To some 
extent, they opened a path to help when I could and they 
added an element to my philosophical thinking that I found 
to be valuable. Further, these burdens were part of the glue 
securing my familiar bonds. It is now the case that I can 
hold their hands through the ebbs and fows of life, even if I 
live far away. That is, epistemic shame led me to be a better 
epistemic agent on some level. This happens to refect the 
upshot of epistemic shame described by both Candiotto 
and Vogl et al. Both think that epistemic shame might lead 
to belief revision. Candiotto puts it in the following way: 
“Through the challenges of others, an epistemic agent 
may feel ashamed for their epistemic errors and, thus, 
have the desire to overcome this unpleasant situation 
through epistemic purifcation.”7 Vogl et al. agree to some 
extent, while also noting several studies that show shame 
to have a variable efect on how motivated someone is 
to improve at the cognitive tasks that triggered with their 
shame.8 Regardless, we can be certain that is it possible for 
experiences of epistemic shame unrelated to the holding 
of a false belief (and the judgment of others) to also lead 
to better belief gathering processes. For example, my own 
experience shows that I pushed to stop the omissions. I 
take that to be an improvement in my belief system even 
if it is not the most comfortable one. Sometimes we avoid 
information that would be too painful for us to bear for the 
sake of comfort and ease. If, as epistemic agents we think 
our goal ought to be to hold true beliefs about the world, 
prioritizing such comfort may sometimes undermine it. It 
is in this trivial sense that I take epistemic shame to have 
led me to improvement, the obtaining of a truer, more 
authentic understanding of my loved ones’ lives.9 
Second, the above refection shows how epistemic shame 
seems possible when the only judgment at play (or the most 
pressing) is one’s own. This is not in contradiction with the 
idea that the degree to which one feels epistemic shame 
depends on what their society values. It is just to say that 
the degree to which one experiences it may be a function 
of one’s own priorities in their epistemic life. I could not 
imagine living a truthful and fulflling life as a scholar and 
not sharing the epistemic burdens of my family. I cannot 
imagine being fulflled by housing all of these creative and 
critical thinking skills only to bust them out for things like 
derivations (no matter how fun). On the contrary, when 
I do have the opportunity to work with them to develop 
solutions, help them write resumes, ask for raises, etc. 
it gives me a sense of worth that I just would not have 
otherwise. In lacking beliefs and their associated burdens, 
I was failing on my own standards for my epistemic life, 
not anyone else’s. I take it as an important component of 
my epistemic life that some of my time is spent solving 
problems with those I care about. Admittedly, this is a luxury 
that not every frst-generation or low-income philosopher 
has. It is certainly one I did not enjoy as a graduate student. 
The burden of these beliefs brought its own set of 
challenges then as it does now. As a graduate student 
on a fxed income and far away from Arizona, helping 
was not nearly as achievable as I wished it to be. I was 
not around to babysit my nephews and niece, so that my 
siblings could go on job interviews for better-paying job 
opportunities. I was unable to send money to fx vehicles or 
pay unexpected medical bills. I often wished I was in their 
town so I could give rides to people when they needed it, 
or host dinners and just hug them to raise their spirits when
times were tough. Uncovering this cavern of beliefs about 
my family’s lives and challenges raised huge demands on 
my emotional well-being. It colored every event that has 
happened to me during my journey in academia. Each 
failed attempt to get a job or an opportunity closer to them 
felt like a personal blow, a failed attempt to be able to 
share the load. As a professor, this is still the case. I am 
in a better position to help, but I still live far away. I lived 
and still live in a mild state of guilt, despite my family’s 
eforts to convince me that this guilt is baseless. Yet, I do 
feel a sense of connectedness with them that I just would 
not have staying in dark. My epistemic shame was replaced 
with these burdens, but the bonds we are sustaining by 
sharing them flls me with so much more purpose and 
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meaning. I am still a part of them and they are a part of me 
and a part of my philosophical life. 
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NOTES 
1. Laura Candiotto, “The Virtues of Epistemic Shame in Critical 
Dialogue,” 76–78. 
2. Ibid., 77. 
3. Ibid., 79. Here Candiotto also argues that group judgment and 
esteem for one as a thinker can shape how likely it is that the 
experience of epistemic shame triggers belief revision. Partially 
because in groups where true belief is valued there will be 
considerable pressure to revise. Limited space prevents me from 
discussing the full account and upshots of epistemic shame in 
this paragraph. 
4. Reinhard Pekrun, “Control-value Theory: A Social-cognitive 
Approach to Achievement Emotions”; Elisabeth Vogl et al., 
“Surprised–Curious–Confused: Epistemic Emotions and 
Knowledge Exploration.” 
5. P. Juarez & Chavarria, C. & Medina, D., 2017; Older, D. 
6. In another work, I show how examples of shame for not knowing 
how to speak Spanish also motivate rejecting an account of 
epistemic shame that necessarily requires a false belief as its 
object. There, my claim is that one gains and fosters connections 
with their loved ones and culture through shared language and 
this is one way in which lacking skills or knowledge-how can 
produce shame in the same way that a false belief can (Munguia, 
forthcoming). 
7. Candiotto, “The Virtues of Epistemic Shame in Critical Dialogue,” 
78. 
8. Vogl et al., “Surprised–Curious–Confused,” 627. 
9. Of course, there are diferent theoretical takes on how one ought 
to be as a belief gatherer. So, this may also be understood in a 
diferent epistemological framework (one that is not necessarily 
consequentialist and hyper-focused on landing on true beliefs, 
but also maybe a virtue epistemology that prioritizes openness 
to information, considering objections to one’s beliefs, an active 
pursuit of evidence for one’s beliefs etc.). However, one spins 
this, no theory necessarily places our own emotional comforts on 
a pedestal above these types of features of their epistemology. 
So, I believe this claim does not necessarily take a stand on 
whether one ought to adhere to a teleological or consequentialist 
take on adjudicating the relationship between epistemic agents 
and truth or true belief. 
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Marginal Disclosures: Sisterhood,
Standpoint, Community, and Thriving 
Zinhle ka’Nobuhlaluse 
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
Ashley J. Lamarre 
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
In “A Troubled Peace: Black Women in the Halls of the White 
Academy,” Nellie McKay writes: “To be black and female in 
the academy has its own particular frustrations because it 
[the academy] was never intended for us to be here. We are 
in spaces that have been appropriated for us.”1 Although 
McKay writes these words in the 60s, specifcally about 
the experiences of African American women, her words 
apply to many Black women who enter the academy. That 
is, even though the numbers of Black women professors 
and scholars are increasing, this change is happening at 
a rather slow pace. Call for papers (CFPs) such as this one 
are telling. The continuous calls for Black women to relay 
their experiences of marginalization are reminders that 
even though there is color in the ivory tower, we remain 
“outsiders-within.”2 
The style of this paper follows from Black feminist and 
womanist thought and takes a conversational format 
between me (Zinhle ka’Nobuhlaluse) and Ashley Lamarre. 
These are our refections from the many intersecting 
identities that we hold. These identities are not essential to 
our being, but they have informed how these institutions 
treat us and those that look like us, hence the importance of 
sisterly scholarship. Through refecting about our individual 
narratives, we hope to highlight the classist, racist, and sexist 
practices that still sufuse in the academy, in particular, in the 
United States of America and in South Africa. Additionally, 
we claim the importance of Black feminist and womanist 
theoretical and methodological frameworks in critiques 
of academia’s continued marginalization of Black women 
scholars. Our desire is not to seek empathy or blame, 
rather we use this refection in a productive way. A kind 
of productivity that is articulated by Audre Lorde in “The 
uses of anger.”3 Lorde explains that “anger expressed and 
translated into action in the service of our vision and our 
future is a liberating and strengthening act of clarifcation, 
for it is in the painful process of this translation that we 
identify who are our allies with whom we have grave 
diferences, and who are our genuine enemies.”4 Black 
feminism(s) and womanism(s) have informed this desire to 
unashamedly write from the standpoints that have shaped 
and will continue to shape our experiences of being Back 
women and being in the academy. 
I. SISTERHOOD 
A good starting point would be to refect on our decision 
to write this paper together. When the CFP came out for 
an APA session on the topic of frst-generation and/or low-
income philosophers in the academy, I (ka’Nobuhlaluse) 
asked Lamarre, a peer in my graduate cohort, if she 
would be interested in collaborating on the presentation 
on which we base this paper. As the only Black women 
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in our cohort with some overlapping research interests, I 
could have readily adopted the mentality that Lamarre and 
I are naturally in competition for opportunities, given the 
racial and historical demographics of philosophy and its 
job market. Instead, I decided this need not be the case. 
Though we have overlapping intersections and research 
interests, we are not in competition with each other. We 
choose to resist this racist heterosexist capitalist neoliberal 
narrative. 
To echo Lorde, the fnal decision to collaborate with Lamarre 
came from the assumption that “[w]e are not here as 
women examining racism in a political and social vacuum. 
We operate in the teeth of a system for whom racism and 
sexism [including classism] are primary, established, and 
necessary props of proft.”5 It is for this reason that we 
need to rally together and go beyond bonding over our 
oppression in order to navigate academia. 
Therefore, my request to be in sisterly scholarship with 
Lamarre was a conscious decision because I treat Black 
feminist thought as a life philosophy. I intentionally use 
the word sisterhood instead of collegiality or friendship. 
‘Sisterhood’ neatly captures a branch of my feminist 
standpoint, that is anchored inUbuntu.Ubuntu is a normative 
and moral philosophy that underscores relationality in most 
Southern African cultures. The ethic is best captured by the 
Zulu proverb “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu.” As a moral 
theory, Ubuntu underscores the ways in which we are 
relational beings—a relationality that is rooted in mutual 
recognition: kobuntu bethu kanye nomlando owabiwe. 
Little did ka’Nobuhlaluse know, her reaching out to me 
(Lamarre), long before this call, disrupted my solitary and 
painstaking process of refecting on my place in graduate 
school. At the start, these meditations were individualistic 
and largely obscured by my imposter syndrome—a 
legitimate form of intellectual self-doubt that can be 
exacerbated by overlapping marginalized identities.6 Over 
time, I recognized that attempting to bury these troubling 
feelings by isolating myself and developing a practice 
of overworking did little to alleviate my depleted spirits. 
Only through the care-flled reallocation of my time to 
robust dialogues with peers like ka’Nobuhlaluse and my 
readings of Black feminist scholarship did I begin to heal. 
This healing meant I felt more prepared, excited, and ready 
to accomplish my graduate work, while also having an 
increased investment in the needs and struggles of my 
peers. Therefore, tankou yon ayisyèn ki tande bri lanbi a 
k’ap sonnen, ka’Nobuhlaluse’s call to co-write with me was 
music to my ears. 
II. STANDPOINT 
Regarding this special issue’s desire to highlight the
experience of philosophers who are “outsiders within,”
I (Lamarre) want to expound on what inspired this
paper’s title. Marginal disclosure, in the case of graduate
applications, is the moment in which an applicant attempts
to reveal their diference within their “Statement of
Purpose.” This voluntary admission of diference precedes
the phenotypical encounter through its presence in this
application requirement. In the very frst lines, in some
cases, we reveal the various intersections of our identities.
I want to consider the rippling efects that can arise from
this moment of disclosure in graduate applications, but not
before exploring why this disclosure occurs in the frst place. 
For many of us, the practice of marginal disclosure is not 
merely an early attempt to illustrate our diference, but 
an intentional gesture to explain how these diferences 
impact our existence. This decision is no coincidence 
in the “Statement of Purpose.” Instead, this choice to 
disclose deviation represents two truths moving towards 
the same goal, successfully making it into the academy 
as one truly is, for what academia truly is. As one truly is, 
denotes a disclosure interested in utter transparency. It 
does not intend to declare inherent “superiority” in our 
intersections. Instead, this admission shows that we have 
experienced our position at those intersections as not 
only a site of struggle but also as “a source of strength, 
community, and intellectual development.”7 This disclosure 
states that one’s commitments to community include 
the philosophical community but also spans beyond it. It 
states that our intellectual development as philosophers 
has already been informed by and will continue to be 
informed by the distinct epistemic and ontological ways 
we inhabit the world. Despite long running contentions 
with “identity-based politics,” Kimberlé Crenshaw clarifes 
that “[t]he problem with identity politics is not that it fails to 
transcend diference, as some critics charge, but rather the 
opposite—that it frequently confates or ignores intragroup 
diferences.”8 Through marginal disclosure, many of us 
seek to reveal our sprawling connectedness and we aim to 
recognize how our connectedness can impact our presence 
and intellectual development. We strive to highlight a 
diference in scholarship and a diference in how we 
might choose to inhabit the traditionally white, male, 
heterosexist space of academia, and more particularly, 
philosophy. In other words, our disclosure is a warning that 
you should not perceive us as any other student but rather 
as “troublemakers” who can truly push and challenge 
departments for the better as our purpose is to disrupt the 
“philosophical status quo.”9 
For what academia truly is means that one recognizes the 
neoliberal tendencies within the academy, noting how the 
institution falls prey to marketplace ideologies. Though 
one might not be sure whether they will be a docile subject 
or troublemaker in the academy, one must make it into the 
academy to even face that dilemma.10 That is why select 
marginalized students deploy identity-based politics as a 
strategy. A strategy that acknowledges how “marketplace 
ideologies,” as described by Patricia Hill Collins, have 
impacted academia’s desire to meet various “marketplace 
needs.”11 In this case, the “marketplace needs” of a 
historically exclusionary institution like academia, and a 
discipline like philosophy, is to entice and retain outsiders-
within who are socially distant from academia. When 
these neoliberal institutions seek out these students, 
they serve their larger systems and agendas by pursuing 
our unique presence and particular research interest. 
These institutions can make themselves eligible for select 
grants and endowments where they would otherwise be 
ineligible. Departments improve their marketability as 
diverse, which can attract additional diverse students— 
while also improving departmental optics at a time where 
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anti-Black and anti-Trans violence is more visible to the 
non-marginalized and the marginalized alike. 
Even if our own inclination does not bring about this 
kind of strategic disclosure, this strategy is also regularly 
encouraged by select undergraduate institutions, 
the varying minorities in philosophy programs, the 
plethora of minorities in the humanities programs, or the 
advice of current marginalized graduate students. This 
marketplace place ideology is the kind of “we only need 
so many” institutional thinking that could make people 
like ka’Nobuhlaluse and I believe we are competitors. 
The drive for scholars of color to perceive our peers as 
competitors are fueled by market logics, claiming a fnite 
and quantifable interest in scholars like us. Again, this is no 
coincidence but instead reveals that these programs and 
institutions are also aware that this disclosure of diference 
can be advantageous somehow. Some graduate programs 
support this idea of disclosure by saving you the trouble 
of having to embed this information in your personal 
statement skillfully by providing you with the option to 
write an entirely separate “Diversity Statement.” This 
observation does not intend to insinuate that all programs 
which ofer the option to write a “Diversity Statement” are 
insincere in openly requesting marginal disclosure. Still, 
the growing popularity of “Diversity statements” represents 
an additional level of labor in which you must articulate 
your diference, which will not be expected of our non-
marginalized colleagues. Despite the perceived benefts, 
this kind of disclosure has selective ramifcations. 
Take a portion of my disclosure, for example, wherein 
I say that I am a Haitian American Black woman from 
Brooklyn, New York. When I wrote this, I expected this to 
be valuable for some of the reasons I already mentioned, 
but I could not anticipate them all. Though I did not expect 
to study Caribbean philosophy, it is no shock that I was 
open, willing, and excited when introduced to this very 
subject matter. Due to the incomplete nature of marginal 
disclosures, I did not explicitly state that I come from a 
working-class family. Perhaps I thought it was implied. 
However, even if I were to include this in my description, I 
do not believe it would have the same ramifcations as my 
Haitian identity. For instance, I could have added that I am 
a low-income student whose parents came to this country 
and became factory workers while all fve of us lived in a 
one-bedroom apartment. Furthermore, we were able to 
move to a bigger apartment and attend relatively better 
schools only because my mom worked twelve-hour days, 
weekdays, and weekends, as a home attendant. At the 
same time, my dad worked similar hours as a paratransit 
bus driver. However, I sincerely doubt this disclosure 
would have entailed me being encouraged into theorizing 
socioeconomic status because of my lived experience. 
In a similar vein, marginal disclosure, by statement or 
phenotype, is not always read as valuable for “marketplace 
needs.” Instead, the perception can be that you will not be 
“marketable” because you will not be interested in staying 
within the true philosophical cannon. This assumption fails 
to realize that the aspects of my marginal disclosure that 
I came to study were new to me as it would have been 
for me to, for example, become a Hegelian. When you are 
already experiencing extreme intellectual self-doubt in a 
discipline that has theorized against your belonging there, 
and are primarily met with engagement and enthusiasm 
when you enter courses that overlap with your identity, it 
becomes a self-fulflling prophecy. I became invested in 
my Haitian-ness or Caribbean-ness and my Black woman-
ness, not because it was wholly what I planned to do but 
what I was, and am supported in, doing. 
III. COMMUNITY
Though I (Lamarre) recognize the contrived ways in which 
I discovered my research interests, I have absolutely no 
regrets in the sense that I thoroughly enjoy exploring these 
new ideas. My concern is around the failure to recognize 
that these intersecting identities and research interests 
come with a set of duties and responsibilities to these 
communities beyond the functions of solitary scholarship. 
In other words, I should not be encouraged to cultivate 
research interests that mirror portions of my marginalized 
identity simply because they are trendy, niche, or register as 
authentic in an academic setting. Instead, the expectation 
should be that there is immense value in theorizing from 
and serving those communities acutely. This realization only 
began to percolate in my mind after reading Joy James and 
Ruth Farmer’s edited volume Spirit, Space, and Survival: 
African American Women in (White) Academe.12 Concerning 
the individualism academia fosters, James described 
alienation as the “signature of academia” and makes note 
that “[i]n belonging to a people seeking freedom from 
colonization, African American academics face issues of 
responsibility and accountability, unrecognized by White 
colleagues.”13 The inability of privileged colleagues to 
recognize this responsibility and accountability causes 
tension when diasporic people take philosophy to be a 
pragmatic discipline that requires service. At the same 
time, “traditional” academe devalues or disregards this 
kind of activity-based theorizing. 
Now, this insight provided me with increased clarity on a 
sentiment that is often expressed by undergraduate and 
graduate frst-generation students. This sentiment is “my 
family does not understand what I do or the responsibilities 
I have as a student.” This perception often leads to tensions 
and disputes surrounding the regular requests family 
members make of us as frst-generation students. In this 
case, I am not referring to the fnancial contributions 
marginalized graduate students make to their families, 
which creates an additional strain on graduate stipends. 
Lamarre, I (ka’Nobuhlaluse) actually want to stress the 
material realities of being a low-income student in that very 
exception you just named. As an international student, I do 
not have the luxury to go home as frequently as I would like 
to. I do not have any fnancial support from my family (even 
if I needed help, the value of the South African Rand to the 
US dollar makes it hard), instead, I am the one who has to 
send money home. This was my reality when my mother 
lost her job last year. The responsibility that I have towards 
my family is not occasional but on going. This responsibly 
is best known as “black tax” in South Africa. As the frst 
one to even get a university qualifcation, supporting 
my family is not a conversation about choice, this is an 
obligation. Interestingly, when I am in the US, I am a low-
income student, but to my family, I am not. These are the 
complexities that our marginal disclosures do not highlight. 
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I (Lamarre) appreciate your ability to nuance this discussion 
with not only the material obligation to family, but also 
what it means to have this responsibility transnationally, 
ka’Nobuhlaluse. Despite my family’s recent experience with 
job loss due to COVID-19 as well, the requests my family 
continue to make of me, like many of our frst-generation 
and low-income peers, are requests for my presence, 
service, and time. These duties range from assistance in 
childcare, eldercare, job searches, family mediation, and 
educational support for younger family members. What frst-
generation students oftentimes perceive to be potentially 
unreasonable or additionally taxing about these requests 
is that it diminishes our ability to solely dedicate our time 
to our academic pursuits and our “new lives” as scholars. 
A social position that seemed nearly impossible to reach 
and seems more challenging to maintain every day. So, in 
just a year, academic institutions can cause frst-generation 
and low-income students to render their own immediate 
families a hindrance to their educational training. This 
import is far more sinister than a “lack of understanding,” 
as it allows one to rationalize that providing decreased aid 
and resources to marginalized families and communities 
is a worthy sacrifce for the greater academic good. Sure, 
this orientation may reap prestige for oneself and fnancial 
benefts for one’s family after years of isolation. Still, the 
chances of securing a viable placement in an extremely 
competitive job market, only to be further stressed by the 
impacts of COVID-19, are incredibly precarious. 
If academia alienates low-income and frst-generation 
students such that family becomes a barrier to success, 
how are we expected to serve any community? We are 
not. We are labor and resources estranged from kin and 
installed into an academic community that devalues any 
external investments that detract from rigorous scholarship. 
In order to do service for the communities we expose in 
our marginal disclosure, we cannot separate community 
needs from academic responsibilities, regardless of their 
so-called incompatibility. With the hope that our sisters 
keep us accountable, we, too, intend to move forward in 
academia, recognizing that “I am because we are.” 
IV. THRIVING 
Will you survive? 
No, darling, I will thrive 
– Ijeoma Umebinyuo, Questions for Ada 
Now Lamarre, here lies another confict that I 
(ka’Nobuhlaluse) am feeling about these essentializing 
conversations (i.e., being low-income or frst-generation), 
these are tensions that have been highlighted by Zine 
Magubane in Hear Our Voices: Race, Gender and the Status 
of Black South African Women in the Academy (2004); 
Mabogo Percy More in Looking Through Philosophy in Black 
(2019), and Pumla Dineo Gqola in Refecting Rogue Inside 
the Mind of a Feminist (2017). On the one hand, I think that 
it is important for us to share the challenges that we face as 
Black, frst-generation, low-income, etc. students. However, 
these narratives can be objectifying. They do not capture 
how I view myself, how you (Lamarre) view yourself, and 
how other Black feminist scholars within the academy 
view themselves. To view oneself primarily through the 
lens of marginality is to succumb to objectifcation. bell 
hooks reminds us that as “objects, one’s reality is defned 
by others, one’s identity created by others, one’s history 
named only in ways that defne one’s relationship to those 
who are subject.”14 It is for these reasons that we need to 
reshape our narratives. I am interested in the narratives 
that show us thriving in the academy. Whiteness thrives 
in seeing us sufer, this is why there is so much interest 
in Black sufering and pain. So, while it is important for 
marginalized scholars to share their narratives, we need to 
be careful in how we share these narratives. As Chimamanda 
Ngozi Adichie (2009) warns us, there is danger in telling a 
single sided story and we have the social responsibility as 
Black people not to participate in the creation of one-sided 
narratives. Most of the time the narratives around being 
frst-generation only focus on the challenges that we must 
overcome. While all the aforementioned narratives are part 
of our narratives, we are not single narratives of struggle. 
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Confessions of a Working-Class Student 
Kayla Aceves 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO 
This is not a philosophical argument. This is not a theory 
or analysis. It is an attempt at recollection. My intention is 
to illustrate my personal experience as a frst-generation 
and low-income philosophy student, but I would not be 
surprised if these experiences resonate with many other 
students from similar backgrounds. It is not a unique 
experience to need to support oneself, even if the fnancial 
need is causing signifcant harm to one’s well-being. 
It is not unique to have to teach yourself how to do and 
handle everything on your own, because you have started 
doing things your caretakers didn’t. I would like to say 
that I appreciate being able to share my experiences and 
thoughts here. The opportunity to be able to write about 
this should not be treated lightly, only because it is such a 
special occasion when others want to listen. I hope that this 
piece can ofer something to those who have faced similar 
struggles and those who have not. More than anything, I 
hope it can initiate conversation and make a diference. 
I am from Calexico, a small border-town where Mexicans 
make up 97 percent of the population. It is a small cultural 
bubble almost stuck in time—one that is currently notorious 
for its position on the border and drug-related crime, its 
corrupt city government and police, and its intense heat. 
It is a strong community, and what I mean by that is it 
possesses a potent culture which bleeds proudly into the 
identity of all its members. If you leave, you fnd that there 
always seems to be something important missing in every 
place you live thereafter. I used to believe this was just my 
family and the food, but now I understand that the thing 
I silently searched for in college, but could not fnd, was 
a place of belonging and a sense of community. Maybe I 
shouldn’t even try to compare the level of social and civic 
engagement I had in my hometown with my experiences as 
a student in a research institution’s philosophy department. 
After all, community is not simply the collaboration 
between individuals, but it also requires a sense of mutual 
recognition between them. I could not expect to just fnd 
something like that at school, or in any place which isn’t 
home. Sometimes, I fnd myself romanticizing my high 
school academic experiences, where I had a strong sense 
of confdence in the classroom, when I felt genuinely 
connected both to my teachers and my classmates. I miss 
feeling like I am coming from the same place as those 
around me and have something of value to share with 
them and vice versa. The harsh reality at the University of 
California, San Diego (UCSD), more often than not, was that 
I found myself so intimidated by my professors and peers 
that I would not engage in class discussion at all. 
My family knew nothing about the major I had chosen 
and did not know what to think, other than that it would 
help me get into law school, which is what they ultimately 
wanted. My grandma (or as I call her, my Palle) never told 
her compadres that I studied philosophy. She told them 
that I was studying “para ser abogada” (to be a lawyer). 
Nobody in my family had gone to university before me, so 
it was a moment of success for all of us when I received my 
acceptance letters. I think this must be a common experience 
for frst-generation students: having complicated feelings 
about our individual goals and success, perhaps to the 
point where we begin to misunderstand ourselves. Maybe 
we fnd that we have been misunderstanding ourselves 
all along. I have often felt as if my journey was not solely 
my own, but that it also belongs to my entire family, all 
the way back to my Nana Maria (my powerful ninety-eight-
year-old great-grandmother). My mother had me when she 
was sixteen years old and that has always made me feel 
obligated to make her proud. If my mom or family would 
not get their degree or the opportunity for a successful 
career, then I would do it for all of us. I used to dream 
of getting rich in order to take care of my family and give 
them everything they wanted. These feelings cause a lot 
of difculty when making choices solely for myself. It’s 
true, I would not have been able to make it to university 
without the sacrifces of my family, especially my parents 
and my grandmother. They deserve my success as much as 
I do, and of course I want to make them happy. I also feel 
the need to set an example for my younger siblings and 
cousins. I must show them what it takes to be able to leave 
our small border town in order to get a “good” education 
and a job. I cannot just abandon this dream of a career and 
money because it feels heavy with history, with my family’s 
struggle up until this point as well as our whole future. The 
dream is not just mine to leave behind. 
When I arrived at UCSD I was going through the worst time 
of my life emotionally. My mental health was not in good 
enough shape for starting my adult student life. Long story 
short: I was kicked out of my house after an explosive 
fght with my parents—I would not speak to them again 
for months. This was a time of many changes, moving, and 
fnancial anxiety for which I did not have their support. I 
cannot explain how devastating that was for me, and it 
set the tone for my independent life moving forward. 
I moved for school even though at that time I was living 
every day knee-deep in anxiety and depression, looking 
forward to absolutely nothing. In a sick sense though, the 
traumatic fght between my parents and I helped in the 
long run because it gave me cause to submit a petition to 
be considered an independent student for the purposes 
of fnancial aid. This meant that my parents would no 
longer be fnancially responsible for me, therefore, I would 
qualify for more aid since their income would no longer be 
considered a part of mine. Once I found out my petition 
was approved, the fnancial aid representative who was 
working on my case told me that I needed to start using 
the free therapy on campus, given the rough situation with 
my parents. I was a little shocked. Therapy was never a 
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thing I saw myself doing (or needing). Nobody checked 
on whether I went or not, and because I was settling in at 
a new job and a new home, I did not go consistently, even 
though I should have. Looking back though, I don’t think I 
would’ve had the time. 
There was an intense level of anxiety or dread anytime I 
was in a classroom, especially in the beginning. I was 
not prepared to feel so intimidated, even though other 
Calexico kids who made it out talked about experiencing 
this when they were studying at a big university. I did not 
feel like I deserved to be there, and with everything else 
in my life going on at the time, I could hardly deal with 
not being able to aford it. The possibility of dropping 
out due to lack of fnancial stability always hung over my 
head, and unfortunately this did not empower or motivate 
me. Student loan debt was also a source of anxiety. I 
already couldn’t even think of an existence which was not 
paycheck to paycheck; how could I take on over twenty 
thousand dollars in loans? I would have to work forever or 
hope to marry someone wealthier. Even the possibility of 
wealth after law school did not put the economic anxiety 
and guilt to rest. I felt that I did not deserve to be in 
university because I could not aford it and I was not as 
knowledgeable as my peers. I still feel ashamed that I was 
never as knowledgeable or well-read as they were because 
I didn’t have time in the same way they did—unlike many 
of them, I had to work. I soon realized that having the time 
needed to study was a clear mark of privilege, aforded 
to those who didn’t have to work to make a living during 
college. Ideas and questions for possible papers quickly 
morphed into nagging reminders of self-doubt and ever-
evolving impostor syndrome. 
It’s important to mention that having enough money to 
travel home during breaks to see family is a privilege, 
especially if they live in another country. Not having to worry 
about having enough for your next meal or for a doctor’s 
appointment and medication is a privilege. Being able to 
aford all your required and recommended textbooks and 
your own printer and ink is a privilege. Having a car is a 
privilege. So is being able to socialize and go to the gym 
without interfering with the time you’re supposed to be 
using to make money to pay for your rent. I am constantly 
reminded of the atmosphere of privilege which surrounds 
academic philosophy. It can at times be sickening, and 
it needs to change. I can see how it drives people from 
working class backgrounds away—a career in reading and 
writing often looks unrealistic to anyone who does not 
come from a certain level of material wealth. Sometimes 
all of philosophy seems like an activity of leisure and/or 
performance, depending on how you’re doing it and who 
you’re doing it for. 
With the fall in my academic self-confdence came the slow 
death of my internal motivation and work ethic. I didn’t 
ft in, in terms of my cultural background or my kind of 
knowledge. My classmates were not like me, in what they 
did outside of class and what they cared about. It took a 
few years before I would make any close friends from the 
same major, and most of them were transfer students who 
were just as “lost” in philosophy as I. We could share and 
bond over the experiences of feeling like the odd-one-
out in a classroom. Whether it was because of our cultural 
background, sexuality, or socioeconomic circumstances, 
our major simply didn’t ofer a place for us. This feeling 
of alienation did not help my self-esteem and it did not 
motivate me to try and carve a space for myself, but it was 
nice to have other people to sink with. A few months ago, 
I discussed these feelings with another UCSD philosophy 
alumnus. I was not shocked to hear that they too struggled 
in having to navigate a program that obviously catered to 
“smart” kids from higher income backgrounds. The way 
we talked about ourselves relative to the other philosophy 
majors was concerning—there were the real philosophy 
majors, the ones who took it very seriously and did well, 
and then there was the rest of us: the other philosophy 
majors who did not speak much in class, the ones who were 
perhaps more reserved and less articulate when they did 
speak. What does this distinction reveal? I will never forget 
this conversation, mostly because it made me deeply sad, 
but also because I wonder who else has felt this way. 
I was not going to let myself live those four years without a
drive or purpose, but it was clear to me early on that it would
no longer be school. Up until then, my self-confdence had
been built on my academic ability and success. After six
months at UCSD, I honestly stopped caring about my grades
because they stopped refecting who I thought I was and
who I wanted to be. It was rough, struggling to keep up with
work and school, knowing I couldn’t do my best and wasn’t
putting my all into it. Instead, feelings of validation started
coming from my part-time retail job, which was obviously
better because it paid. My academic responsibilities were
doomed to pay the price for my fnancial hardship: I was
always going to need to work in order to survive. Financial
need was truly the only obstacle between me and the ability
to devote myself fully to my studies. 
Once, I emailed a philosophy professor to let them know 
that I would be leaving class a few minutes early in order 
to get to work on time. (I would still have to walk twenty 
minutes across campus, wait for the bus, and then walk to 
work.) They were fne with it, but wanted to know how many 
hours a week I spent working. I was sort of thrown of by this 
question, but I responded that on average I worked about 
twenty-eight hours. Before I responded, I found myself 
thinking about how many hours I was going to tell them 
relative to how many hours I spent in class and studying. 
The next time our class met, my professor expressed how 
they were displeased with how our education competes 
for time with work. They also said that they knew some 
of us were “working up to twenty-eight hours a week” 
and that it would simply be better for us if we just “didn’t 
have to.” Although nobody else knew about our email 
exchange, I felt deeply embarrassed about my economic 
circumstances as I listened to these comments hunched 
over my desk in the back row of the small classroom. I 
felt shame and resentment. It never bothered me when I 
saw everyone around me with MacBooks and other typical 
college student brand-name items, while I had my ancient 
and heavy HP laptop that I carried around in the same 
backpack I’ve had since high school (I love that backpack!). 
However, it bothers me deeply that I did not come from 
enough wealth in order to walk away from the tightrope-
balancing-act that is being a full-time student with a job. 
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Not only did I have to sit through my own internal struggle 
(where I felt a lot of guilt) when dealing with this, but I had 
to put up with the expectations of others as well. 
To be clear, I do not think my professor meant to make me, 
or any other working student, feel bad. Nevertheless, those 
comments were unnecessary. How could my professor
have been more understanding and accommodating? The 
thing is, I’m not sure. I can only say that professors should 
try to be more sensitive to perhaps what could be radically 
diferent economic conditions of their students, and if 
they are to speak about it openly, be prepared to ofer 
the necessary resources and support for those who are 
struggling.1 Most of my professors ofered me support by 
giving extensions of a day or two, maybe with a few words 
of encouragement and acknowledging my circumstances. 
This was enough for me—I wanted to be able to handle it 
all, get everything turned in on time, even if I came back 
home from work at 3 AM the night before and got no sleep. 
However, not every working student will feel, think, or work 
this way. Students who are frst-generation and working-
class should feel able to ask for more fexibility and help 
from professors when we need it, even if we feel bad about 
asking. How do we get there? 
Trying (and constantly failing) to balance work and school 
was ultimately the most challenging part about college. I 
quickly realized how I was naturally much more motivated 
to work than to go to school. Work was a place where I 
felt like my labor mattered, it paid me, I felt recognized 
and productive. I did not feel these ways when doing 
philosophy. I worked all four years of college even when 
my therapist repeatedly asked me to consider taking on 
more loans instead of working. He said I was always on 
“survival mode” which is common for frst-generation 
and working-class students (who would’ve thought?!). 
The idea of living without having to work is absurd to me, 
but I also acknowledge this is most likely a psychological 
consequence of struggling under capitalism. But really, I 
preferred the job because I felt like I made a diference 
there, I belonged there, I succeeded there, and it provided 
me with more money than I ever had in my life. To be honest, 
there were times I felt like I thrived, the total opposite of 
how I felt at school. Even when the hours were terrible and 
resulted in my being late or absent to class, I never felt like 
I had the option to quit work. Nobody else was going to 
fnancially support me and somehow having a job kept me 
going. It wasn’t until I had to depend on the sympathy and 
mercy of my professors that I felt bad for working. I am too 
ashamed to admit how many times I turned assignments in 
late. I was given a lot of extensions. I couldn’t keep up with 
all the weird shades of shame, (in)validation, and anxiety 
that contaminated my own thoughts about myself and my 
academic performance. I have my degree now, yet I do not 
feel like I truly deserve it. I do not feel like I put in the 
time or mental efort that is necessary for obtaining a whole 
BA. I know how much I hustled to get all my papers and 
readings done, so why do I feel like all of the work that I did 
put in still didn’t amount to much, like I didn’t accomplish 
anything? 
Four years have passed since I started this journey and I am 
currently counting my losses. I fear how badly people would 
think of me if they knew that I felt as if this experience had 
resulted in more losses than gains for me. Yes, I gained an 
education at a top institution, I learned more in four years 
than I may have learned in my whole life before. I have 
gone to places my family only wishes they could go, as my 
mother would say. I am privileged, there is no doubt about 
that, and I feel guilty writing this because I know that many 
other people deserve to be in the same place as me but 
cannot be. There was just a lot of loss I did not anticipate 
by choosing to go to college. I did not give myself the 
chance to begin my degree in a healthy, functioning place. 
I missed out on so much time with my family. My younger 
brother, who I practically raised, grew up into a teenager 
and I was not there for that. We are not as close as we used 
to be. To my dismay, time went on without me. I missed 
out on too many award ceremonies, sports games, family 
dinners, and laughter. In some ways I felt like I could not 
recognize my family’s ways of life anymore. My great-
uncle, my Tio Chuy, moved back to Calexico soon after I 
left for college. He is a grandfather fgure to me, someone 
I look up to because he was somehow always in a good 
mood, always trying to lift everybody’s spirits. He was an 
incredibly supportive father to my cousins and always did 
his best to take care of both my grandma and Nana. My 
uncle had lived through so much. He grew up working in 
the felds and had children to support at a young age. But 
no matter how hard life got, you could count on his humor, 
smile, and love. Memories of his jokes and laughter bring 
me deep comfort and I feel intense guilt and regret for 
not expressing more of my appreciation to him. I looked 
forward to being able to spend time with him since he 
was living at home, and I would go back once I graduated. 
We didn’t have that time together. After he moved, it was 
discovered that there was a tumor in his brain. I didn’t get 
to say goodbye to him or spend time with him while he was 
recovering between surgeries; and then he was gone. This 
is a great regret. My Nana Maria would pass away shortly 
after her son, a few weeks after I frst sat down to write this. 
That’s four years I could have had with the two elders of my 
family before they were gone. I genuinely feel like college 
was a time where I had to leave my family behind, and I 
was unaware that I was making that choice by moving away 
for school. Work commitments kept me from visiting home 
much, and now that miserable excuse matters as much as 
that prestigious piece of paper. 
The more time goes on, the less I fnd in common between 
myself and the people I grew up with. The only people I 
have truly felt close to and identifed with. I do not just 
feel disconnected from my family because of the physical 
distance. Now there are way fewer things to talk about, and 
I fnd that when my family speaks to me it’s more about 
how things used to be. We become sentimental, but our 
interactions can feel so passive. I don’t even feel like the 
daughter, granddaughter, sister, niece, and cousin I was 
before I left. Whenever politics come up my palms start 
to get sweaty because my family and I do not see eye-to-
eye on certain things. Some of my family members glorify 
my struggles of living on my own and supporting myself. 
This makes me sad sometimes because I feel like as my 
family, they should want me to live comfortably, instead of 
romanticizing me working long hours during fnals week 
and facing housing insecurity. When we disagree, my 
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family either (1) assumes that my opinion is founded on a 
superiority complex I developed in college, or (2) does not 
take my opinion seriously because I studied philosophy. 
Since they do not understand exactly what philosophy is, 
they assume that it is too difcult to try and understand, or 
it is too silly. I honestly still do not know how to respond to 
this since I do not want to be stuck-up about my education 
to my own family. I wish they could take me and my studies 
seriously, though I know in their own way, they do. There is 
nothing much I can do except hope that we will cross this 
bridge with time, understanding, and patience. 
Philosophy has not been all terrible. I am seriously 
considering graduate school and have attended programs 
dedicated to diversity in the discipline in order to feel 
more comfortable with and aware about my own place 
in the feld. Those experiences, as well as my time at the 
Kierkegaard Library at St. Olaf, have given me so much 
confdence in myself that I think maybe I can do this. I have 
some sense of support from my family, though my mother 
and grandmother were devastated when I announced I was 
no longer into the idea of law school and instead I wanted 
to pursue philosophy. As far as support from my professors 
goes, every one of them has warned me about the lack 
of job prospects in academic philosophy, which is a valid 
reason to try and rid myself of any desire to enter the 
profession. I applied to a few master’s programs around 
the time I graduated, and I was accepted to them all. It 
didn’t feel like such an accomplishment for many reasons. 
I still feel deep down that I’m not a philosophy-type-of-
person and maybe the programs I got into only accepted 
me because it doesn’t take much to get in. My family also 
didn’t express much excitement and joy like they did when 
I was applying for undergrad. This may have to do with the 
pandemic and overall bad vibes right now, but I feel like 
they would have shown more enthusiasm if I was sending 
them screenshots of law school acceptance letters instead. 
I would have regretted not pursuing philosophy. Despite 
how hard it’s been, I can’t imagine doing anything else. 
I would say that it wasn’t until my second year that I truly 
began doing better in my coursework because I was 
motivated by developing my own interests. I can remember 
that fortunate series of events as follows: 1) I took Mexican 
philosophy and felt like something was familiar in the 
content, approach, and atmosphere of the class, which I 
had never felt before. It was the only time during college 
where I felt like I was in class back in high school, which may 
not sound like a good thing—but it is. I don’t mean that the 
class was less difcult, or less philosophical, and therefore 
easier. No, I faced the same struggles while writing and 
reading for this class, but, because I felt connected to the 
content, I was more motivated to do my best. I wanted to 
understand more, I felt the urge to put in the work and 
engage with the texts at home and with my classmates 
during lecture. After taking this course, I became a 
member of the FiloMex (Mexican philosophy) Lab, which 
was a culturally and philosophically afrming experience. 
2) I took Existentialism and developed a strong interest in 
Kierkegaard, a philosopher whose work has provided me 
with a framework that helps me understand the way I live, 
what I do, and how I love. I would end up having a beautiful 
experience doing a summer research program where we 
worked together as a small class daily to “summon his 
wisdom.” Having that moment and feeling connected to 
a particular thinker, their philosophy, and the community 
which exists only to celebrate and understand their work 
was very important for me. Before then, I honestly did not 
know what it was like to do “research.” I had not been to 
a conference or experienced a Q&A session. I didn’t know 
what a community in philosophy could look and feel like 
until I did that program. 3) I read Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit at the end 
of my junior year and felt like my mind was burst open.
4) During my senior year, I participated in the regional Ethics 
Bowl. I ofcially became a part of the small undergrad 
philosophy community on campus because I served as Phil 
Club Vice President. I also completed my frst independent 
studies: one on Kierkegaard and Hegel, and another about 
racism and responsibility. 
Since I’ve fully integrated into the working class after 
fnishing my BA, I’ve missed studying philosophy more 
than I anticipated. I became comfortable with the idea 
that I’m not cut out for it, the way I am for working in a 
non-academic setting. I think I led myself to believe that 
because I know I’m good at working. But I think I can be 
good at philosophy too. More recently, I have been able 
to put more time into fguring out the answers to my own 
questions about existence, doing reading groups solely out 
of my interests. This makes me feel confdent that I have 
what it takes and all I needed was the time. The part I am 
most grateful for is the support and help from my advisors, 
and other philosophers too. I am serious about my plans 
for graduate school, so who knows what happens next? 
NOTES 
1. Thank you to the anonymous reviewer who read my piece and 
pressed me to say more on this—there is much to think about. 
Abolition University: Mobilizing Black 
Feminist Philosophy to Transform 
Institutions of Higher Education into 
“Vehicles of Decarceration” that Affirm 
the Lives of First-Generation Students 
Brady Heiner 
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, FULLERTON 
In this moment of national reckoning with structural racism 
and racialized state violence, particularly as they pervade 
the US criminal legal system—a moment crystallized 
by the recent siege of the US Capitol by armed white 
supremacists, carrying Confederate fags, intent on 
overturning a democratic election—it is imperative that 
we recognize and reckon with the work of Angela Y. Davis. 
An engaged Black feminist philosopher, Davis has for 
more than ffty years been the most prescient and incisive 
voice on abolition in the country. Contemporary calls to 
overhaul the dominant American approach to public safety, 
to decrease distended public investment in institutions of 
racialized state violence and to reinvest public resources in 
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marginalized communities, have their theoretical origins in 
Davis’s consistent call for a New Abolitionist Movement— 
calls which date back to the mid-1990s.1 
In this article, I argue that Davis’s philosophy of 
abolition articulates a vision and analytic framework for 
refashioning institutions of higher education into “vehicles 
of decarceration” that afrm the lives of historically 
marginalized, frst-generation students.2 Moreover, 
I maintain that reconstructing institutions of higher 
education along these lines is an essential moment in 
the actualization of the unfnished project of American 
abolition. I advance this claim in three steps. First, I 
summarize Davis’s philosophy of abolition, focusing on the 
way that it revamps W. E. B. Du Bois’s historically grounded 
conception of abolition democracy into a regulative ideal 
for anti-racist democracy consisting of two essential 
moments—one negative, one constructive.3 Then I argue 
that refashioning institutions of higher education to afrm 
the lives of historically marginalized, frst-generation, 
formerly incarcerated students is an indispensable 
ingredient of the constructive moment of abolition. 
The second half of the article will apply these insights to 
the California State University Project Rebound Consortium, 
a network of programs across fourteen public universities 
designed to support the higher education and successful 
reintegration of the formerly incarcerated. This program 
is an exemplar of the mobilization and materialization of 
abolitionist philosophy at the postsecondary level. The 
majority (63 percent) of Project Rebound students are frst-
generation; 61 percent are Black, Latinx, or Native; and 69 
percent are Pell Grant recipients. Many of them had their 
educational journeys as youths violently disrupted by the 
school-to-prison pipeline. I analyze how Project Rebound, 
by centering the leadership of formerly incarcerated 
people, works to deliver formerly incarcerated frst-
generation students from the prevalent experience of 
compounded imposter syndrome. Project Rebound helps 
formerly incarcerated frst-generation students emancipate 
themselves from an imposterism compounded by the 
prison label—a “badge of inferiority,” which not only makes 
them feel that they don’t belong in higher education but 
is legally designed to deny them both the sense and the 
substance of belonging in mainstream social institutions 
altogether. 
I. BLACK FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND ABOLITION 
Davis’s philosophy of abolition is driven by the ideal of 
abolition democracy. Drawing from W. E. B. Du Bois’s 
analysis of the post-Emancipation period in his work Black 
Reconstruction in America, 1860–1880 (1935), Davis argues 
that mass and racially disparate incarceration in the US is a 
sedimentation of slavery.4 Indeed, it is a result of America’s 
failure to comprehensively abolish slavery. “Du Bois argued 
that the abolition of slavery was accomplished only in the 
negative sense,” Davis writes.5 In other words, slavery was 
rendered illegal and formally disestablished as an economic 
institution. However, the Thirteenth Amendment (1865) 
to the US Constitution did not comprehensively abolish 
slavery; it explicitly recodifed slavery “as a punishment 
for crime.”6 And as a growing body of scholars, activists, 
and cultural producers (following Davis) have shown, the 
US criminal legal system has served as a receptacle for 
the persistence-through-permutation of racialized violence 
and social death ever since. 
“In order to achieve the comprehensive abolition of 
slavery,” Davis argues: 
after the institution was rendered illegal and black 
people were released from their chains, new 
institutions should have been created to incorporate 
black people into the social order. . . . Because 
this did not occur, black people encountered new 
forms of slavery—from debt peonage and the 
convict lease system to segregated and second-
class education. The prison system continues 
to carry out this terrible legacy. It has become a 
receptacle for all of those human beings who bear 
the inheritance of the failure to create abolition 
democracy in the aftermath of slavery. And this 
inheritance is not only born by black prisoners, but 
by poor Latino, Native American, Asian, and white 
prisoners [as well].7 
Creatively adapting Du Bois’s historically grounded 
concept of abolition democracy into a regulative ideal of 
social justice, Davis articulates a theory of abolition that is 
composed of two concurrent and inextricably interrelated 
moments.8 By “moment” I mean, in the Hegelian sense (das 
Moment), an essential but partial aspect, stage, or part of a 
whole. One of the moments of abolition is negative, while 
the other is constructive. Comprehensive abolition requires 
the correlational development of both moments. 
The negative moment involves “a negative process of 
tearing down,” i.e., dismantling the prison industrial 
complex and the vestiges of slavery embedded within it. 
This is the moment of decarceration and divestiture. When 
ideologically detached from the second, constructive 
moment of abolition, the moment of divestiture is 
distortedly deployed by detractors to foment fear and to 
caricature abolition as, at best, naively utopian or, at worst, 
an irresponsibly monstrous agenda of inciting complete, 
unaccountable disorder. “When abolitionists raise the 
possibility of living without prisons, a common reaction is 
fear—fear provoked by the prospect of criminals pouring 
out of prisons and returning to communities where they 
may violently assault people and their property.”9 We
bear witness to this caricatured, often explicitly racialized 
fear, for instance, in reactionary calls to defend the police 
against the mass mobilized demands to defund the police, 
and at rejoinders to the claim that “Black Lives Matter” with 
counter-assertions that “All Lives Matter” or “Blue Lives 
Matter” (as if it weren’t obviously the case that the mattering 
of Black lives, and the inscription of that mattering into 
dominant institutions, were a necessary condition for all 
lives to concretely matter). 
Such fear and reaction are partly the product of our 
tendency to “transfer to crime other fears for which we 
have no mode of expression.”10 They also stem from the 
epistemological resilience11 of carceral logic, which not 
only works to confne millions of mostly Black, brown, 
Native, and socioeconomically disadvantaged bodies, but 
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also confnes our collective capacities for thinking, feeling, 
imagining, and acting beyond prisons and police.12 To say 
that the logic of carcerality is “epistemologically resilient,” 
following Black feminist epistemologist Kristie Dotson, 
is to say that as an instituted social imaginary, it can 
absorb extraordinarily large challenges and disturbances 
without redefning or dislodging its dominant underlying 
structure.13 Like people in the nineteenth century who 
had become so inured to the instituted system and social 
imaginary of slavery that they could not conceive of society 
without it, so it is with the institution of the prison and the 
logic of carcerality today.14 Instead of envisioning a world 
without human cages as an incitement to the presence of 
life-afrming, liberatory possibility, people confronted with 
the radical epistemological ingenuity of prison abolition as 
a philosophical and concrete anti-violence project instead 
imagine a mere absence of the carceral status quo—a 
vacuum of law enforcement teeming with unfettered 
violence.15 But such ideologically laden fears disregard 
or dissemble the fact that decarceration and divestiture 
comprise just one partial aspect of the philosophy of 
abolition democracy. The constructive moment of abolition 
entails radically reimagining public safety,16 which involves 
rethinking an array of major public institutions, including, 
and especially, institutions of higher education. 
“It is true,” Davis argues, “that abolitionists want to 
dismantle structures of imprisonment, but not without a 
process that calls for building alternative institutions.”17 
Abolition democracy “is not only, or not even primarily, 
about abolition as a negative process of tearing down, but it 
is also about building up, about creating new institutions.”18 
Thus, the second and equally essential moment of abolition 
is reconstruction. 
Reconstruction is the afrmative, constructive aspect of 
abolition—a creative process of fashioning and investing in 
an array of social institutions, such as public employment, 
health, housing, and education, that are animated not by 
exploitation, domination, and social death, but instead by 
life-afrming relationships governed by equitable access 
to opportunity and infrastructures of care. Dismantling 
the carceral logics and systems that “disappear people 
in the false hope of disappearing the underlying social 
problems [those people] represent,”19 these alternative 
institutions would establish vital systems of support that 
many communities lack, afrmatively disrupting the 
intergenerational cycles that set people on track to prison 
(e.g., poverty, housing and food insecurity, unemployment, 
abuse, addiction, and undereducation). The institutions 
of abolition democracy would substantively resolve the 
plethora of social, economic, and political problems that 
mass, racialized policing and incarceration in actuality 
exacerbate and extend by “devour[ing] the social wealth 
needed to address the very problems that have led to 
spiraling numbers of prisoners.”20 
II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF ABOLITION AND THE
FIRST-GENERATION UNIVERSITY 
Davis’s work conceptually severs state punishment’s 
“seemingly indissoluble link with crime.”21 Instead, 
she articulates the criminal legal system’s implication 
in the structural (re)production of gender, racial, and 
socioeconomic inequality. One of the critical, and decisively 
feminist, innovations of Davis’s philosophy of abolition is 
that, through the concept of the prison industrial complex, 
she shifts our attention from the prison, conceived as an 
isolated institution, to the wider set of symbiotic relationships
sustained among correctional communities, transnational 
corporations, media conglomerates, prison guard and 
police unions, legislative agendas, and judicial procedural 
systems.22 By widening and homing our critical attention in 
on the broad set of relationships that undergird the prison 
industrial complex—and through which carcerality and its 
profteering insinuate themselves into our everyday lives 
and institutions—Davis articulates the expansive scope of 
decarceration as an overarching political vision. She also 
guides the intention of abolitionist world-making toward 
the formation of life-afrming relationships across an array 
of social institutions: 
[T]he most efective abolitionist strategies will 
contest [the relationships that uphold the prison 
industrial complex] and propose alternatives that 
pull them apart . . . [and] imagine a constellation 
of alternative institutions. . . . The creation of new 
institutions that lay claim to the space now occupied 
by the prison can eventually start to crowd out the 
prison so that it would inhabit increasingly smaller 
areas of our social and psychic landscape.23 
In making this point in diferent contexts, Davis repeatedly 
references the abolitionist signifcance of educational 
institutions. “Prison abolitionist strategies,” Davis argues, 
“refect an understanding of the connections between 
institutions that we usually think about as disparate and 
disconnected. They refect an understanding of the extent 
to which the overuse of imprisonment is a consequence 
of eroding educational opportunities, which are further 
diminished by using imprisonment as a false solution 
for poor public education.”24 Structural racism plays a 
signifcant role in determining who goes to prison and 
who gets to go to colleges and universities, as racism “is 
inscribed in the very processes that create trajectories that 
lead inevitably toward incarceration or higher education.”25 
Mass and racially disparate policing and incarceration 
are reciprocally and recursively related to the erosion of 
public educational opportunities at all levels. The school-
to-prison pipeline diverts the pathways of many would-
be frst-generation college students, especially youths of 
color. Not surprisingly, most formerly incarcerated college 
students are also frst-generation. Thus, institutions of 
higher education—and specifcally, the way that they 
function with respect to formerly incarcerated and frst-
generation students—are essential to the formation of 
abolition democracy. “Just as anti-slavery abolitionism 
called for new schools, so anti-prison abolitionism also 
emphasizes educational institutions.”26 Colleges and 
universities are not only vital to actualizing the promise of 
equitable access to higher education and its associated 
opportunities. They are also critical to the construction 
of lines of communication and coalitional formations that 
link academic communities and imprisoned communities 
in ways that recapitulate the historical relationship 
SPRING 2021 | VOLUME 20  | NUMBER 3 PAGE 33 







between enslaved people and abolitionists.27 Institutions 
of higher education are also crucial to the development of 
infrastructures and communities of care that ultimately (and 
inclusively) increase public safety, security, and prosperity. 
Indeed, Davis claims that educational institutions are “the 
most powerful alternative to jails and prisons.”28 However, 
to “transform schools into vehicles of decarceration”29 
requires not only that schools be demilitarized,30 but that 
the spaces now occupied by schools be shifted, and their 
agendas expanded, through empowering relationships 
with historically marginalized communities that construct 
life-afrming alternatives to the school-to-prison pipeline 
and the revolving door of mass incarceration. 
Davis focuses primarily on K-12 schools as “upstream,” 
preventative points of intervention for breaking 
intergenerational cycles of poverty and undereducation 
and building abolitionist alternatives to the school-to-prison 
pipeline. I will focus on the California State University Project 
Rebound Consortium as an exemplar of the mobilization 
and institutionalization of abolitionist philosophy at 
the postsecondary level. Project Rebound works both 
“downstream” by constructing a prison-to-college pipeline 
and “upstream” by creating opportunities for formerly 
incarcerated staf and students, as ambassadors of higher 
education, to mentor marginalized youth of color in their 
local communities as well as in carceral settings, disrupting 
the school-to-prison pipeline and building a pathway to 
higher education for frst-generation students in its place. 
III. PROJECT REBOUND: TRANSFORMING
UNIVERSITIES INTO VEHICLES OF
DECARCERATION AND CONSTRUCTING
INFRASTRUCTURES OF CARE 
The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the 
world,31 and California has the second largest prison and 
jail systems in the country.32 Mass incarceration drains 
state budgets, depleting public resources that might 
otherwise be allocated to strengthen social safety nets 
and improve educational access and quality; it is also a 
signifcant generator of social inequality, contributing to 
the creation of a class of people permanently locked out 
of the opportunities of mainstream society, even well after 
they are released from the system. Formerly incarcerated 
people face momentous obstacles to successful reentry. 
The American Bar Association (2015) has cataloged over 
45,000 federal and state statutes and regulations that 
impose collateral consequences on persons convicted of 
crimes, including barriers related to accessing afordable 
housing, transportation, and gainful employment. Currently 
and formerly incarcerated people also face tremendous 
roadblocks in accessing the transformative power of 
higher education, which for many is the most efective and 
successful pathway to a more purposeful and prosperous 
life. Prisons overwhelmingly prioritize labor over education. 
Education in prison tends to be restricted to adult basic 
education, high school equivalency, vocational, or career 
and technical education, but not college. And only in 
December 2020 did the government fnally end the twenty-
six-year ban on Pell Grant eligibility for incarcerated 
students. While possessing knowledge, experience, 
and skills that stand to enrich the university community, 
formerly incarcerated students (and aspiring students) have 
uniquely urgent needs in navigating academic institutions, 
accessing the available academic and student supports (or 
even knowing what supports there are), and acquiring the 
soft skills and social capital necessary for academic and 
postgraduate success. 
The California State University (CSU) Project Rebound 
Consortium is a network of programs across fourteen 
universities within the largest public four-year university 
system in the country that are designed to support the higher 
education and successful reintegration of the formerly 
incarcerated through the mentorship and living examples 
of other formerly incarcerated students, graduates, 
faculty, and staf. Project Rebound ofers a community of 
support to students who have experienced the traumas 
of incarceration and who now face a multitude of social 
barriers related to housing, employment, transportation, 
and food insecurity—barriers that threaten to derail their 
lives and lead to re-arrest. Operating throughout the state 
of California, Project Rebound builds the capacity of CSU 
campuses to support reentering students by eliminating 
barriers and mitigating insecurities that compromise their 
ability to thrive academically. Project Rebound constructs 
a life-afrming alternative to the revolving door policies 
of mass incarceration by making higher education more 
accessible to and supportive of formerly incarcerated 
students and aspiring students so that they can acquire the 
knowledge and skills of a university education, enhance 
their capacity for civic engagement and community 
leadership, secure meaningful and gratifying employment, 
empower themselves and their families, and ultimately 
make stronger, safer communities. 
Sixty-three percent of the more than four hundred self-
identifed formerly incarcerated CSU students that are part 
of the Project Rebound community are frst-generation 
college students; 61 percent are Black, Latinx, or Native. 
Like (other) frst-generation students, formerly incarcerated 
students often experience “imposter syndrome,” a 
psychological pattern characterized by pervasive self-
doubt, in which an individual harbors a persistent fear of 
being exposed as a fraud.33 Imposter syndrome is more 
broadly experienced by many frst-generation students, 
who are often made to feel that they don’t belong in college; 
that they lack the background and social capital deemed 
necessary to succeed in higher education.34 Students 
sufering from impostor syndrome are more prone to low 
self-esteem, anxiety, depression, emotional exhaustion, 
social isolation, and burnout.35 Due to associated feelings 
of separation or dissociation from self, such students also 
frequently select majors and careers that do not align well 
with their own passion and purpose, which can lead to loss 
of intrinsic motivation, exacerbated emotional exhaustion, 
and withdrawal.36 
Students who have experienced incarceration (again, the 
majority of whom are also frst-generation) experience 
compounded forms of imposter syndrome. They are not 
only made to feel that they don’t belong in higher education; 
they are frequently made to feel that they don’t belong 
in mainstream social institutions at all. This feeling is the 
product of extensive and purposeful social engineering. 
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Formerly incarcerated students arrive at the university with 
what the late sociologist Devah Pager called a “negative 
credential.”37 Like educational or professional credentials, 
the “negative credential” of a criminal record “constitutes 
a formal and enduring classifcation of social status, which 
can be used to regulate access and opportunity across 
numerous social, economic, and political domains.”38 Unlike 
an earned educational or professional credential, however, 
which grants an individual access to opportunities, the 
criminal credential is “a unique mechanism of stratifcation,” 
an unearned imposition of the state, manufactured out 
of 45,000 collateral consequences of criminal conviction, 
that “certifes [formerly incarcerated people] in ways that 
qualify them for discrimination or social exclusion.”39 The
state-sanctioned social stigma of criminal conviction is so
extensive and intractable that scholars and activists refer
to it as a “mark,” “brand,” “label,” or “badge of inferiority”
(thereby conceptually linking collateral consequences with
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), one of the most notorious decisions
involving race in the history of the US Supreme Court, which
established the “separate but equal” principle that was used
until 1954 to legally uphold Jim Crow segregation). 
Formerly incarcerated students have an abiding fear of 
being exposed and marked by “the prison label.”40 Indeed, 
as legal scholar Michelle Alexander argues in The New Jim 
Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, 
“the system of mass incarceration is based on the prison 
label, not prison time. . . . Once a person is labeled a 
felon, he or she is ushered into a parallel universe in which 
discrimination, stigma, and exclusion are perfectly legal, 
and privileges of citizenship such as voting and jury service 
are of-limits.”41 As a “badge of inferiority,” the prison 
label “relegates people for their entire lives to second-
class status . . . locked out of the mainstream society and 
economy—permanently.”42 The prison label compounds 
the imposter syndrome felt by formerly incarcerated, frst-
generation students. Produced by punitive institutions 
and sensationalizing media conglomerates, the outsider 
or marginalized self-concept that formerly incarcerated 
students internalize is an integral currency of the “closed 
circuit of perpetual marginality” that mass incarceration 
manufactures.43 
A signifcant part of the work of Project Rebound is geared
toward the elimination of the prison label and the social
stigma of incarceration. One of the primary ways Project
Rebound erodes the social stigma of incarceration is by
centering the leadership, agency, civic engagement, and
living example of formerly incarcerated college students,
graduates, faculty, and staf. The principle of “each one teach
one” is at the core of Project Rebound’s philosophy. Project
Rebound staf have an incarceration experience of their
own. Many are alumni of the program who have successfully
transitioned back to society by pursuing higher education
as a transformative practice, earning undergraduate and
postgraduate degrees, pursuing research, and assuming
leadership roles within their communities. 
Believing that those closest to the problem hold the seeds 
of the solution, Project Rebound program staf and student 
peer navigators support other formerly incarcerated people 
with admissions and fnancial aid applications, course 
registration and major selection, soft skills and technical 
literacy, student life and leadership, securing internships, 
and career development. Through trauma-informed, asset-
based community development and public education, staf 
exemplify, highlight, and build upon the many character 
strengths that formerly incarcerated people bring to 
institutions of higher education—virtues like resilience, 
persistence, resourcefulness, enthusiasm, gratitude, self-
determination, and commitments to fairness and social 
justice. Project Rebound staf and students also amplify 
the unique critical insights of currently and formerly 
incarcerated people. Borne of the lived experience of 
struggle with the intricate injustices and indignities of 
the prison industrial complex, the insights of Project 
Rebound scholars productively complicate and contribute 
to scholarship, teaching, and policymaking on criminal 
justice, social inequality, and public safety. 
By recasting the experience and survival of incarceration as 
a source of personal and collective empowerment, Project 
Rebound provides formerly incarcerated students with an 
opportunity not only to socially reintegrate in a college 
setting, but also to psychologically integrate their lived 
histories into their present identities, projects, and pursuits 
in an empowering way that dislodges the defnitions 
imposed upon them by the prison label. As one Project 
Rebound alumnus, Robert, puts it: 
Project Rebound is an existential spot for me. It’s 
where I get together with others who are similarly 
situated; they have an incarceration, as I do. That’s 
a huge part of who I am. . . . Project Rebound has 
been a scafolding. It’s allowed me to integrate 
this important part of me into this educational 
experience and not have to feel like I’m hiding this 
part of myself. 
Project Rebound scholars routinely speak of the freedom 
felt from “coming out of the shadows,” exercising agency in 
their own self-defnition, and utilizing their knowledge and 
experiences to teach and empower others. By shattering 
the stigma and shame associated with the experience 
of incarceration, Project Rebound creates a culture that 
acknowledges, as Ruth Wilson Gilmore puts it, “that where 
life is precious, life is precious,” that there is no essential 
diference between people in prison and people in the free 
world.44 Currently and formerly incarcerated people are not 
failed human beings deserving of second-class citizenship; 
they are intrinsically valuable people—the overwhelming 
majority of whom are precious Black, Latinx, and Indigenous 
lives—whom we recognize as our friends, as members of 
our families, communities, and in some cases, our selves. 
III.1 CULTIVATING COMMUNITIES OF CARE AND
BELONGING 
One of the primary goals of Project Rebound is to cultivate 
a culture of care and belonging for formerly incarcerated 
students on California State University campuses across 
the Consortium through community building, holistic peer-
led and professionally supported healing practices, and 
wraparound support that help Rebound Scholars actualize 
their full potential. This entails that our students not be 
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seen and not see themselves as clients and recipients 
of services—not as multiply disadvantaged objects to be 
managed—but rather as valuable members of a community 
of care and aspiration. 
For example, in response to the fact that formerly 
incarcerated people are ten times more likely to experience 
homelessness than the general public,45 Project Rebound at 
CSU Fullerton established the frst transformative housing 
community for formerly incarcerated university students in 
the nation in 2018. The John Irwin House is named after 
Dr. John Irwin, a criminology professor at San Francisco 
State University who founded Project Rebound in 1967 and, 
prior to becoming a scholar, had spent fve years in prison 
himself. The John Irwin House not only provides housing for 
six students, but also serves as the hub of Project Rebound’s 
community-building work. It provides a space for the entire 
Project Rebound community to participate in regular social 
gatherings, orientations, workshops, mentorship meetings, 
celebrations, peer-to-peer support meetings, and more. 
The Irwin House is a scholar-centered space, thoughtfully 
designed to support learning and cultivate life skills so that 
our students can successfully transition to independent 
living after graduating from the program. 
As a community center, the Irwin House also enhances 
Project Rebound as a community of social and 
psychological reintegration. Like other frst-generation 
students, the identity tensions and estrangements 
that frst-generation, formerly incarcerated students 
experience in their educational journeys are often 
multilateral and multidirectional. Students experience
compounded imposter syndrome when they begin to 
integrate onto campus and interact with faculty, staf, 
and their more “traditional” student peers. They also 
often experience tension and estrangement from their 
families and communities of origin, who for a variety of 
reasons often experience cultures of higher education as 
foreign—sometimes even as unwelcoming, threatening, 
or hostile. It’s noteworthy that this sentiment from one’s 
family is common not only among formerly incarcerated 
students in Project Rebound, but frst-generation students 
more broadly. Project Rebound works to mitigate this 
estrangement and resist the institutional history of US higher 
education, which has predominantly served exclusionary
ends, reproducing rather than redressing social inequality. 
Utilizing the student-centered, yet domestic space of the 
Irwin House, Project Rebound welcomes students and their 
multigenerational families to commune with staf, faculty, 
and community partners at monthly cookouts, food pantries, 
holiday gatherings (e.g., “Friendsgiving”), and graduation 
celebrations. Students’ families, including the youths of 
the next generation, are not patronized or ostracized, 
but afrmed and recognized as integral participants in 
and benefciaries of Rebound Scholars’ educational and 
emancipatory journeys. In this way, families of Rebound 
Scholars feel less estranged from the educational pursuits 
of their loved one, but instead, come to see themselves 
as part of the intellectual and social community of which 
their loved one is a part, and students’ children, nieces, 
and nephews frequently come to see themselves as future 
college students, thus interrupting intergenerational cycles 
of undereducation, addiction, and incarceration. 
Attending to students’ basic needs is an integral part of 
constructing abolitionist infrastructures of care. Over 40 
percent of CSU students experience food insecurity and 
10 percent experience homelessness.46 Project Rebound 
knows from experience that these rates are higher among 
frst-generation, formerly incarcerated students. In addition 
to providing housing and housing support scholarships, 
Project Rebound also provides meal vouchers and other 
forms of support to increase the food security of students. 
For example, Project Rebound at CSU Fullerton launched 
a Food Justice Initiative to address the escalating food 
insecurities of Rebound students and their families during 
the COVID-19 crisis. Pivoting in response to the rapid closure 
of campus infrastructure, which suddenly deprived the 
members of the program of the campus food vendors upon 
whom they rely upon for regular meals, Project Rebound 
at CSU Fullerton created a food pantry at the Irwin House 
and then broadened that work to encompass an organic 
community garden, horticultural training, and culinary skills 
curriculum aimed at providing Rebound Scholars with more 
equitable access to healthy food and empowering them 
with knowledge and skills to ensure greater long-term 
food security for them and their families. The garden also 
contributes to the holistic healing and basic wellness needs 
of Rebound Scholars by providing a therapeutic outdoor 
space, conducive to physical distancing, where students 
can socialize and serve the community while earning a 
wage and receiving hands-on experience with the harvest 
cycle—from seed to table. In these ways, Project Rebound 
helps develop networks of care, including housing and 
food security, for frst-generation and formerly incarcerated 
students who might otherwise lack these critical sources 
of security. 
Such infrastructures of care produce measurable and 
discernible results. Project Rebound is resoundingly 
successful. Compared with the State of California, which 
has a 46 percent recidivism rate, zero percent of Project 
Rebound students have returned to prison. Furthermore, 
65 percent of Project Rebound students earn over a 
3.0 grade point average, and 87 percent of Project 
Rebound graduates have been admitted to postgraduate 
programs or secured full-time employment. These results 
demonstrate that investing in abolitionist infrastructures of 
care increases public safety while dismantling systems of 
oppression and exclusion. 
III.2 SHIFTING THE FOOTPRINT OF THE
UNIVERSITY TOWARD JUSTICE 
The communities of care that Project Rebound cultivates 
extend beyond the university. Project Rebound builds 
bridges between the university and a broad array of 
community and grassroots political formations and 
philanthropic entities—founding mentorship programs 
with elders in the community, designing capacity-building 
workshop series on civic engagement, trauma-informed 
social work, and alternatives to violence that are facilitated 
by community-based organizations, and engaging in 
outreach and mentorship with currently incarcerated 
people and youth directly impacted by the criminal legal 
system. Forging these new relationships is not only a matter 
of increasing equitable access to higher education—the 
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language of “access” implies that the university makes itself 
more accessible while otherwise remaining unchanged. 
By embracing and empowering frst-generation, formerly 
incarcerated students on university campuses, and by 
constructing networks of care and advocacy among them 
and diverse community partners, Project Rebound shifts 
the footprint of the university toward social justice. 
Project Rebound exemplifes the leading role that 
institutions of higher education must play in the theory 
and practice of constructive abolition. Through student-
centered, grassroots-oriented empowerment work, frst-
generation, formerly incarcerated students, faculty, and 
staf can inspire and reconstruct universities so that they 
begin to crowd out the prison industrial complex, so that 
the prison industrial complex inhabits increasingly smaller 
areas not only of our social and psychic landscape, but of our 
state and municipal budgets. To be sure, negative abolition 
is essential. We must divest from prisons and police, which 
for decades have consumed increasingly breathtaking 
proportions of state and municipal budgets, cutting public 
investment in education, health, employment, and housing, 
while producing greater social inequality and harm. But, as 
abolitionists have argued for over two decades, divesting 
from the prison industrial complex must go hand-in-
hand with constructive reinvestment in infrastructures of 
care. Mass and racially disparate incarceration arose due 
to America’s failure to comprehensively abolish slavery 
by establishing such infrastructures of care. Just as anti-
slavery abolitionism called for new schools, so anti-prison 
abolitionism must also emphasize colleges and universities 
as indispensable institutions for forging the future of 
abolition democracy. 
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Supporting First-Generation Philosophers 
at Every Level 
Bailie Peterson 
UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO 
The APA has recently taken steps to address concerns 
related to teaching and supporting philosophers and 
students from less privileged backgrounds. I want to add 
to this project by feshing out some concrete ways that 
philosophy professors contribute to the challenges faced by 
frst-generation and fnancially disadvantaged philosophers 
and students. I hope that in making these behaviors explicit 
it may be easier for faculty to acknowledge and overcome 
them. 
I will share several undergraduate experiences as a frst-
generation woman from a low-income background, which 
demonstrate ways that these identities come into confict 
with class diferences. I will also include observations and 
comments from my students. I teach in a university with 
a signifcant population of underrepresented students.1 
While I have some things in common with my students in 
terms of background, they face challenges that I do not, 
related to race, health, and disability status, for example. I 
hope that their experiences can add to the conversation in 
ways that mine cannot. 
I will also address something that I only recently recognized. 
These issues do not go away with the attainment of a 
degree or a particular job or title, and they can continue 
to have deleterious efects on one’s professional life. 
The uncomfortable environment that professors create 
or support is not only damaging to undergraduates, but 
to graduate students and incoming faculty from less 
traditional backgrounds, who may feel a renewed sense of 
imposter syndrome and alienation. 
I. IS PHILOSOPHY WORTH SHARING?
Before I begin, I’d like to quickly set aside the question 
of whether or not there is value in studying philosophy, in 
general, as well as specifcally for less privileged students. 
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While this is an essential preliminary question, I assume 
that most of us working in this feld fnd it to be worth 
sharing with those who are left out. Nevertheless, many 
existing arguments establish the worth of philosophy, 
based on benefts like improved reading comprehension 
and critical thinking.2 
We have no reason to assume that the benefts of philosophy 
fail to apply to less privileged students. There are even 
preliminary suggestions that the benefts of philosophy are 
especially signifcant for underrepresented students.3 
Philosophy courses can also provide opportunities for 
students to refect on meaning, value, and identity. In 
Moving Up without Losing your Way (2019), Jennifer 
Morton suggests that refective practices like these can 
help alleviate concerns relevant to frst-generation and low-
income students as they navigate spheres of conficting 
identity.4 
Considering these benefts, we ought to correct the 
current imbalance. I caution those tempted with thinking 
that philosophy isn’t relevant to all students to question 
their assumptions. We must avoid jumping to harmful 
conclusions that reify dangerous stereotypes about the link 
between class and talent, interest, or ability. 
Beyond these suggestions, the most substantial reasons I 
fnd for increasing access and exposure to philosophy come 
from teaching. I am not alone in this—philosophers share 
positive experiences teaching a range of students outside 
of college, including K-12 students, homeless youth, and 
people in prisons.5 Frequently, these students lack prior 
understanding of and exposure to philosophical works. 
However, philosophy does not need to have pre-requisites 
or other kinds of previous exposure, and students from a 
range of backgrounds are often eager to learn more. 
In my case, I frst took a philosophy course at community 
college. I added the class because I liked the professor, 
but I had a very vague understanding of the content. 
Despite this lack of previous exposure, I enjoyed the course 
so much that I asked what I needed to do to become a 
professor during the frst weeks of the term. At that point, 
I was not on a path to a PhD by any means. I had dropped 
out of high school during tenth grade, ran away from home, 
lived among homeless youth and adults, and, eventually, 
completed a high school diploma program primarily as a 
way to increase job opportunities beyond minimum wage 
options. I had not intended to begin the work towards my 
associate’s degree and did so only after the state diploma 
program provided a scholarship. Philosophy provided a 
new approach to the specifc questions that mattered to 
me. The ability to call everything into question and disagree 
with authority and past teachings was empowering. I did 
not stop until I met the goals I set out in my frst course, 
earning my doctorate, and beginning my career as a 
professor. 
While my initial experience with philosophy may not 
represent most low-income, frst-generation high 
school dropouts, the immediate and profound interest I 
developed carried me through despite many challenges. 
Some of these challenges refect deeper issues that may 
explain why philosophy has continually lacked diversity. 
These issues come, in part, from the content, e.g., the 
lack of representation of women and other marginalized 
philosophers.6 But eforts to make philosophy more inclusive 
must also focus on other factors, like an uncomfortable 
classroom setting or hostile learning environment. 
Therefore, we must not only take into consideration the 
necessity of eforts like diversifying syllabi (which have 
essential and demonstrable benefts),7 but must recognize 
the importance of delivering content without alienating 
students. In my frst philosophy course, my professor was 
incredibly adept at fostering a sense of community and 
belonging, which are essential ingredients in the quest to 
make philosophy more inclusive. 
On the other hand, philosophers contribute to the lack of 
diversity by creating uncomfortable environments, in both 
overt and subtle ways. This last concern is my main focus, 
as it hasn’t been addressed, and I think that changes in this 
area would be signifcant and necessary at every level. 
II. A MISMATCH IN BACKGROUND 
I do not think philosophers intend to make philosophy 
feel exclusionary, but they often act in ways that create 
this impression, sometimes out of a lack of awareness 
or understanding. Frequently, the challenges faced by 
students are invisible—you cannot tell by looking at a 
student what they are facing outside of the classroom. 
Given the frequent mismatch between the background of 
professors and students (especially in institutions with large 
numbers of frst-generation and low-income students), 
there is the potential for professors to make assumptions 
that do not accurately refect others’ experiences. 
In her recent work, Jennifer Morton works to counteract this 
lack of understanding by providing vivid frst-hand accounts 
of her students’ lives and the emotional, psychological, 
and ethical costs that they must pay to achieve their goals.8 
This narrative approach can help philosophers develop 
awareness and sensitivity toward issues that they haven’t 
experienced themselves. For example, if you were a more 
traditional student, you might make assumptions about 
what it means to miss a class or fail an assignment. If 
you lived on campus, your parents provided fnancial and 
emotional support, and you did not work outside of school, 
your assumptions may not refect students’ realities. 
Many students work full time, sometimes in physically 
and mentally demanding jobs.9 Others provide substantial 
care for children, parents, or siblings. A large number of 
students are active service members or veterans, which 
can also create obstacles. They sometimes sufer adverse 
mental and physical health concerns, which can be 
exacerbated by fnancial problems and lack of adequate 
insurance. Students from underrepresented groups may 
be confronting micro- and macro-aggressions or actively 
combating racism, sexism, homophobia, and/or other forms 
of oppression and exclusion. Many experience overlapping 
issues that make college work more challenging to 
navigate. The lack of awareness of who our underprivileged 
students are can lead to assumptions, stereotypes, and 
harmful behaviors. Further, when colleagues do not ft the 
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assumed mold of the “typical professor,” they are likely 
to fall victim to similar challenges based on assumptions 
about their backgrounds and experiences, as well.I will now 
give examples that illustrate these concerns and identify 
harmful preconceptions. 
II.1 THE MYTH THAT UNDERPRIVILEGED
STUDENTS ARE DOOMED TO FAIL 
It is unfair to assume that your students are set to fail, for 
example, even if they did not have the same educational 
opportunities you expect. In my case, I quickly learned 
that some college professors viewed my academic 
background as a mark against me. I began community 
college with a deep sense that I did not belong. It was a 
community college, after all, and college had seemed like 
an unattainable dream for most of my life. By the time I 
graduated from community college, however, I had made 
signifcant strides towards feeling like I belonged. 
But my confdence signifcantly diminished on day one 
as a philosophy major when I shared with my Ancient 
Philosophy professor that I was a transfer student. 
He immediately discounted my prior experience with 
philosophy and suggested that I fnd a tutor. Even though 
I earned an A in his course without outside help, I quickly 
decided that I was still an imposter and that my past work 
could not counteract my lack of initial pedigree. Comments 
like these can have a lasting impact. Often, it seems that 
these troubling interactions stem from inexperience with 
what life is like beyond the academic bubble. 
II.2 THE IN-CROWD 
Sometimes exclusionary behaviors are puzzlingly overt. 
In my junior year of college, a young beginning professor 
with a new Ivy League PhD and fashy sports car learned 
from another student that I lived in a mobile home park. He 
asked me what it was like—what kind of people lived there, 
and if he could observe sometime. His attitude made me 
feel more like an anthropological specimen than a college 
student. 
Other times, minor slights can compound and contribute to 
an overall chilly environment. I teach at a university located 
in a community where many families work in agriculture, 
and many students come from rural backgrounds. As a 
professor, if you literally turn your nose up at the smell 
of cattle and have to leave for the day, you are showing 
students, staf, and faculty that their home—and perhaps 
the livelihood that supports their family—disgusts you. 
This attitude comes through when professors make 
ofhand remarks that “their children would not attend 
this university” or that they could not imagine living in 
the city or area where most of their students grew up. 
If students already feel that they do not belong, these 
subtle behaviors can push them out the door or express 
that professors view them as less than. Even when these 
comments are not directly shared, these attitudes are likely 
to come across in interactions with students. These biases 
are part of why, as I suggest below, it is essential to take 
students’ comments seriously. If students feel belittled, 
they may be detecting biases that professors themselves 
are not fully aware of, and their words may refect more 
profound issues.10 Here again, these problems move into 
the profession. When colleagues make assumptions about 
your upbringing or criticize your educational background, 
this creates a hierarchy within departments, refecting 
the challenges faced by undergraduates. For example, 
quizzing job candidates about their knowledge of wine or 
international travel demonstrates that you have a particular 
type of person in mind for the job. Comments like these 
can further the feeling of alienation for faculty who come 
from less privileged backgrounds. 
III. CREATING COMMUNITY
III.1 DEMONSTRATING RESPECT FOR OTHERS
AND ENCOURAGING A GROWTH MINDSET
While the above examples illustrate various problems, there 
are positive means to counteract these issues. Becoming 
aware of our diferences and identifying the assumptions 
guiding our teaching practices can allow us to change. 
For example, when teaching, we might initially model the 
confrontational classroom dynamics that we experienced 
as students. But, we can also adopt methods that work 
better to promote a sense of belonging. 
We have many opportunities to demonstrate respect and 
cultivate a sense of community. For example, teaching 
introductory courses includes many opportunities for 
professors to reveal inconsistencies or contradictions 
within students’ views. However, we must be careful 
not to discourage or disregard students as uninitiated 
beginners. Professors can show respect for students’ 
burgeoning understanding, even as we aim to help them 
improve and overcome error. Misunderstandings provide 
excellent opportunities to illustrate the philosophical virtue 
of humility, to work through the benefts of scrutiny and 
critical analysis, and to demonstrate a growth mindset. 
Encouraging a “growth mindset” (or the belief that 
intelligence is a quality that can be changed and developed) 
versus a “fxed mindset” (or the belief that intelligence is 
innate or fxed at birth) has many benefts.11 For example, it 
has been shown to promote a love of learning, encourage 
students to embrace challenges, and to increase happiness 
and confdence.12 
Furthermore, the practice of demonstrating our own 
shortcomings and potential for progress is an important 
teaching practice, both as a way to connect and to 
increase a sense of belonging in the classroom. To this 
end, I frequently share my past mistakes and progress 
with students, and encourage them to practice “failing.” 
Philosophy can just be objectively confusing, even when 
one has substantial experience in the feld. Normalizing 
these struggles at every level (perhaps, especially in the 
high-pressure environment of grad school) is one important 
way to create an inclusive environment. However, when 
professors show hostility towards their students’ views, 
this refects a pernicious elitism that shuts down learning 
and decreases trust in the professor.13 
III.2 CULTIVATING A SENSE OF BELONGING
In some cases, students can experience alienation to the 
degree that it impedes their ability to complete essential 
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tasks. I recently taught in a summer program focused 
on bridging the gap between high school and college. 
The students had received athletic scholarships to play 
football, and many were members of marginalized groups. 
Unfortunately, some of these students had a deep sense that 
they didn’t belong. One timid but talented student found 
college so uncomfortable that a ten-minute meeting with a 
professor was one of the biggest obstacles of the semester. 
For context, I am a woman, fairly early in my career, and my 
students typically fail to fnd me intimidating, for several 
reasons, many related to gender and personality. I prioritize 
ways to encourage students to feel a sense of belonging in 
college. I’ve attended and taught workshops on this matter 
and work with various campus groups towards these goals. 
Nonetheless, it took gentle but concerted eforts to 
increase this student’s confdence and sense of belonging. 
I reached out by email. I pointed out the benefts of his 
specifc contributions. I made it a point to highlight areas 
where he had made progress and where his unique life 
experiences proved relevant and meaningful to the 
class.14 I focused on increasing both a growth mindset and 
collaborative learning and created many opportunities for 
less stressful interactions early on.15 
I am discouraged when I imagine what would have 
occurred in many other professors’ courses. His lack of 
eye contact, for example, may have been misconstrued. 
His sudden absence from the virtual classroom, when put 
on the spot, could be seen as disrespectful, rather than 
as a sign of a student trying very hard to overcome his 
nerves while saving face before his peers. For students in 
this position, professors must work to create a welcoming 
environment. The smallest nudge towards the door is often 
all it takes to convince students to return to their lives 
before college. Note that in the case of underrepresented 
faculty, mentoring is essential for overcoming similar gaps. 
It was not until I got to know professors outside of my 
department that I felt comfortable sharing the ways that I 
didn’t ft. Their guidance helped me to fnd my voice and 
convinced me to continue despite challenges. 
III.3 TAKING STUDENT COMMENTS SERIOUSLY 
The behaviors identifed above are dangerous for both 
faculty and students. They can confrm students’ beliefs 
that they just aren’t cut out for college.16 We know that 
frst-generation students fnish college in more time and 
less frequently, and these uncomfortable encounters may 
provide part of the explanation.17 
Worse yet, we know that these students may be less 
likely to complain or self-advocate and more likely to 
treat professors with undue authority.18 I have witnessed 
demeaning and harsh behavior towards students who 
take it to confrm their perceived shortcomings and do not 
complain or report poor treatment. These considerations 
put the onus on professors to ensure that we are advocating 
for these students. We must correct those who—even 
inadvertently—contribute to these issues. When we receive 
complaints or comments, it is prudent to imagine that many 
more students share these concerns. Of course, student 
complaints are not always accurate19—but, given the sense 
that philosophy is exclusionary, we ought to work hard to 
determine the causes of this view. We cannot disregard the 
opinions of the most vulnerable, even if it requires checking 
our egos or seriously editing our pedagogical practices to 
serve the needs of a changing student population. 
We must be aware of the potential for implicit bias and 
acknowledge that the invisibility of various struggles and 
identities may enable negative behaviors to slip beneath 
the radar. It is essential to create awareness of elitism and 
other class-related attitudes and to assess the climate 
within existing departments. The attitude that only some 
people belong is pervasive and often comes to college 
with underrepresented students. We owe it to them to 
prevent the proliferation of these harmful attitudes. 
IV. ADDRESSING THESE CONCERNS FOR JUNIOR
FACULTY 
Given the nearly immeasurable diference between my life 
pre- and post-college, I have always found it essential to 
support students from similar backgrounds and to address 
the challenges that stand in their way. However, it has 
recently become clear that part of my exclusive focus on 
students obscured the fact that the exclusionary behavior 
I have described extends beyond professor-student 
interactions. 
We can tie this to some of the myths embedded in the 
traditional narrative of upward mobility. Jennifer Morton 
rejects this narrative due to the overlooked costs and 
inequities that frst-generation and low-income individuals 
face as they work to achieve their goals. A further problem 
with the typical portrayal of upward mobility is the idea 
that once one has “made it” past the hurdles of college, for 
example, they become accepted as part of the new group, 
and their struggles disappear. 
Contra this idea, we have evidence that frst-generation 
students fare worse than their peers beyond college in 
salary, interviews, and job prospects.20 These challenges can 
stem from a lack of awareness of how the professional world 
operates and ignorance of one’s lack of understanding, or 
“meta-ignorance.” We also know that issues like imposter 
syndrome present themselves well into professional life. 
In my frst years as a professor, I failed to acknowledge 
the continuing infuence of these factors. It is now clear 
that I was trying to navigate within a new sphere without 
adequate support. I was eager to please and skeptical of 
my worth, which made it easy to fall victim to behavior that 
undermined my eforts, added to my workload unfairly, or 
displayed a lack of respect towards my contributions. 
I encourage other professors from less privileged 
backgrounds to self-advocate and work to understand the 
possibility of meta-ignorance about policies like parental 
leave, salary negotiation, and service requirements, all of 
which caused confict in my frst years. 
Although I initially struggled to self-advocate, this was 
not the endpoint. I’ve benefted from refective practices 
like those suggested by Morton, as well as by fnding 
understanding and community with other philosophers. I’ve 
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found ways to support my students while also supporting 
departmental changes that have made it better for all of 
us. Most importantly, I found mentors who I could trust to 
encourage and support my progress. The situation is not 
hopeless, but, like the alienation of students, it requires 
awareness as the frst step towards change. 
It is important to realize that my suggestions will require 
active work. This includes building departments that 
engender discussion and constructive feedback, time 
and patience in identifying and addressing issues, and a 
willingness to consider alternatives to current practices. 
This work must be prioritized by departments, especially 
when junior faculty are working to improve existing 
environments. In some cases, this will require cross-
campus collaboration (e.g., linking in with student support 
specialists, administrators, and advocacy groups) to ensure 
that changes will have lasting efects. Acknowledging the 
need for change is an essential frst step, but it will take 
substantial efort to make a shift in existing departments 
with long-standing traditions and practices. Given the 
APA’s mission, I suggest creating networks and mentoring 
opportunities within the organization to help meet these 
goals. 
Additionally, it is crucial to ensure that this work is not the 
sole responsibility of faculty from less privileged groups, 
especially as they may be facing other challenges, such 
as meta-ignorance, or imposter syndrome, as discussed 
above.21 We must work together to assess and eliminate 
bullying, elitism, and hostility in our departments.22 
Importantly, this must begin in Philosophy 101 and continue 
past dissertation writing, into the job search, and through 
the tenure process. 
I hope that my comments can add to the APA’s eforts to 
improve the feld for less-likely would-be philosophers, 
and I strongly encourage them to continue to prioritize 
these goals. 
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NOTES 
1. For example, roughly 46 percent of incoming students are frst-
generation in 2020, and about a third are Pell-grant eligible. 
2. For a survey or reasons to major in philosophy, see the fnal 
chapter in Stich and Donaldson, Philosophy: Asking Questions, 
Seeking Answers. There is extensive support for philosophy within 
the K-12 philosophy movement, and much empirical research 
to demonstrate benefts (for example, Trickey and Topping, 
“Collaborative Philosophical Enquiry for School Children”; Millet 
and Tapper, “Benefts of Collaborative Philosophical Inquiry in 
Schools”; Mohr Lone and Burroughs, Philosophy in Education: 
Questioning & Dialogue in Schools). There is also data on GRE, 
GMAT and LSAT scores. However, we must consider whether 
there is a causal connection between the likelihood to pursue 
philosophy and better scores, or whether philosophy leads to 
higher scores (see the data available at ets.org, lsac.org, and 
mba.org. Relevant data is also compiled here: http://dailynous. 
com/value-of-philosophy/charts-and-graphs/). 
3. Preliminary results from in-depth studies in the UK suggest 
that students who are most disadvantaged gain more in 
reading comprehension and math after philosophy courses, 
as compared to their peers. See the studies linked here: 
https://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/projects-and-
evaluation/projects/philosophy-for-children/. I have argued 
elsewhere that Summer Philosophy programs could improve 
the achievement gap, primarily due to empirical fndings 
highlighting the benefts of studying philosophy (Peterson, 
“Can Summer Philosophy Programs Help Close the Achievement 
Gap?”). The benefts discussed here may be even more relevant 
and applicable to these students, as they navigate challenges 
in their own lives and within their communities. Thanks to an 
anonymous reviewer for pressing this point. 
4. Morton links these benefts to psychological research on 
values afrmation. See, for example, Cohen and Sherman, “The 
Psychology of Change: Self-Afrmation and Social Psychological 
Intervention,” cited in Morton, Moving Up Without Losing Your 
Way: The Ethical Costs of Upward Mobility, 130. 
5. For example, consider the success of programs like the 
Princeton Prison Teaching Initiative (https://prisonteaching. 
org/) or examples of teaching youth in diferent contexts at 
the Philosophy Learning and Teaching Organization (plato-
teaching.org). I describe my experience teaching a free course 
for disadvantaged students in my school district in (Peterson, 
“Can Summer Philosophy Programs Help Close the Achievement 
Gap?”). Debalina Chatterjee and Joseph Milillo’s 2019 PLATO 
Conference presentation on teaching critical thinking and 
philosophy to homeless youth at The Carying Place is another 
relevant example. 
6. The APA has many useful resources related to these issues. 
See, for example: https://www.apaonline.org/page/diversity_ 
resources. This page contains many resources and suggestions 
to increase diversity in philosophy, including eforts to increase 
philosophy classes ofered at every level. 
7. See, for example, Saul, “Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat and 
Women in Philosophy,” on the importance of adding women 
to course syllabi. My point here is that while necessary, these 
eforts may not be sufcient to make the feld welcoming to all, 
especially if departments and classrooms are uncomfortable. We 
must address both sets of issues. 
8. Morton, Moving Up Without Losing Your Way. For example, 
students may have to sacrifce the relationships most important 
to them, confront cultural diferences, and contend with the 
challenges of code-switching. 
9. Many students work to pay for college themselves and avoid 
loans at all costs. Sometimes, this is linked to concerns about 
their (or their parents’) citizenship status, and concerns about 
the role of federal aid. There is a vast need for mentoring and 
assistance about fnancial matters, particularly for students who 
do not receive this information from their families or peers. 
10. Morton’s suggestions apply here, as well. Engaging in self-
refective work with students can increase awareness, 
understanding and empathy of these diferences. These 
benefts extend to student-to-student interactions. One term, 
after a formerly homeless student in my ethics class shared her 
experience, I received many informed and conscientious essays 
on a topic that is sometimes treated poorly by students who 
hold stereotypes about homelessness. See further comments in 
section III.2. 
11. See Dweck, Mindset: The New Psychology of Success. 
12. Ibid. See also Leslie et al., “Expectations of Brilliance Underlie 
Gender Distributions across Academic Disciplines,” for example. 
These benefts may be especially important when students fnd 
philosophy initially inaccessible. 
13. This is linked to yet another of the “Ethical Costs” Morton 
discusses. Students’ beliefs, values and experiences should not 
be dismissed, even if they are beyond the range of what the 
professor may be able to imagine. 
14. Several students in this course shared personal experiences 
with issues facing their families, including struggles related to 
poverty, the rights of felons’, and the efects of racism and white 
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privilege. I sometimes share an experience of bystanders failing 
to notice the body of a homeless man in downtown L.A., during 
the busy morning commute. While students can sometimes 
be dismissive of issues that they haven’t experienced, hearing 
frsthand from peers, e.g., from an African American student who 
witnessed police brutality in his community, is hard to turn away 
from. Of course, a comfortable environment is essential before 
this can take place, which is why some of the other issues are so 
important. Normalizing the experiences of those outside of the 
typical range of philosopher, student or professor is a powerful 
way to demonstrate belonging, while improving access to the 
material. Thank you to the reviewers for suggesting further 
discussion of these points. 
15. I do not mean to suggest that we should coddle students, or 
omit necessary tasks, like conferencing with professors. Instead, 
I wish to highlight that we can follow methods for encouraging 
and supporting all of our students, including growth mindset 
and student-centered learning, without sacrifcing rigor. See for 
example, Friedlaender, et al., “Student-Centered Schools: Closing 
the Opportunity Gap”; Kuh et al., Piecing Together the Student 
Success Puzzle: Research, Propositions, and Recommendations, 
and Jacquart et al., “Diversity Is Not Enough: The Importance of 
Inclusive Pedagogy.” 
16. See for example, Cataldi et al., “First-Generation Students: 
College Access, Persistence, and Postbachelor’s Outcomes”; 
Cokely et al., “Impostor Feelings as a Moderator and Mediator 
of the Relationship between Perceived Discrimination and 
Mental Health among Racial/Ethnic Minority College Students”;
Hutchison, “Infuence of First Generation Status on Students’ 
Perceptions of Faculty”; Morton, Moving Up Without Losing Your 
Way: The Ethical Costs of Upward Mobility. 
17. See, for example, Eismann, “First Generation Students and Job 
Success”; Cataldi et al., “First-Generation Students.”
18. See Cataldi et al., “First-Generation Students”; Hutchison, 
“Infuence of First Generation Status on Students’ Perceptions 
of Faculty”; Swanson et al., “An Evaluation of the Educational 
Impact of College Campus Visits: A Randomized Experiment.” 
19. This is especially true for women and people of color, who, 
research shows, may be unfairly rated due to implicit bias, racism 
and sexism. (See, for example, Huston, “Race and Gender Bias 
in Higher Education: Could Faculty Course Evaluations Impede 
Further Progress Toward Parity?”). 
20. See, for example, Eismann, “First Generation Students and Job 
Success.”
21. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point. 
22. Power dynamics can exacerbate these issues, especially for 
junior faculty, and in smaller departments. When one’s chair, for 
example, creates a hostile environment, junior faculty may put 
themselves at signifcant risk by complaining. Gender also plays 
a role, and women are frequently asked to complete gendered 
tasks. Therefore, tenured faculty need to become advocates 
whenever possible. 
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BOOK REVIEWS 
Women’s Activism, Feminism, and Social 
Justice 
Margaret McLaren (Oxford University Press, 2019). 290 pp. 
$104. ISBN: 978-0190947705. 
Reviewed by Nancy J. Hirschmann 
THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 
The heart of Margaret McLaren’s excellent new book, 
Women’s Activism, Feminism, and Social Justice, entails 
looking at systemic and structural injustice as it is lived 
and experienced by women. A central theme of the book 
is that “addressing poverty, oppressive social norms, and 
violence in interpersonal relationships requires a broad-
based approach to social change” (4), and McLaren’s 
book brings together many often-disconnected threads of 
philosophy: abstract and pragmatic, analytic and political, 
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systemic and small scale, global and local. This produces 
three central contributions of the book: a new approach to 
global issues she calls a feminist social justice approach; 
within that, a philosophy of relational cosmopolitanism; 
and an argument about the importance of women’s activist 
organizations to the achievement of feminist social justice, 
focusing on two local feminist organizations in order to 
illustrate her arguments. 
After setting out the framework of her argument, McLaren 
recounts her work with two feminist activist organizations 
in India, MarketPlace India and the Self-Employed Women’s 
Association in India (SEWA). She considers their practical 
work as a ground for feminist philosophy; perhaps even 
a kind of feminist philosophy in itself, but certainly as a 
touchstone for the political and practical importance of the 
philosophical points and arguments that she herself makes. 
In Chapters 2 through 4, McLaren then considers why
alternative approaches, particularly the human rights model,
the economic empowerment model, and mainstream
cosmopolitan models, are inadequate for the achievement
of social justice, particularly for women. Though human
rights approaches have produced many positive efects,
she argues, they also are problematic in their fundamental
assumptions (70), particularly their individualistic focus
rather than on “structures and systems” (67), leading to
reformism rather than wholesale systemic change. The “‘one
size fts all’ rubric” (58) and a focus on “legal and political”
rights undermine attention to “economic and social rights,”
which McLaren believes are particularly important to
women as “the largest majority of impoverished people,”
as well as social rights, particularly education, health, and
childcare, all of which are generally left aside (58). Although
some of these weaknesses can be addressed by expanding
the scope of rights, a deeper critique “that the rights
framework is imperialist [is] not so easily accommodated
within the liberal rights framework” (59). A focus on rights
also seems to be accompanied by implicit, and sometimes
explicit, arguments that human rights violations against
women, such as domestic violence, are the result of cultural
practices, reinscribing the colonialist move (62). 
While “empowerment” strategies focus on the economic 
issues that a human rights focus generally ignores, it 
too ignores other factors of structural equality that are 
particularly important to women themselves, such as 
their children’s education (119). Such models are also 
even more individualistic, operating within a neoliberal 
framework of individual responsibility and achievement 
while hypocritically deploying cultural norms against 
women, such as the “economy of shame” that microfnance 
institutions often rely on, whether by making communities 
fnancially responsible if an individual fails to repay a loan, 
or, as in Bangladesh, incarcerating women for loan default, 
which “results in a loss of virtue, according to cultural 
norms” (126). Such measures actually disempower women 
in ways that do not get measured. 
Cosmopolitanism as it is generally envisioned similarly 
fails women. Often asserted as a counter to nationalism, 
its view that we are citizens of the world and that we 
have a moral obligation to care for strangers, viz. people 
of other nations, depends on a western view of abstract 
humanism and universal capabilities and similarities. It 
does this by asserting universal principles of justice and 
equity that are to be applied to everyone around the 
globe regardless of the specifc situation of the country in 
which they live and the values of their national heritage. 
So, diference is tangential, and what is more important is 
that everyone is fundamentally the same, with the same 
rights and entitlements. For McLaren, such accounts 
of cosmopolitanism fail because their “commitment 
to hyperindividualism, abstraction, idealization, and 
acontextuality overemphasizes certain features of humans 
and limits itself to addressing moral obligations outside of 
actual circumstances of inequality and power diferences” 
(150). They also smuggle in imperialist ideas in imposing 
western liberalism and ideals onto other contexts. 
McLaren presents as an alternative to these approaches 
a powerful argument for gender inequality that she calls 
a “feminist social justice approach” (5). This approach not 
only follows the common feminist norm of recognizing the 
link between theory and practice, grounding her normative 
arguments in not only ethical ideals but in the lived 
experiences of women. It also seeks to link a structural 
understanding of injustice to local instances of its practice. 
Her argument thereby seeks to link the normative to the 
economic to the political to the social; and it is not only 
transnational but also intersectional because gender 
always intersects with all other aspects of identity, such 
as race and ethnicity, nationality, economics, religion, 
cultural practices, motherhood, and other familial relations. 
But the intersectionality that McLaren takes up is not just 
in terms of the identities of women; rather, she considers 
the ways that structures of privilege and oppression work 
in intersectional ways. That is, although McLaren draws on 
the experiences of particular individuals who sit at diferent 
particular vectors of identity, she is interested in what Maria 
Lugones called “structural axes of oppression” in which 
these women live and act rather than their intersectional 
identities per se. In McLaren’s argument, intersectionality 
happens at the level of structure: systems are intersectional. 
A key dimension of the feminist social justice approach 
is relational cosmopolitanism, which starts from an 
assumption of common vulnerability and particularly a 
capacity to sufer. At the same time, it seeks to recognize 
and embrace diference, indeed treating it, as McLaren puts 
it, “as resources for mutual learning” (141). Her conception 
borrows from the thinking of Rabindranath Tagore, reading 
him through the lens of, and combining his ideas with, 
contemporary work in feminist philosophy and social theory. 
Taking as its starting point a long-established feminist norm 
of interdependence and relationality, popular in feminist 
thinking since at least Carol Gilligan’s groundbreaking work 
in the early 1980s which McLaren draws on (143), McLaren 
argues for a normative understanding of relationship 
building that is founded on principles of feminist solidarity: 
for McLaren, interdependence doesn’t just describe what 
we are, it should be our basic normative value. McLaren 
holds that working together across diferences is central 
to the development of our compassion for sufering and 
can help “expand moral imagination” (144). Relational 
cosmopolitanism afords an important advance on the 
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nationalism-cosmopolitanism debate, because it can help 
resist the close-mindedness and hostility to others, who 
are seen as competitors for resources, if not antagonists, 
that can characterize nationalist approaches; while at the 
same time providing greater nuance and complexity to the 
sometimes ham-fsted ideals of cosmopolitanism which 
often ends up simply imposing an obtuse form of western 
liberalism (thereby smuggling in a kind of nationalism). 
McLaren then turns to what a relational cosmopolitan 
approach can do to foster a feminist approach to 
social justice, and this turns on two key elements, one 
philosophical, one practical, but both ethical: responsibility 
and fair trade. She draws on a notion of responsibility 
as being responsive to others’ needs, rather than the 
“rights” model of responsibility as taking credit or blame 
for something—a view that she borrows from Iris Young 
but in fact goes directly to Gilligan’s own view originally 
introduced in In a Diferent Voice. But we understand 
her attribution of this model to Young when she seeks to 
identify a weakness of Young’s distinction between social 
responsibility and political responsibility, a distinction that 
Gilligan herself does not make. McLaren notes that these 
two “kinds” of responsibility are intimately related, applying 
the keen feminist insight that the social is political, the 
personal is political, the familial is political, the community 
is political. She attributes to Young the insights that political 
responsibility starts from the idea that we are connected 
through our social and economic arrangements; and that 
political responsibility is a matter of gradation—some are 
more clearly and directly responsible than others. She 
deploys these ideas to engage with questions of how to 
alter structural injustice. 
This leads to McLaren’s argument in favor of fair trade, 
which entails the decision of consumers to purchase 
products that operate within a recognized Fair Trade 
framework. At frst, this might seem like an anemic ending 
to McLaren’s ambitious call for structural change, for many 
tend to think of it as an individualist consumerist action 
well within the frame of global capital. Many even dismiss 
Fair Trade as a neoliberal dodge that cannot produce any 
fundamental or systemic changes. But McLaren disagrees, 
arguing that even as we advocate for structural change, 
individuals must make moral choices in their day to day 
lives. She points out that individual acts support (or fail to 
support) larger structures. To reject Fair Trade “obscures 
the connection between collective political actions aimed 
at changing unjust structures and intentional, politically 
informed ethical choices” (226). And it is positive action, not 
negative. For instance, boycotts of products made through 
exploitive labor are often seen as efective, as corporations 
are more likely to respond to consumers “voting with their 
feet.” McLaren points out, however, the problematic aspect 
of boycotts, in that exploited workers are in many cases 
worse of if they have no income than if they work under 
exploitive conditions. She draws on protests against Nike’s 
use of sweatshop as a better model of organized action 
against the structure, because through massive popular 
protests the threat of a boycott motivated Nike to change 
labor practices so that the exploitive conditions ended 
and workers kept their jobs under better conditions. But 
even well-organized boycotts are not enough; we also 
need to advocate for an alternative structure of work, labor 
and production. We must act materially, not just through 
protest. 
Fair Trade provides such alternative structures, and 
purchasing such products not only helps individual 
workers but the alternative economic structure in which 
they work as well. Thus, McLaren also advocates support 
of cooperatives, in which members share collectively in 
the profts, and receive social dividends in that a portion 
of profts go to collective goods like improving roads. 
We need to support alternative structures to top down 
capitalist corporations, and Fair Trade can be a way that 
westerners, who still need to feed and clothe themselves, 
can help promote these alternative structures. If protests 
and boycott threats lead Nike to stop sweat shop practices, 
that’s good; but just continuing to buy from Nike instead 
of switching to Fair Trade organizations where possible 
doesn’t help change the structure. We have to pursue both 
the individual and structural, because individuals have to 
work toward something, not just against. McLaren notes 
that “feminists who support these organizations through 
buying their products, political advocacy, and their own 
eforts to change unjust laws, policies, and social norms 
. . . engage in a type of multilevel, multifaceted political 
solidarity that recognizes that women’s struggles difer in 
diferent social and national contexts, while they are also 
linked through transnational structural injustice” (194-95). 
So, it’s not enough to buy fair trade cofee, we also have 
to urge our stores to supply more Fair Trade products, and 
we have to lobby our government for policies and laws 
that support fair economic trade. “As consumers, we are 
implicated in systems of unjust production, and both our 
individual choices and collective political actions matter” 
(203). 
It is difcult not to be somewhat cynical about this last 
argument; most of the people who buy $3 T-shirts at 
Walmart do so not just because they happen to like cheap 
merchandise but because it is the only way to make their 
budgets work. Fair Trade consumerism is decidedly an 
upper-middle class undertaking. But that is not a reason 
for such people not to practice it. For those with more 
resources have greater responsibility for social action. We 
need not only to recognize how structures must be changed 
to produce more socially just outcomes; we also need to 
recognize who is most capable of changing injustice and 
put the pressure on those entities (such as multinational 
corporations) to efect these changes (194). Thus, those 
with economic privilege, including feminist philosophers, 
have more responsibility to engage in fair trade practices 
and promote structural change in other ways. Transnational 
feminist solidarity is an ethical commitment; feminists of 
the global North have an ethical obligation to support Fair 
Trade practices and workers’ cooperatives. 
This broad overview does not do the argument justice, and 
I have run out of room in this review to discuss McLaren’s 
support of cooperatives over micro-fnancing, the examples 
that she provides through her work with MarketPlace India 
and SEWA, both of which are cooperative organizations, and 
many fner, more specifc aspects of McLaren’s nuanced, 
passionate, and persuasive argument. I found this book 
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well-structured, -written, and -argued. McLaren’s critiques 
of the shortcomings of existing models are very efective, 
and her conception of relational cosmopolitanism is very 
provocative, an important concept that is greatly needed 
in the debates over globalization, worthy of future research 
and debate. I used this book in a mixed under/graduate 
seminar in feminist theory last spring and they found 
the argument provocative and engaging, and the book 
enjoyable to read. Highly recommended. 
Feminist Trouble: Intersectional Politics 
in Post-Secular Times 
Éléonore Lépinard (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2020). 336 pp. $29.95. ISBN: 978-0190077167. 
Reviewed by Joan Eleanor O’Bryan 
STANFORD UNIVERSITY 
Who is feminism for? The question reverberates frightfully 
in feminist discourse. Despite decades of theorizing that 
the unifed feminist subject is an impossibility (given 
diferences in race, class, sexuality, etc.), the question 
remains all too relevant in praxis—much to the detriment of 
the movement as a whole. Or at least, so argues Éléonore 
Lépinard in her new book, Feminist Trouble: Intersectional 
Politics in Post-Secular Times. 
The tendency of feminists to rely on such a question, 
according to Lépinard, is a dangerous one: it results in 
an ethical stance in which we are liable to judge people 
as being “good or bad feminist subjects” (11). It is those 
judgments—particularly on the part of white feminists— 
which have supported the rise of “femonationalism”—a 
phenomenon referring to the way that governments have 
justifed anti-immigration and Islamophobic policies in the 
name of women’s equality. 
Instead of asking the “subject” question (who is feminism 
for?), Lépinard posits that we ought to be asking a 
“relational” question (with whom am I in community?). 
Drawing on Joan Tronto’s ethic of care, Lépinard defnes 
feminism as “a project to care for those who could be part 
of this political community, who are put in relation with 
it through their claims or the claims that are made about 
them in the name of feminism” (231). 
Lépinard’s theory emerges from her empirical research, an 
attempt to ensure that her book is “grounded in the social 
and power relations that shape feminist communities” 
(14). This takes the form of a comparative study of feminist 
organizations in France and Quebec. There are two parts 
to this endeavor: frst, an archival research project, tracing 
the histories of feminist organizations in the two nations; 
and second, a series of ethnographic interviews with white 
and racialized1 feminists on racism, organizing, and the 
relationship between religion and contemporary feminism. 
It is in Lépinard’s delineation of her empirical fndings that 
her book’s greatest strengths and also weaknesses manifest 
themselves. Most interesting is her discussion of the impact 
of diferent national backgrounds on feminist praxis in 
each respective nation. Both Quebec and France exhibited 
similar national discourses regarding the relationship 
between the state and local religious minorities, largely of 
immigrant-background. A large proportion of the discussion 
centered on the roles and rights of religious women in 
public life, with a signifcant proportion of (usually white) 
feminists—or feminist-coopters—seeing Islam in particular 
as incompatible with women’s emancipation. These 
“sexcularism” debates raged not only nationally but also 
within women’s organizations, creating room for coalition 
or schism within feminist groups. 
Feminist organizations in Quebec and France, though 
sharing much in the way of background ideology and 
culture, manifested starkly diferent responses to the 
sexcularism discourse. In Quebec, racialized feminists 
were able to make their voices heard, and acting in 
coalition with white feminists, were able to speak out on 
behalf of religious accommodation and against the racism 
and Islamophobia they saw as intrinsic to such legislation 
as the prohibition of facial veils. Though their eforts were 
not perfect, Lépinard argues that the leading Quebec 
feminist organization was able to “keep a critical distance 
from femonationalist discourses” (61). In France, however, 
no such distance was achieved. The leading feminist 
organization’s response to various instances of racism and 
femo-nationalism, in particular those in national policy, 
was so disappointing to French racialized feminists that it 
resulted in uproar and schism. 
Lépinard credits the diference between the two nations to 
three key factors: 1) the strength of racialized women’s self-
organizing; 2) the relationship between feminist groups 
and the broader left; and 3) the history of institutional 
relationships within umbrella organizations with groups 
representing racial minorities. The frst and third factors 
seem relatively self-explanatory; it makes sense that 
stronger organization on the part of racialized feminists 
and patterns of positive interaction between white and 
racialized feminists would ensure that voices of color be 
elevated during these debates. But the second factor was 
surprising, and deserves further attention. 
The two dominant women’s organizations Lépinard 
discusses, the Fédération des femmes du Québec (FFQ) 
in Quebec and the Collectif national pour les droits 
des femmes (CNDF) in France, faced diferent political 
landscapes, which resulted in their respective abilities to 
engage with racial and religious diferences. As Lépinard 
describes, in Quebec during and immediately after the 
FFQ’s founding, the left—and in particular the radical 
left—was decidedly weak. As a result, the FFQ’s early 
institutionalization and activism made it a powerful force 
within leftist politics. The organization thus emerged both 
relatively autonomous vis-à-vis other movements as well 
as infuential, with left-wing parties in Quebecois politics 
headed by former FFQ members. 
The CNDF in France, on the other hand, never had the 
opportunity to grow in strength and autonomy in the 
manner of the FFQ. Lépinard analyses how CNDF’s roots 
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grew in the radical/class struggle of the French second-
wave feminist movement, meaning that its leadership and 
members attempt to address class and sex oppression 
jointly, “a strategy that put them in constant relation to 
leftist politics, trying to convince leftist organizations and 
unions to include a gender perspective while attempting 
to also exist on their own and to forge coalitions with the 
radical feminists” (76). Unlike the FFQ, the CNDF comprises 
representatives of political parties and unions, meaning 
that the infuence tends to be from outside-in, rather than 
the reverse. So, whereas the FFQ found the left a source 
of sustenance, rather than competition, the CNDF found 
itself struggling for power. This point matters because 
“the competition of the women’s liberation movement 
[the CNDF] with radical-left politics during the second 
wave encouraged white feminists to frame their claims 
as universal in order to resist the tendency in radical-left 
politics to sideline gender issues” (64). Because the FFQ 
did not face the same pressure, it could invest political 
energy into diferentiation among women. 
Lépinard’s archival analysis is fascinating and enlightening. 
Less convincing, however, are the conclusions she 
draws from her ethnographic work. Generally speaking, 
ethnography is hard to do well. The methodology is 
most useful when it points us to what Ian Shapiro calls 
“problematizing redescriptions”—“accounts of political 
phenomena that destabilize the lens through which we 
traditionally study them, engendering novel questions and 
exposing new avenues of moral concern.”2 Ethnography 
is thus most productive when it uncovers for us new 
ways of thinking, valuing, or perceiving old phenomena. 
The problem with using ethnography as evidence for 
established fact—such as the fact that white feminists 
often discriminate morally and politically against feminists 
of color—is that a theorist is likely to fall into the well-
recognized traps of the empirical researcher: frst, the 
propensity to over-extrapolate and generalize from small 
samples, and second, the desire to fnd what it is she’s 
looking for.
Although Lépinard is keen to demonstrate that she 
does not fall prey to such temptations, she cannot help 
but extrapolate beyond what her data can ofer. For 
instance, although she provides the requisite caveat that 
her interviews do not “exhaust the variation of feminist 
whiteness,” nor are they “representative of the diversity of 
white feminists,” she writes as though she has uncovered 
the true “essence” of the phenomenon (85). Occasionally 
she makes it explicit: in a footnote, she states that her 
interviews are “representative of how feminism is made 
white” (emphasis added, 284). Furthermore, her analysis 
“charts a general evolution in feminist whiteness” (19). 
This seems a stretch. From a small selection of views, 
she constructs a supposed ideal type—the means by 
which feminism is made white—and seeks to defne it 
comprehensively. This goes beyond what ethnography can 
rightly claim to do. 
The second, and more troubling, trap which ethnographers 
must fear is the tendency of the researcher to impose 
her own normative framework upon her subjects. When 
Lépinard engages in such behavior I become suspicious 
not only of her methodology, but of her normative project 
as a whole: that moving from a subject-based approach 
to a relational one will help prevent white feminists from 
judging, othering, or excluding feminists of color. 
Take for instance, her interview with three racialized 
feminists in France regarding legislation prohibiting the 
veil. Mariam is an immigrant from Mali in her ffties, Samira 
is another woman of presumably middle age (she was an 
adult during the Algerian civil war in the early 1990s, though 
she had immigrated to France by that point), and Maleiha 
leads an organization of lesbians of color in Paris. All three 
have lived experience dealing with oppression, racism, and 
the struggles of immigration. All three, also, are against 
veiling. Although united in opposition to the legislation, 
the three women see veiling as detrimental to women, 
and in particular to Muslim women born in France, as they 
highlight that veiling is a cultural, not religious, tradition. 
Given especially their experiences in environments in which 
veiling has not necessarily been an autonomous decision 
on the part of participants (149), they understandably see 
the issue as one of complexity. Lépinard, however, reads 
them as essentially brainwashed by white ideology: 
Despite the fact that the three interviewees 
disapprove of the 2004 and 2010 bans, the needs 
and rights of veiled women are not put at the 
center of their critical analysis of the law. These 
discourses testify to the strength of hegemonic 
discourses in the French public sphere about 
secularism as necessary to emancipate women, 
and about the veil as a sign of oppression (148). 
Implicit in this discussion is exactly the kind of judgement 
Lépinard thinks she can avoid: these are “bad” feminists. 
Who then does Lépinard approve of? Sandra, a young 
activist who came of age as a feminist in the early 2010s, 
has the “right” political opinion. When asked about veiling, 
she responds: “What is emancipation? It goes back to a 
simple question: well, is a woman free to choose how she 
dresses, what she wears?” (150). For Sandra, there is no 
complexity. It’s “simple.” Ignoring background conditions, 
national discourses, and the lived experience of immigrant 
and other women, she expounds in the abstract: feminism is 
all about free choice. That this tenet of liberal feminism has 
been criticized since Simone de Beauvoir and before is of 
no import. On this banal statement, Lépinard waxes poetic, 
admiring how Sandra’s statement “expresses not only a 
political will for inclusion, but also a desire for relationality 
with those supposedly abject feminist subjects, a will 
and a wish to expand the boundaries of feminism’s moral 
universe and its promise of treating equally its members” 
(150). 
Lépinard, despite her theoretical wish to remove the judging 
of “good” and “bad” feminists from the political project, 
so easily slips into their implications. One cannot help but 
read this chapter as follows. The middle-aged women, 
with all their experience and knowledge, are presumed to 
neglect those with whom they claim to be in community. 
They are “bad” feminist subjects. The young woman, on the 
other hand, who states the beliefs that Lépinard happens 
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to hold, is a “good” subject. Is this treating all who make 
feminist claims as political equals? 
Indeed, it isn’t only the author’s inability to maintain her 
own approach which results in my skepticism; the entire 
thesis has troubling implications. The idea that anyone who 
makes a claim under a feminist banner is therefore to be 
treated as my political equal and joint compatriot in the 
political project strikes me as naive, to say the least. Do 
Phyllis Schafy and Sarah Palin’s causes become feminist by 
their claims or by the claims that are made about them “in 
the name of feminism”? What about men’s rights activists? 
There are good reasons to be discriminating in determining 
what indeed advances the cause of feminism, and what— 
and who—does not. 
In order to do so, it will require messy, confictual, and 
difcult organizing, engaging with those within and 
outside the feminist project. It will require exactly the kind 
of work and analysis Lépinard so deftly engages in during 
her archival exploration. It will be painful, and it will be 
complicated, and it will require choosing between good 
and bad feminists, the same way we choose between good 
and bad socialists, good and bad democrats—exorcising 
those “false friends,” as Lorna Finlayson so aptly puts it: 
the Sarah Palins, Phyllis Schafys, and others who advocate 
policies which harm more than they help. 
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Entitled: How Male Privilege Hurts Women 
Kate Manne (Penguin Random House, 2020). 288 pp. $27.00 
ISBN: 978-1984826558. 
Reviewed by Vanessa Wills 
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
Kate Manne’s Entitled: How Male Privilege Hurts Women
takes up some of the central themes that animated her 2017, 
Down Girl. Where her frst book is a conceptual analysis 
of misogyny, Manne’s more recent book is presented 
as a series of case studies of particular manifestations 
of misogyny. These treatments of various misogynistic 
encounters illuminate what Manne refers to as “male 
privilege”—a phenomenon that encourages men to feel 
“entitled” to various goods and services from women, with 
these goods being often sexual or emotional in nature. 
Entitled inherits many of the strengths of Down Girl and 
expands the picture; it also leaves open some questions 
that were raised by the earlier text. 
Misogyny, we should remember from Down Girl, is, on 
Manne’s view, not most fruitfully thought of as a kind of 
inner hateful feeling inside men’s hearts. Rather, on Manne’s 
account, misogyny is “best conceptualized as the ‘law 
enforcement’ branch of patriarchy—a system that functions 
to police and enforce gendered norms and expectations, 
and involves girls and women facing disproportionately 
or distinctively hostile treatment because of their gender, 
among other factors” (7). For Manne, misogyny is a means 
of policing women for their perceived failures to render 
unto men what is theirs. One of Entitled’s contributions is 
to ofer a catalog of the occasions upon which misogyny’s 
policing function may be deployed. 
Understanding misogyny in this way allows us to avoid 
trivial back-and-forth about whether any particular man 
actually hates women in his heart of hearts—a debate that 
in most cases can never be adequately settled, that ofers 
too much obscurantist plausible deniability to apparently 
misogynistic men, and that adds little to our ability to 
theorize the central question of oppression as experienced 
from the point of view of the oppressed person. That men’s 
experiences are more often centered in our collective 
social imagination is itself a manifestation of misogyny— 
”himpathy,” a term Manne coined in Down Girl. Manne’s 
account of misogyny helps us to reorient our attention from 
men’s motivations to women’s experiences of gendered 
mistreatment and to fnd out what can be learned from this 
shift of perspective. 
Entitled opens with the reader called upon to gaze, with 
their mind’s eye, upon an image: the sullen, bright red 
face of then-Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh. It 
is a face twisted in rageful resentment that in being vetted 
to determine his ftness for a seat on the highest court 
in the land, he might be called to account for his alleged 
commission of sexual assault against Christine Blasey Ford 
when both were teenagers moving in the same social 
circles of an afuent DC suburb. 
Rhetorically, this beginning reminds one of the cinematic 
device in which the camera looks frst through a keyhole, 
one’s gaze tightly narrowed to a specifc object that serves 
as the point of reference for all that follows as the frame 
widens and the feld of vision expands. 
Manne describes Kavanaugh as “a picture of entitlement.” 
What do we see in that picture? Kavanaugh is angry, white, 
cisgender, afuent, powerful, and protected. Ford, also 
white, afuent, and established in her professional career, 
is not without her own enjoyment of social privilege— 
indeed it is this positionality that likely accounts for some 
of the courage she exhibited on the stand and for her 
having gained any standing for her claims at all. However, 
Ford has one obvious social disadvantage with respect 
to Kavanaugh: he is a man and she is a woman. As a 
woman, far from having access to the sort of shielding and 
protection that Kavanaugh experienced, Ford was driven 
from her home by relentless violent threats against her and 
her family—punishment for speaking out as a victim—and 
as of the time of this writing, she has not yet been able to 
return. 
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Manne’s invocation of the confrontation between 
Kavanaugh and Ford as a touchstone and framing device 
allows us to focus on one centrally salient fact about the 
feld of the confict—the disparity between how men and 
women are treated and, accordingly, how little men’s 
treatment of women seems to matter. At the same time, it 
is also indicative of an inherent “whiteness”—and cisness, 
straightness, etc.—of male entitlement as it is theorized in 
Entitled. 
In her contribution to a print symposium on Down Girl
that appeared in the journal Signs, Peggy McIntosh noted, 
“most men of color cannot show they feel entitled in public 
without being seen as a threat.”1 In response, Manne 
clarifed that it is already part of her view that Black men, 
for example, typically do not experience male privilege 
and entitlement in the way that white men do. Manne 
writes, “male privilege is only enjoyed in full by white, 
heterosexual, cis, wealthy, and nondisabled men.”2 The 
suggestion then, is that to the extent that a man is removed 
from this hierarchical social ideal, he enjoys male privilege 
to an accordingly lesser extent than do men who are white, 
straight, cis, afuent, nondisabled, etc. 
One question we might ask is whether it is the case that 
the experiences of marginalized men are diferent from 
privileged white men’s principally in degree when it comes 
to their enjoyment of male privilege or their lack thereof. 
We might alternatively wonder whether the experiences of 
marginalized men are sufciently diferent in kind that we 
might ask, why refer to the object of analysis here as “male
privilege,” at all? Might there be greater utility found in a 
term that more clearly encapsulates or signals the role of the 
full complement of privileges which combine to produce 
the particularly noxious brand of hubristic entitlement one 
fnds in a fgure such as Brett Kavanaugh? 
As it happens, I think, with Manne, that there are indeed 
excellent reasons to speak of various forms of identity-
based privilege that track a range of mutually determining 
and often simultaneously operative social hierarchies, 
“male privilege” being one of them. As modern “western” 
conceptions of gender are themselves essentially shaped 
by colonialism and white supremacy, it is not surprising that 
speaking of “maleness” would always already implicate 
one in a range of other related identity discourses. And 
the notion that full enjoyment of male privilege involves 
the enjoyment of a whole host of other privileges does not 
itself make the concept any worse of than, for example, 
“white privilege,” which we might also say is conditioned 
by a number of other complicating identity factors. 
Yet, it seems to me to matter that white privilege discourse 
is typically rooted in the experience of poor and working-
class people—especially, of encounters between poor and 
working-class Blacks and members of the so-called “white 
working class.” That is to say, in thinking about white 
privilege, the image with which we begin is generally not 
of a white person who is extraordinarily afuent and in 
possession of all that the full suite of hierarchies of social 
privilege has to ofer. Rather, white privilege is specifcally 
conceived as a way of making sense of how working-
class whites come to see themselves as having a stake in 
a system of racial capitalism that otherwise ofers them 
rather little. White privilege can’t be—and for the most part, 
hasn’t been—theorized in a way that takes its paradigmatic
expression to be of privilege along one vector of identity 
that is enhanced by privilege associated with every other 
identity marker, as well. 
One way in which this might matter is in its implications 
for our ethical responses to the sense of “entitlement” that 
can accommodate various varieties of privilege. Rageful 
entitlement and prideful sense of injury is obviously 
objectionable in the case of an elite, overly privileged 
blowhard such as Kavanaugh. His sense of entitlement is 
problematic and of-putting because it seems grotesque 
and insatiable, extending well beyond the bounds of what 
is seemly for any one person to seek for themselves, and 
apparently failing to respect the rights and boundaries 
of others around him (which is to say, even if we were to 
claim agnosticism about whether he committed the acts of 
which Ford accused him, we are still left with the fact that 
he made it plain to see that he had no respect for her right 
and standing even to be heard). 
There are, generally speaking, at least two ways in which 
a sense of entitlement might be inappropriate. It might 
be a sense of over-entitlement, a conviction that one 
is owed much more than one is in fact actually owed. It 
might also get things wrong about against whom that claim 
of entitlement is appropriately made. It has been noted 
before that when we think of white privilege, what we 
have in mind is typically a combination of genuinely racist 
domination and some rather reasonable claims to which 
one might truly be entitled: the right not to experience 
prejudice on the basis of one’s skin color, the right to be 
treated fairly in a court of law, etc. 
Although some of the rhetorical force of Manne’s use of the 
term, “entitled” derives from the pejorative connotations 
that the word has taken on in contemporary parlance, it 
is clear that as an ethical concept, she takes entitlement 
itself to be neutral. She speaks, for example, in the closing 
chapter, of her daughter’s “warranted entitlement” to 
bodily autonomy, to fallibility, to epistemic justice, and so 
on. Manne writes, “Entitlement, as I’ve written about it in 
these pages, has most often referred to some people’s 
undue sense of what they deserve or are owed by others. 
But, for all that, entitlement is not a dirty word: entitlements 
can be genuine, valid, justifed” (186). 
The entitlements Manne lists for her daughter (for any girl 
or woman), further include the entitlement “to be cared 
for, soothed, nurtured” (188). This is of course, a normal 
and reasonable human want. It is also, needless to say, 
an inherently social one that requires for its satisfaction 
another person who is willing to care, nurture, and soothe. 
As in my experience of engaging with Down Girl, I found 
myself wondering how bringing the concept of “alienation” 
into conversation with Manne’s approach might help us 
make sense of some of the problems and scenarios that 
she brings to our attention. I am especially put in mind 
of Marx’s 1844 manuscript, “The Power of Money,” which 
concludes thus: 
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Assume man to be man and his relationship to the 
world to be a human one: then you can exchange 
love only for love, trust for trust, etc. [. . .] If you 
love without evoking love in return—that is, if 
your loving as loving does not produce reciprocal 
love; if through a living expression of yourself as a 
loving person you do not make yourself a beloved 
one, then your love is impotent—a misfortune.3 
Incels, such as the misogynist serial killer Elliot Rodger, 
whom Manne discusses as a case of “entitlement to 
admiration,” claim to want love, care, and yes, sex, but 
see themselves as locked out of an economy of wealth 
and physical attractiveness that unlocks access to human 
connection. They rebel against this with the insistence that 
they deserve intimacy from the women of their choice just 
on the basis of existing. It is tempting to say that they see 
women as objects, but it is probably more accurate to say 
they mostly understand that women are not objects, and 
resent it. 
We live in a world that largely denies people meaning, 
belonging, and authentic human connection. Manne 
concludes Entitled with refections on how she will raise her 
daughter to survive in a world that expects women to pick 
up the slack for this in their individual interactions with men. 
These refections mark, Manne writes, a personal transition 
between the more pessimistic Down Girl (which ends with 
a meditation on Shel Silverstein’s The Giving Tree), and the 
moderately more hopeful Entitled. Still, Manne shares, she 
has “tremendous difculty picturing a world in which girls 
and women can reliably lay claim to what they are entitled 
to, let alone one in which they get it” (192). 
Of course—especially from our historical vantagepoint 
as women have experienced tremendous reversals and 
setbacks due in large part to the COVID-19 pandemic and 
governments’ insistence on placing as much of the social 
burden onto the domestic caregiving space as possible— 
this is certainly fair enough. I’ll suggest, though, that 
Entitled, which begins with a scowling, extremely privileged 
white man and closes in contemplation of the life of a baby 
girl, also white and born into numerous forms of privilege, 
valuably demonstrates the contours, possibilities, and
political limitations of “white” liberal feminist approaches 
in the contemporary moment. 
Manne herself is aware of such limitations, always clear
that a full accounting of sexism and women’s oppression
necessarily requires a broad and diverse array of voices, of
which hers is but one. And yet in engaging with Entitled, I
at times found myself almost preferring the pessimism of
Down Girl’s dark ending, which ofered not even a glimpse
of a way out. That is not because I think it is unreasonable
to have fghting spirit—I certainly don’t. Much less still do
I wish for Manne to be without it! But there is a tension
here worth naming: to create a world without misogyny will
require tearing down many features of our society that, to
women most likely to share social space with especially
privileged men, might seem worth keeping. The solution
to women’s oppression in elite spaces doesn’t exist as
such because in a world without women’s oppression, that
particular problem and those elite spaces don’t exist, either. 
A world without the unbridled male entitlement Kavanaugh 
enjoys would be a world in which his social stratum simply 
isn’t there; we can scarcely imagine such a world from 
the point of view of the women Kavanaugh encounters 
in his social sphere because they—qua highly privileged 
women except, largely speaking, for their experience of 
gender oppression—wouldn’t exist there, either. And so 
a perspective on misogyny from the social position of 
those with hardly any social privileges at all is not just a 
complement to more elite women’s perspectives but itself 
often a corrective; it can shed light not only on the social 
meaning of oppression in the lives of severely marginalized 
people but also ofer greater clarity on the nature of 
oppression in elite spaces. 
Manne writes, 
Hope, to me, is a belief that the future will be 
brighter, which I continue not to set much store 
in. But the idea of fghting for a better world—and, 
equally importantly, fghting against backsliding— 
is not a belief; it’s a political commitment that I can 
get on board with. (185) 
Such commitment is laudable and necessary, especially if 
it presages an even more pugnacious and critical turn in 
Manne’s theorization of misogyny. Entitled concretizes the 
themes of Down Girl and also reads as a transitional work: 
the embers of fghting spirit, Manne reports, are only newly 
lit. I am eager to see how their glow helps shape future 
directions in her contributions to the struggle against 
women’s oppression. 
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Irigaray and Politics: A Critical 
Introduction 
Laura Roberts (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2019). 224 pages. £24.99. ISBN Paperback: 978-1474422826 
Hardback: 978-1474422819. 
Reviewed by Fulden İbrahimhakkıoğlu 
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY, FULDEN@METU.EDU.TR 
Laura Roberts’s Irigaray and Politicssituates the contributions 
of the French feminist philosopher and psychoanalyst Luce 
Irigaray within the larger framework of political theory and 
ponders the social and political resonance of her ideas in 
a globalizing world. As the reader progresses through the 
chapters, it becomes more and more apparent that Roberts’s 
inquiry into the larger political signifcance of Irigaray’s 
oeuvre is guided by a decolonial sensibility and meticulous 
attention to interlocking systems of oppression. Roberts 
PAGE 50 SPRING 2021 | VOLUME 20  | NUMBER 3 
















employs a feminist methodology in thinking through lived 
experience and social positionality. From the outset, she 
is explicit about the historical background that informs her 
engagement with Irigaray. She notes that witnessing the 
dismantling of apartheid as a white South African woman 
“provided a distinct, perhaps decolonial, lens through which 
[she] frst encountered Irigaray’s philosophy” (6). Roberts’s 
analysis through this lens ofers a refreshing approach to 
Irigaray’s intellectual heritage. She reads Irigaray’s work in 
conversation with some unlikely interlocutors, including 
but not limited to, Gayatri Spivak, Silvia Federici, and 
bell hooks, whose philosophical connections to Irigaray 
have thus far been underexplored. In this sense, Roberts 
makes an original contribution to the existing literature 
on Irigaray, while at the same time identifying, through 
an Irigarayan framework, the negligences of the political 
theory on the Left, which, she suggests, continues to be 
dominated by male thinkers residing in the West. “What’s 
left of the Left,” she writes, “misunderstands the feminist 
politics of experience; they fail to see the relevance of the 
politics of desire and the afrmation of alternative ways 
of becoming subjects” (ix). The book, in this way, seeks 
to fll an important gap, not only in Irigaray scholarship, 
but also in political theory at large, as the author rethinks 
some contemporary social movements from an Irigarayan 
lens. In this way, the book serves as a reminder of feminist 
“schemes, methods, practices of tactics” (ibid.) that bear 
on the political through an analysis that centralizes Irigaray 
but also goes beyond by way of reconsidering Irigaray’s 
work in the context of postcolonialism, globalization, and 
local struggles that seek to respond to global problems. 
Beginning from the question of sexual diference, Irigaray’s 
philosophical challenge, Roberts argues, “opens up new 
foundations and possibilities of rethinking politics based 
on relational sexuate subjects” (3). As a critique of the 
universal subject posited by Western philosophical and 
cultural traditions, Irigaray seeks to rethink subjectivity not 
through the model of oneness or sameness, but from out 
of sexuate diference or as she puts it, twoness. This move 
enables Roberts to envision other forms of relationality that 
would not be based on domination, to which the model of 
the universal subject is susceptible. That is to say, starting 
from this question of sexuate diference, one would be 
able to envision inclusion beyond assimilation. Arguing 
against reductionist readings of Irigaray that portray her 
as an essentialist, Roberts sets out to explore the nuances 
in Irigaray’s thinking on sexuate diference and the 
possibilities for radical social and political change that such 
thinking embodies. Roberts suggests that Irigaray seeks to 
bring out the diference (i.e. alterity) at the very heart of 
philosophy and politics, in an attempt to undermine the 
hegemony of the One—that is, the narcissistic sameness 
that permeates Western thought. This ontological 
challenge, as Roberts puts it, “gives rise to a politics of 
grace and wonder, requiring us to rethink our relations 
with one another, and to constantly push the boundaries, 
to crack open time and to invent the new” (6). The new, 
here, refers not only to new subjectivities, and accordingly, 
new ways of seeing, feeling, being, and relating; but also, 
as Roberts demonstrates later in the book, new ways of 
socially organizing and building pockets of resistance and 
communities of care. 
The frst chapter focuses on Irigaray’s ambivalent relation 
to psychoanalysis. While psychoanalysis can often serve as 
a tool to diagnose, classify, and treat individuals as part of 
the eforts toward regulation and normalization, Roberts’s 
engagement with Irigarayan psychoanalysis in this chapter 
shows that it can also be used for a cultural diagnosis or 
a symptomatology of a political kind, and thereby help 
facilitate social change. Roberts notes that, while Irigaray 
uses the conceptual tools that psychoanalysis ofers to 
bring sexuate diference to the fore, she is also highly critical 
of both Freud and Lacan, who defned “female sexuality 
as lacking” (27). At the end of this chapter, Roberts thus 
establishes an important and insightful connection between
Irigaray’s thought and contemporary decolonial philosophy.
She suggests that Irigaray’s diagnosis of Western culture as
“a culture of narcissism, supporting and supported by the
universal (masculine) narcissistic subject” (13) is analogous
to what bell hooks has called a “white supremacist capitalist
patriarchy” (32). “Contemporary decolonial philosophers,
in various ways,” she writes, “illustrate the connections
between world historical, socio-political events and how
these continue to enable epistemic privileging of the
phallocentric logic of western metaphysics which nurtures
this narcissistic subject that founds western metaphysics”
(35). Irigaray’s critique of western phallocentrism, in other
words, is amenable to a decolonial analysis. 
Roberts then goes on to explore imaginings of “an 
autonomous feminine subjectivity” (45) that would disrupt 
this culture of narcissism that privileges sameness. She 
suggests that Irigaray’s project is not only critical, but also 
creative: “Irigaray is concerned with creating a positive 
feminine symbolic and a feminine divine in order to bring 
about a feminine subjectivity that allows for a woman-
to-woman sociality in which women, as autonomous 
sexuate subjects, can relate to and love one another as 
sexuate subjects” (79). Defending Irigaray against common 
criticisms of essentialism, Roberts argues that rather than 
seeking to defne “woman,” Irigaray aims to open up the 
symbolic for women’s self-articulation that is yet to come. 
That is to say, Roberts suggests that Irigaray seeks to carve a 
space for the emergence of a new subjectivity (i.e. feminine 
subjectivity), which has previously been foreclosed under 
the hegemony of the One (i.e. masculine subjectivity that 
is accepted as universal). Feminine subjectivity, in this 
regard, is not something that is pre-given and waiting to be 
discovered, but rather something to be invented. 
Next, Roberts focuses on Irigaray’s later work which 
deals with questions around ethics. Taking, as a starting 
point, Irigaray’s ethics of relating to the other with love, 
attentiveness, responsivity, and wonder (instead of 
narcissistic arrogance), Roberts provides a sketch of an 
anti-imperialist ethics by engaging with Spivak’s Irigarayan 
ethics, where radical uncertainty and alterity are central 
to women’s solidarity. Bridging ethics and politics, the 
last chapter focuses on an Irigarayan approach to home, 
family, and community as political sites. In this chapter, 
Roberts explores the resonance of Marxist feminism in 
Irigaray’s thinking and considers social movements like 
municipalism that seek to reconfgure the aforementioned 
sites through a “feminisation of politics” (155)—that is, 
the valorization of feminine values, like attentiveness and 
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empathy, within the sphere of politics. Roberts concludes 
that Irigaray’s project is at once both philosophical and 
political: “It is a political-philosophical project, a politics 
that is founded upon the recognition of the sexuate 
other in the emergence of subjectivity, and gives rise to 
a politics of grace and wonder, and requires the courage 
to step into the unknown, to push the boundaries to crack 
open time and to invent the new” (159). Here Roberts’s 
analysis presents a novel way of thinking about Irigaray’s 
critical/creative political-philosophical project by drawing 
connections with contemporary social movements. These 
connections help ground the theory and render it concrete 
and historically situated for the readers. 
Roberts’s analysis presents the complexity of Irigaray’s 
ideas in a clear, nuanced way. This thoughtful treatment of 
Irigaray, however, is not mirrored by an equally attentive 
consideration of Irigaray’s use of language in complex, 
obscure, metaphorical, and performative ways –especially 
in her earlier writings– that seek to disrupt and undermine 
the phallocentric symbolic order and give birth to the 
new. Of course, Roberts does not altogether overlook the 
signifcance of style: “Irigaray’s poetic and dialogic writing 
style mimics the qualities of fuidity and openness she 
sees connected to the feminine body” (87). This, however, 
is the extent to which the book explores the role of style in 
Irigaray’s thought, which seems like a missed opportunity. 
A more elaborate take on the ways in which Irigaray uses 
language in captivating ways, performing the very thought 
she seeks out to explore by way of taking the reader on 
an imaginative journey through her poetic style of writing 
would have further strengthened Roberts’s argument 
about the role of the critical/creative in Irigaray’s political-
philosophical project. 
Grounding Irigaray’s thought in political action is an 
important strength of the book. Bridging theory and praxis, 
Roberts’s narrative moves from the question of sexuate 
diference to subjectivity and imagination, from questions 
around ethics to postcolonialism, women’s solidarity, and 
social movements. More than an eloquent introduction 
to Irigaray’s thought, then, Roberts’s book seeks to make 
insightful connections between these diferent felds and 
bodies of literature. It thereby establishes much needed 
dialogues between Irigaray, decolonial thought, and 
political activism. 
Roberts’s analysis also ofers important responses to one 
of the most common criticisms raised against Irigaray: that 
of essentialism. Roberts writes: 
Irigaray is well aware of the lived diferences 
between women, and her argument for sexuate 
rights is not an attempt to cover over diferences, 
or ignore diferences between women. Rather we 
must read this as part of the mediations necessary 
for feminine subjectivity, woman-as-subject, in 
all her diferent ways of being, to emerge. We 
require new myths, new ontological structures, 
new religions, new politics, and we require new 
laws.” (83) 
While I fnd Roberts’s reading of Irigaray as a non-
essentialist helpful, I also wonder whether replacing One 
(the subject of narcissism) with Two would prove adequate 
when it comes to the oppressiveness of the binary system 
of gender. Would it be possible, I wonder, to take up these 
notions of fuidity and diference beyond the masculine/ 
feminine dyad? To take the question a step further, would 
it be possible, at all, to queer Irigaray? Sexual diference, 
after all, is not synonymous with sexual multiplicity, and the 
signifcance of this distinction may serve to make Irigaray 
relevant to queer politics. It would be worthwhile, I think, 
to push the question of sexual diference a step further 
and think about the possibility of an Irigarayan ethics and 
politics beyond the gender binary. 
Throughout the book, Roberts ofers a compelling analysis 
that establishes novel connections between Irigaray’s 
thought and various other fgures within political theory, like 
hooks, Spivak, and Federici. In this way, the book identifes 
and responds to important gaps in Irigaray scholarship and 
ventures into hitherto unchartered territories. Roberts’s 
account is a clear and concrete take on a complex, difcult 
thinker, which makes this book a good ft for both specialists 
and non-specialists. While making important contributions 
to Irigaray scholarship, thanks to its clear style of writing 
and conciseness, Irigaray and Politics would equally be 
suited for consideration in undergraduate seminars. 
Roberts’s book both provides a clear introduction to 
Irigaray’s thought and ofers space to expand the larger 
signifcance of the conceptual toolbox ofered by Irigaray’s 
writings. In this sense, it speaks to Irigaray scholars, political 
activists, and those who are unfamiliar with Irigaray’s work 
alike. Roberts somehow manages to render Irigaray’s 
thought concrete and accessible, without diminishing 
her philosophical complexity. While she makes a valuable 
contribution to scholarship by rethinking Irigaray in the 
postcolonial context, it is clear that Roberts’s engagement 
also resonates well beyond the confnes of academia. 
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